Think about what? Representationalism makes perfect sense metaphysically, which just indicates an logically necessary method describing how our intellect works. But to think about how the brain as a physical substance works, as that by which our intellect is possible, representationalism wouldn’t even be a theoretical condition, hence wouldn’t make any sense to include it in an empirical descriptive method. — Mww
a tacit admission that whatever is said from a purely speculative point of view, sufficient for us to comprehend what it is we do with our intelligence, cannot possibly be the method the brain, in and of itself, actually uses to provide it. — Mww
Representationalism makes perfect sense metaphysically, which just indicates an logically necessary method describing how our intellect works. — Mww
Right, but the direct/indirect realism discussion is also commonly framed in terms of whether we directly perceive real objects or whether we instead directly perceive a representation or other perceptual intermediary (and only indirectly perceive real objects). I reject that we perceive a mental representation and say that we directly perceive real objects.
As stated earlier, I think the naive realist position is based on the misguided notion that when we perceive a real object we perceive the world in itself (or somehow identify the perception with the object). A perception that is identical with its object is not really a perception at all; it is the object.
The indirect realist opposes the naive realist position, saying that we do not directly perceive a real object but that we directly perceive only a mental representation of the real object.
I reject the direct realist notion that to perceive a real object is to perceive the world in itself (or that our perceptions are identical with the perceived object) and the indirect realist notion that we directly perceive only mental representations of real objects. Instead, I say that our perception of real objects is direct (in a non-naive sense) because perceptions are mental representations.
Our own notions of representations will constantly come up against fuzziness and exceptions to rules. All this suggesting that what we think of as representations are redundant to whatever is going on underneath the hood — Apustimelogist
a tacit admission that whatever is said from a purely speculative point of view…..cannot possibly be the method the brain…..actually uses.
— Mww
I'm not understanding this. Could you say more? — frank
Nevertheless, we don’t know what goes on under the hood, yet we rise to the occassion of making it comprehensible to ourselves, in some form, by some method. Representation is merely a component which fits into one of those methods. — Mww
so we throw stuff at the wall, see what sticks — Mww
Experiences don’t exist in the brain, but the things the brain does, whatever that is, that makes it seem like experiences exist in the brain, exist in the brain. — Mww
In for a penny, why not in for a pound? Thinking and judging is just about the entire human conscious intellectual environment anyway, isn’t it?
At least now I have a better idea regarding your mindset, so, thanks for that. — Mww
Thanks for the explanation. A question arises regarding the misguided notion of naive realism, that to perceive a real object is to perceive the world in itself.
The qualifiers “in itself” or “as it is” confuse me to no end, and to be honest I have never seen a naive realist affix these phrases to statements about an object of perception, at least in common language. It makes me think that in order to see an object “as it is” I must see it from an infinite amount of perspectives at the same time, that in order to really see an object I must also see what I cannot possibly see, for instance the back of an object while looking at the front of it, or what it looks like if no one was looking at it, and so on. — NOS4A2
So the question is: If we’re not perceiving the world in itself or as it is, what are we perceiving? — NOS4A2
What is the physical/physiological difference between us seeing a mental representation and a mental representation existing in our heads?
This is where I think you're getting so confused by grammar.
If mental representations exist and if distal objects are not constituents of these mental representations and if our knowledge of distal objects is mediated by knowledge of these mental representations then indirect realism is true, because that's all that indirect realism means. — Michael
User
With respect to the direct/indirect realism debate, what difference does it make to the indirect realist position to say that perceptions are mental representations, instead of that we perceive mental representations?
ChatGPT
In the direct/indirect realism debate, direct realists argue that we perceive the external world directly, while indirect realists contend that what we perceive are mental representations or sense data, rather than the external world itself. The distinction between saying "perceptions are mental representations" versus "we perceive mental representations" may seem subtle, but it carries significant implications for the indirect realist position.
Perceptions as Mental Representations: This perspective suggests that perceptions are constructed within the mind based on sensory input. In other words, our experiences of the external world are mediated by mental processes that interpret and represent sensory data. From this viewpoint, perceptions are seen as internal mental states that correspond to external objects or events. Indirect realists who adopt this view typically argue that our awareness of the external world is always filtered through mental representations, which may or may not accurately reflect the true nature of external objects.
We Perceive Mental Representations: This formulation emphasizes the act of perception itself, suggesting that what we directly encounter are mental representations rather than external objects. According to this interpretation, perception is inherently subjective and mediated by mental processes. Indirect realists who adopt this stance argue that our experiences are fundamentally shaped by the way our minds represent sensory information, and that there is no direct access to the external world independent of these mental representations.
The difference between these two formulations lies in the emphasis on either the nature of perceptions themselves or the act of perceiving. However, both perspectives align in asserting that our awareness of the world is mediated by mental representations. The distinction may have implications for how indirect realists conceptualize the relationship between the mind and the external world, as well as how they address philosophical challenges such as skepticism and the problem of perception.
User
Could those who say "perceptions are mental representations" be direct realists instead of indirect realists?
ChatGPT
Yes, it's possible for individuals who assert that "perceptions are mental representations" to still be direct realists, although this stance might require some clarification and nuance.
In the direct realism framework, the key idea is that our perceptual experiences directly reflect the external world as it is, without the need for intermediary mental representations. However, some direct realists might acknowledge that perceptions involve mental processing and representation without necessarily subscribing to the idea that these representations mediate our access to the external world.
For instance, a direct realist who asserts that "perceptions are mental representations" might argue that the mind actively organizes sensory input and constructs a coherent perceptual experience, but they would maintain that this process occurs in real-time and directly corresponds to external objects or events. In this view, mental representations are seen as immediate reflections of the external world rather than intermediaries that stand between the mind and reality.
So, while the statement "perceptions are mental representations" is often associated with indirect realism, it's conceivable for a direct realist to adopt this view with the caveat that mental representations serve as immediate reflections of external reality rather than as intermediaries mediating perception.
I'm not speaking for Luke. He's far more eloquent and concise than I. — creativesoul
This also appears to be consistent with the enactivist view that Pierre-Normand and @fdrake have been arguing for, if I understand it correctly. — Luke
In this view, mental representations are seen as immediate reflections of the external world rather than intermediaries that stand between the mind and reality. — Luke
But I don't want to go further and impute a dualistic structure to the mind-independent actuality. — Janus
It seems that language is dualistic in its logical structure, its grammar. If that is so, then all of our discourse will be dualistic also. (…) I don't think our mindsets are that far apart. — Janus
...our ability to interpret what we perceive depends on our prior embodied experiences and conceptual repertoire. I couldn't see a duck as a duck if I had never encountered ducks before, either in person or through images. But these enabling conditions for interpretation do not stand between me and the duck when I perceive it. Rather, they are the background that allows me to make sense of my direct perceptual encounter with the duck itself. — Pierre-Normand
We don't directly see cows – according to the naive and indirect realist's meaning of "directly see"1 – but we do indirectly see cows.
Given that the adverb "directly" modifies the verb "see", the phrases "I directly see a cow" and "I see a cow" do not mean the same thing. The phrase "I indirectly see a cow" entails "I see a cow" and so the phrases "I do not directly see a cow" and "I see a cow" are not contradictory.
1 A directly sees B iff B is a constituent of A's visual experience. — Michael
What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see? — creativesoul
the cow I see isn’t a constituent of my visual experience. — Michael
I don’t understand your question. It’s like asking “what counts as a constituent of a portrait of the President if not the President the portrait is of”. — Michael
the cow I see isn’t a constituent of my visual experience.
— Michael
What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see? — creativesoul
If "the cow I see isn't a constituent of my visual experience" makes sense according to the position you're arguing for/from, but you cannot clearly and unambiguously state what does count as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see, then that is not a problem with the question. It's evidence that there's a problem with the framework you're practicing. — creativesoul
Not necessarily. I’m undecided between eliminative materialism and property dualism. — Michael
All we have are "stories" that are constructed and enacted in experience and we argue about their merits. — Apustimelogist
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