Sure. — Jackson

I do not say mind is physical or non-physical. — Jackson

a net ethical point of +1 and I get my ticket to paradise. Someone else who has [...] a net ethical point of -6 and goes to jahanam. — Agent Smith

I wonder what happens to a person with a net ethical point of cipher/zero? — Agent Smith

While this is a small bullet to bite, — lish

[1] Tell me, do you think that a single grain of wheat is a heap?
[2] Well, certainly, it's the very smallest size of heap.

Game over. People often finish up claiming 2 had been their position all along. Perhaps it should have been, and the puzzle is a fraud. — bongo fury

Briefly this is Russell's way of saying that science does not even define what physicality is: — Jackson

If all my thoughts are physical, — Jackson

Even Bertrand Russell admitted that the very definition of matter was incoherent. — Jackson

I know there is a physical world. I hardly think that explains reality. — Jackson

without defining the aspect the spatial designations you use. — Nickolasgaspar

Now if one asks Is sex without consent immoral (rape) then the answer is yes for that specific situation. — Nickolasgaspar

Can morality be absolute? — PhilosophyRunner

If rape is wrong because we have agreed it is wrong, it is good when we change our mind. — Hanover

...as to the residual character of propositions we have that full latitude of choice that attends the development of gratuitous fictions. — Quine, Ontological Remarks on the Propositional Calculus

why does panpsychism want to put consciousness everywhere? — Daemon

What is the colour of a proposition? — Banno

I would say the utterance of a sentence expresses a proposition. — frank

I don't know what the second question means exactly. — frank

Do you know anything about the data/information idea? — frank

Plus, if you want to talk to a reliable source, — frank

Russell wanted to picture it as: a proposition is a state of affairs. The snag there is that there are false propositions. — frank

What is the content of a sentential utterance? And is it sentential? — bongo fury

It is content. — frank

It's an abstract object. It's the primary truth bearer. — frank

Allen: I guess I should never have suggested having a philosopher-king.

Simmias: Especially when you kept pointing to yourself and clearing your throat.
— Woody Allen, 'My Apology'

people who sleepwalk, — Manuel

nowadays, with the benefit of modern science and an understanding that the source ancient ‘thinking’ that led to dualism was relatively uninformed, we can dispense with the illusion — Brock Harding

Thinking is not an illusion, the concept that you need a non-physical entity to think is. — Brock Harding

Oh, come on, if consciousness, thinking, etc. were an illusion, then this discussion would be also an illusion! — Alkis Piskas

Does it follow that B is not-A and that C is not-A?

I don't think so. — Millard J Melnyk

We say "the son resembles the father" rather than
"the father resembles the son." We say "an ellipse is like a circle," not "a circle is like an ellipse," — Tversky, Features of Similarity

I can not find any case where "A is not B" is not equally well conveyed by "A is other than B". — Millard J Melnyk

If I am experiencing the bird, not the activity in my brain, why does my dog see a different image than the image I see? — Qwertyportne

... this is software archeology, and software doesn’t leave much of a fossil record. Software, after all, is just
concepts. It is abstract and yet, of course, once it is embodied it has very real effects. So if you
want to find a record of major “software” changes in archeological history, what are you going to
have to look at? You are going to have to look at the “printouts,” but they are very indirect. You
are going to have to look at texts, and you are going to have to look at the pottery shards and
figurines as Jaynes does, because that is the only [...]
of course, maybe the traces are just gone, maybe
the “fossil record” is simply not good enough.

Jaynes’ idea is that for us to be the way we are now, there has to have been a revolution—
almost certainly not an organic revolution, but a software revolution—in the organization of our
information processing system, and that has to have come after language. That, I think, is an
absolutely wonderful idea, and if Jaynes is completely wrong in the details, that is a darn shame,
but something like what he proposes has to be right; and we can start looking around for better
modules to put in the place of the modules that he has already given us. — Daniel Dennett, Julian Jaynes's software archeology

The question is, how do qualia improve the analysis in a way that is not just as clear from a discussion of colour scales and pitch and tone and time scales etc... — Banno

some seem to relate to the idea easily and the concept seems to make more sense to some than others. I am inclined to think that the idea of qualia is useful to some extent, — Jack Cummins

What question?

You habitually fail to make your point, — Banno

I'm mystified how "qualia" is any more lazy or obfuscating than "consciousness" or "subjective experience"; and why Dennett and Banno continually want to let the others off the hook. — bongo fury

I've explicitly argued that both consciousness and subjectivity are overused by philosophers. — Banno

Neither Dennett nor I have argued that there is no need to talk about experiences; rather that replacing talk of experiences with talk of qualia is unhelpful.

Which idea of qualia am I trying to extirpate? Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do. That is to say, whenever someone experiences something as being one way rather than another, this is true in virtue of some property of something happening in them at the time, but these properties are so unlike the properties traditionally imputed to consciousness that it would be grossly misleading to call any of them the long-sought qualia. Qualia are supposed to be special properties, in some hard-to-define way. My claim--which can only come into focus as we proceed--is that conscious experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special.
— Dennett, Quining Qualia — Banno