Can you re-assure me that nothing disastrous will happen — Ludwig V

Just assume that terrible things are going to happen at any time, and then when they do happen you won't be surprised. Does that help?

He wants (needs to) rule that distinction out [between appearance and reality], (i.e. show that the question "How do you mean?" cannot be answered in this context). But he doesn't quite get that far. — Ludwig V

I don't know what the standard would be to "rule... out" the distinction, but I don't think he wants to say our questions about the world cannot be addressed, and so does not need to show that the position has no meaning. The problem of our skepticism of the world and others is not going away here; Austin is only pointing out our sufficient ordinary criteria in order to normalize how we address these situations (rather than solving it for every case, forever).

What I take him to be doing in Lec VIII is showing there are other types of cases involved in the issue in order to break apart the forced dichotomy of appearance vs. reality, which dictates their definition and mechanics. This widening of cases allows for discussion of appearing and appearance, and reality and what's real, only with the requirements of a context and the ordinary criteria we use in those situations.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B

Lecture VIII: I first realized here that Austin is very bent out of shape that someone can just "prefer to say" things one way or another, depending on their "preferences" (p.78); which made me look back at words being "invented ad hoc" (p.75), or "fooled around with" (p.62), and his guard against distinctions seeming "arbitrary" (p. 63), and particularly his insistence that some things can be "wrong" (p. 63), leading to:

...if Ayer were right here, then absolutely every dispute would be purely verbal. For if, when one person says whatever it may be, another person may simply 'prefer to say' something else, they will always be arguing only about words, about what terminology is to be preferred. How could anything be a question of truth or falsehood, if anyone can always say whatever he likes? — Austin p. 60

Which makes me consider that one of Austin's motivations, that I grant appear hidden, is to find (or defend) a truth between metaphysical certainty and radical skepticism (which would make his concerns less than trivial). This may come later.

What he does say is that Ayer is fixated on the case where we think something is there but nothing is, which sounds like when philosophy thought that ethics was possible, but determined there was nowhere from which to judge right and wrong (the way it wanted). Leaving that be, Austin counters with the case where we “see something where something else really is.” (Id.) This sounds similar to a case where one thing is limiting our ability to pick out another, say, seeing the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika (PI, #420). Austin also points out cases where “something is or might be taken to be what it isn’t really.” (P.80) This error comes from the possibility to focus/judge on parts of a thing ("aspects" Wittgenstein will say) for which there are criteria (thought of by philosophy as "particulars", or, here, "my perception"), and thus, as he points our here, the possibility to be fooled sometimes in the process. The fact there are certain public possibilities, is why “seeing” is not a mental process but is simply recognizing or identifying (“taking” says Austin) something as something, say, seeing a wing as a way for a bird to retain body heat, rather than seeing it as a means of flight. (One could almost say we “perceive” it that way, but this makes it sound like only we can, or know we have.) I’ll leave my thoughts on “general accounts” and “predictive value” for another time.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B


A p.s. to the reference to ways of distinguishing between dreaming and awaking in Other Minds. I found the quote (p. 87). Based on the surrounding text, I take it that Austin feels that the situation is one that philosophy has removed from the attendant contexts of the two things.

The doubt or question 'But is it a real one?' has always (must have) a special basis, there must be some 'reason for suggesting' that it isn't real, in the sense of some specific way, or limited number of specific ways, in which it is suggested that this experience or item may be phoney. Sometimes (usually) the context makes it clear what the suggestion is... If the context doesn't make it clear, [only] then I am entitled to ask 'How do you mean? .... — Austin, Other Minds, p.87 (emphasis in bold added) this is a link to the text

The fallout here is that asking the question "Am I awake or dreaming?" assumes that we are asking how we "know" if our experience is "real" in situations where we are able to distinguish between the two solely on the difference in the situations (their separate contexts)--Austin puts it rather arrogantly that I am not "entitled" to ask, but he just means it would never come to whether dreaming was a phoney version of being awake. Now, how the situations are different is a matter we could discuss, as I think I have, but that can be elaborated as ordinary, recognized distinctions of the surrounding circumstances.

fail, again

Can you re-assure me that nothing disastrous will happen if I follow the link anyway? — Ludwig V

I am running Safari on an iPad 6 and nothing seems to have gone wrong, but, and here’s a question, how would one know they are hacked when the point is for the hacker not to reveal they are hacking someone?

Did you see this reply?

I take him in the current work only to be pointing out that words can have different import given a context of expectations and shared understandings, rather than assumed to be interchangeable wherever they are until proven otherwise.

I believe Austin may be thinking that we know the concept of dreaming from 'one's own case'. — Richard B

It doesn’t sound like anything I’ve read of his. Even in Other Minds he is debunking Moore’s argument from analogy (I would like to know the page of your quote, as I could not find it). I would say that “the recognized ways of distinguishing” (not “knowing”) dreaming from waking are the criteria for differentiation of the two, one of which I claimed would be that we only remember dreams; another would be we don’t have control over the events of our regular life in the same way. I also think it bears pointing out that “recognized” is meant: by society, and is not a conscious acknowledgement or reasoned application of criteria. Our lives ordinarily happen as a matter of course and our criteria are only applied when there is something unexpected, “phishy”, “phoney” as Austin says. I believe I gave some examples of those circumstances above as well.

The quote by Wittgenstein is very easy to take in multiple ways. But, if our “descriptions” are the outward criteria, then there doesn’t need to be anything “inner” in the sense of something I know. Wittgenstein calls them “expressions” because I am in no better position to “describe” (or know) something than you are (I may be blind to myself, or say something that reveals more about me than I realize). This may be, of course, off the topic of Austin, other than he is also discussing criteria, and it does have a fallout for what processes are “inner”.

mulligan

I don't think it's a dismissal of Austin to fail to see anything of metaphysical import — frank

We're getting off the rails. I thought you were dismissing my claim that Austin "is providing evidence of how the world works." Thus my bolded quote where he is making claims about how the world works. As far as metaphysics goes, I'm not sure what you mean by that term. He's dismantling metaphysics (in all its hydra-head of forms), not trying to substitute an answer to the same skepticism.

We're approaching a point of difference, perhaps, in that for me, there is a place, if not for certainty, then at the least for confidence in our understanding, a foundation found in the very actuality of these considerations. We are not utterly adrift. I'm not sure you will agree. — Banno

I do, but--and this is Cavell reading Wittgenstein, so I'll keep it short--there is knowledge, and then there is our relation to that knowledge, to our criteria. You may know the right thing to do, but not do it, but then you are responsible for doing so. We may have confidence in our criteria, but we still have to live our lives by them, or not. Pure (only) knowledge is the attempt to remove any doubt, thus the possibility of human failing, remove the need for "our bond".

"'Real or not?' does not always come up, can't always be raised. We do raise this question only when, to speak rather roughly, suspicion assails us--in some way or other things may be not what they seem; and we can raise this question only if there is a way, or ways, in which things may be not what they seem. — Austin p.69 (my emphasis in bold)

You'd have to give me some reason how this is not claiming evidence of how things are or are not done, or when they can be. — Antony Nickles

What metaphysical truth do you see in that? — frank

I was responding to what seemed like your dismissal that Austin:

"is providing evidence of how the world works, — Antony Nickles

I really didn't see him as doing that at all..."

Does it make sense now?

@Banno @Ludwig V (Below, I'm trying to capture that there is something to the sense that metaphysics (and skepticism) seem to follow the criteria that Austin sets out for real or not.)

Nevertheless, the truth about metaphysics is that it comes from philosophy's desire to generalize the question "Real or not?" onto everything, thus making "real" a quality of the entire world, as opposed to mediated; or objective as opposed to subjective, or appearance as opposed to universal, etc. In Austin's words, metaphysics was manufactured to answer the question whether the entire world "may not be what it seems", "raised" out of our fear ("suspicion", skepticism) that it is true. The remaining criteria (a must) of Austin's is "there is a way, or ways, in which things [the whole world] may be not what they seem [it seems]." p. 69 I'm not sure how that plays out.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus @Richard B

People do seem to have picked up the puzzle about why, if Austin wants to deny reality, he doesn't just come out with it. He seems to dance around the question with marginal and trivial comments on how the word "real" is used, and so forth. I think someone should at least try to explain why. — Ludwig V

I did try to explain here and here why Austin and Wittgenstein do not overtly argue for a certain case. What it comes down to is that the authority of their claims, about these examples, is only as much as you are willing to grant in seeing for yourself (finding your own reasons perhaps), say, about what Austin is claiming about how "real" works (and thus how "reality" does not**). This shift in perspective is so radical that it is possible to fight someone "too close in" where you are engaging on their terms, instead of continually leaving the door open that they might see the bigger picture, despite that we are "inclined" to just give up (PI, #217). What it takes to see the point is not adopting an opinion, understanding an argument, but changing your "attitude" (perspective, as position with respect to) or the "aspect" you see Wittgenstein will say, perhaps by even seeing what you thought you wanted in a new light (your "real need") and, in a sense, changing who you are.

One point, however, is that we all want to get at the truth, find (explicate) something illuminating about ourselves and the world. So we can say that a claim does not make sense; that we can't (yet, hopefully) figure out what sense it has, but to say it is "meaningless" is to imply that it shouldn't be meaningful to those who propose it (though I understand your point is logical Ludwig), which not only could be taken that we are dismissing "them", but that we are refusing to understand their reasons for making the argument they do (which I am guilty of). Austin crosses this line more cruelly than Wittgenstein, who is actually investigating why he wanted the kind of answers he sought in the Tractatus.

marginal and trivial comments on how the word "real" is used — Ludwig V

Again, we are trivializing the import of these claims in mistaking that they are about how "words" are "used". He is making claims about how we actually (in the world) judge whether things are real or not; he is using these examples to draw out the criteria for it and the mechanics of it. I'm not sure how I can explain this another way unless someone explains what there is not to understand. (Not turning spade... not turning spade...)

p.s.** Austin does not get into the cases of when we do want to address "reality", as in something someone is avoiding, what you encounter in being naive, in insulting someone's hope as just a fantasy, etc.

I really didn't see him as doing that at all. Interesting how differently two people can read the same paragraphs, huh? — frank

'Real or not?' does not always come up, can't always be raised. We do raise this question only when, to speak rather roughly, suspicion assails us--in some way or other things may be not what they seem; and we can raise this question only if there is a way, or ways, in which things may be not what they seem. — Austin p.69 (my emphasis in bold)

You'd have to give me some reason how this is not claiming evidence of how things are or are not done, or when they can be.

Do you mean if everyone believed in God, that would make him real? — frank

I'm not sure you've read Sec. VII, where Austin claims that we only ask "Real or not?" in the case of something in particular (p. 68-69). So the question "Is God real?" would be framed "Is that a real god?", and then we would apply the criteria for gods, such as, perhaps, do people believe in its power, its truth, or is it just an idol. Another way to come at it would be to question, when we ask "Is God real?", what criteria do we apply? what would be the basis for our judgment? in what situation are we asking this question? (to a priest? to ourselves?) Obviously you are thinking of specific criteria without considering, also, if "real" in this case is a different sense, and thus subject to different criteria.

I just disagree that there are metaphysical truths we can pull out of the way we speak. It's frequently difficult to even pin point how our speech refers, much less discover great truths in grammar. — frank

Maybe you are not taking seriously Austin's "cannot" and "wrong" and "facts" and the distinctions he points out. He comes off as arrogant, but he is providing evidence of how the world works, so, unless you can argue with his examples (by saying, "no that's not the way it works"), I don't see how, reasonably, you can categorically "just disagree" with his conclusions--this isn't about opinions. One "metaphysical truth" or implication from Austin's examples is that our speech does not "refer", in the same way there is nothing "direct" for us to "perceive" or not. But I'll leave you to feel however you'd like.

So if everyone says "God created the world in six days", would that reflect the mechanics of how the world actually works? — frank

You're thinking of "the world" as not including origin stories, mythology, religious belief, etc. That there is, for example, nothing meaningful to anyone about having the world be created. This is an example of judgment by one standard, e.g. what is "real".

re-thinking

I can't avoid the suspicion that... the arc expressed here is not as explicit as you make it seem. — Banno

Where Wittgenstein is enigmatic and full of questions, I think Austin takes too much for granted that we will see the implications of what he is doing, and so I do think part of the effort has to be making explicit why he is pointing out what he does (apart from just eviscerating Ayer's position). I find the offhand comments to be the most important almost.

My hope was not to bring Cavell's interests and conclusions into this reading of Austin, but I have let myself be goaded (with all this dismissive talk of "just language" and "quibbling") into expanding on the reasons why philosophy wants something like Ayer's "solution", which is how Cavell sees Wittgenstein going further than what seems like Austin simply refuting Ayer.

I should resolve myself to just doing my reading and responding to those doing the same, but I always hope there is some possibility of getting through to people if I could just say the right thing. But how do you help with this, where the whole picture and every word in it is either confused or wrong. It makes me think Austin is even more of a genius because he can make sense of Ayer.

Method, more specifically, I think (the method of "inquiry"). — Ciceronianus

My Dewey is rusty; "method" rings a bell now. I leave it to you to draw those distinctions at some point.

I don't think there are much in the way of metaphysical implications from Austin, do you? He's just pointing out the way we speak. — frank

This is a common misconception. I don't think Austin does himself any favors by saying he is just examining "sense perception" and not directly explaining the implications of what he is doing, and then just jumping into examples. For one, his critique of Ayer is an example of a larger philosophical issue, which includes metaphysics. "The case of 'universal' and 'particular', or 'individual', is similar in some respects though of course not in all." (p.4 fn1) And, also, Austin is denying there is "reality" (directly addressing the metaphysical), which Ayer is arguing we just don't have direct access to (p. 3 and Lec. VII -- I discuss that here).

I address the underestimation of Austin, as just "pointing out the way we speak", here above, but the gist of it is that the things we say (or could say) in situations reflect the criteria we use in judging a thing, and the mechanics of how the world actually works. What we say when talking about "real" are an expression of what matters to us about it, what we count as applicable, how mistakes are corrected, etc.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus @Richard B

There is an additional aspect to this desire for certainty. It is the tendency to universalize. Admittedly not everything is certain (sometimes our sense deceive us), but equally not everything is uncertain (sometimes our senses do not deceive us). — Ludwig V

Absolutely. Reacting to the fact that we can't know ahead of time when and how we will make mistakes, be deceived, be judged for not doing the right thing, come to an impasse with others, etc. pushes us towards the vision that we only see "our perception" or only "particular" parts of a chair, i.e., that our relation to the world is always mitigated. The desire for "purity" as Wittgenstein puts it, or "certainty" as Cavell terms it, results in the abstraction from individual cases, turning the state of our situation into an intellectual "problem" which we want to solve universally (beforehand), for any case, so we will never be wrong again, not have to be responsible for our errors and moral duty.

This is why Austin is giving us an overview** of the case-specific actions we can take to reconcile (after the fact) the issues that skepticism takes as simply a failure of knowledge, to show that the individual case is not a weakness, but a strength, as the mechanics work better given the details of the particular, rather than the abstraction to a universal.

**Wittgenstein also investigates examples of the universalization of philosophical issues (rules, others, mental processes, etc.) by showing us a "clear view" of specific "intermediate cases" (see quote below) so we might see how our ordinary criteria are sufficient, precise, etc. despite our disappointment that they can't keep us out of trouble. "A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.—Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases. PI, #122.

phhfttt, fail

You keep reminding me of Dewey. That's a good thing for me, but perhaps not for others. See his The Quest for Certainty. Analytic and OLP philosophers weren't the only ones seeking to cure philosophy of its various ills. — Ciceronianus

I do think it is important at some point (once we have the complete reading under our belt) to differentiate Austin from Dewey from Wittgenstein, etc. Preliminarily, I think Dewey and Austin don't take into consideration the continuing fear of skepticism (given the powerlessness of our ordinary criteria) in the same way as Wittgenstein, who sympathizes with, and tries to understand, the skeptic's desire (as he fell into that trap with the Tractatus), rather than the, say, condescension that Austin gives off, or Dewey's belief in procedure (or something like that).

That's what I disagreed with, that math is regarded by philosophers as the ultimate paradigm — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, it’s not the answer that matters, it’s the desire for an “answer”: something universal, generalized, predetermined, predictable, perfectly logical, etc., e.g., God, the forms, the thing-in-itself, consciousness, reality, sense data, qualia, etc. Austin is saying the whole enterprise is wrong from the get-go.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus @Richard B

As an additional note on Lecture VII: Part of philosophy’s problem (exemplified by Ayer) is that the desire for a perfect knowledge, and the subsequent resignation to an imperfect knowledge, both only allow for a fixed outcome (of knowledge, or a “perception”, or “appearance”, or “mental process”, or “meaning”). In this lecture about “reality” Austin is also explaining how our relationship with the world is more than just information, such as would correspond to (equate with) an “objective” world.

As I discussed earlier, one point is that you can’t “fool around” (p.62) with words because of the way they work—the distinctions they make, what they count as doing or being something—is taken from how the world works (their criteria are: what has mattered to our society, what is “really important” (p.77))—I mean, you can fool around, but you look like a madman, or a poet.

Another point, again, is that the situation that we find ourselves in matters, so it is always a discussion of an event (as Ricouer would call it)—a moment in time with a past and you and another with things a certain way, even expectations, etc. To call this just a context though might miss the fact that it also has a future. We do not just see something and either get it (“really” know it) or do not (as an immediate “perception”, just indirect now). We make mistakes, but we correct ourselves; we jump to conclusions, but we can dig deeper and learn more; we apologize, make excuses; but we carry on--despite not having perfect knowledge--without cutting ourselves off from the world.

Another difference with fixed knowledge is that it does not do well with ambiguity, and when we don’t know how to "proceed" (Wittgenstein discusses this as "being able to continue", e.g. a series). As Austin says, there may not be “any right answer” (p.66) and, that, in certain cases, “there is no right answer… no rules according to which, no procedure by which, answers are to be determined.” (P.67) These are the kinds of situations that create the fear of radical skepticism, which philosophy believes can only be resolved by definite knowledge (but then it can’t get it). Austin shows that, despite our not knowing what is “right”, or having a “rule” or a “procedure” or determined “answer”, we still manage to move forward in situations where there is no “tidy, straightforward style” (p.72). His example is that “like” allows us to “adjust” (p.73) our language to adapt to something new, not simple. And being able to account for outliers is not a strong suit for objective criteria; for example, when “pig” has a “meaning” that is a universal amongst particulars. Austin is pointing out that in not demanding a universal “pig”, or a “new world” (i.e. “reality”), but in having "flexibility" (p. 74), we are actually "more precise" (Id.) and can better handle the "unforeseen" (p.75), which is to say, we proceed with the ability to readdress the situation; we can live through it without figuring it all out ahead of time (deontologically, teleologically (what is “right”? A rule, a value?) Thus Austin says, the criteria we employ at a given time can’t be taken as "final, not liable to change.” (p. 76) And that openendedness allows our understandings to adapt as our lives change.

The idea that it is just a matter of just looking, or collecting data, is far too simple. — Ludwig V

As this is important to Austin as well—though I don’t know exactly what you are referring to when you say “that it is just a matter”—Wittgenstein keeps insisting we “look” not because he can’t speak about something (as some carry over from the Tractatus). It’s that ordinary criteria have no power of argument (logical, necessity). So what they are doing is drawing out examples of when you would say such-and-such about something. All they can do is create those examples (“show” you them); you have to accept for yourself the validity of the implications on what matters to a thing being that thing, how distinctions are made, what judgments, etc. They make claims about the mechanics of that thing (the grammar Wittgenstein says; Austin will point out “salient features” on p.68) but you must come to it on your own—prove it to yourself (or provide another description, expand the context to incorporate other considerations, etc.) And then we can debate the impact those have on philosophical issues.

P.s. - this is why Wittgenstein is so enigmatic, why he leaves us with so many questions; because, as you say, we have to do the work for ourselves. I believe this to be in part because they are asking you to take a totally different perspective on an old philosophical issue. That it’s not a new opinion, but a new way of seeing, a changed self.

How does the fact that you and I agree that the answer to 2+2 is 4 say anything about reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, math doesn’t tell us about the world. But it has qualities similar to the standard by which philosophy wishes it could judge the world, and, when it finds that doesn’t work, instead of seeing the ordinary criteria that already exist, it projects its standard onto the qualities of an imagined Reality.

I think maybe I worded something about math that triggered your response; I don’t claim anything in particular about it other than as an example of the standard, which Plato in the Theatetus and Descartes set out better than me.

If math is just a different way of using language, how does it possibly obtain this status of "objective"? — Metaphysician Undercover

If you do math, and I do math (competently), we come up with the same answer. It doesn’t matter who does it. It is universal, rule-driven, predictable, repeatable, logical, a fact, etc. (that’s all I mean be “certain”). Imagine everything Socrates wanted for knowledge; that’s why he used math as the ultimate example in the Theatetus.

But Malcolm is saying that this idea that dreaming is an experience where we question, reason, perceive, imagine is an incoherent one, so there is no sense to say we are comparing experiences to determine they are qualitatively similar or not. — Richard B

I’m not sure were Austin put forward “this idea” of what we do in dreams. I was trying to show that there actually are, as he says, “recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking”. Why does this have to mean: while we are dreaming? It seems perhaps Malcolm is creating his own opponent, but I don’t think it is Austin.

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus

Lecture VII is not a theory about what the word “real” means. It’s showing how the actual world works compared to the imagined idea of Reality itself, the theory of an “objective” world. In this case, compared to the picture that we do or do not “perceive” “Reality”, something immutable, infallible, and generalized to every object and abstracted from any circumstance and any responsibility we might have.

However, despite this need for—let’s call it a pure knowledge (as Wittgenstein does) or perfect knowledge (as Descartes does)—everything but math is not “objective” in the way philosophy imposes on “Reality”. But instead of looking, as Austin does, at how we actually manage our uncertain world, Ayer internalizes the world’s failings by making it our failing: that we can only “perceive” a world that is “real”, which forces us to only be able to ask confused questions like: do we perceive “reality” directly? Or is our perception of “reality” indirect/mediated? Maybe through some “real” process of the (perfect) brain? or because it is “my” “perception” of “Reality”? (and you have yours—instead of just our varying personal interests).

The dismissal of Austin is done for many reasons, but it boils down to an inability to accept anything but an “answer” to the world’s uncertainty (like a perfect knowledge) or nothing at all (falling back only on a mediated “perception”), and not taking seriously that the ordinary ways we handle problems in each case are sufficient and our only recourse. Austin is (as is Wittgenstein) only seen either as setting out just a different answer to these cobwebs of misunderstandings—that he is some version of a “realist”—or that the mechanics he uncovers about the world are trivial in response to these issues (he’s just relying on words or “common sense”).

Lecture VII: Once again, Austin is not talking about words (explaining words), he is looking at the words we say when we do something to illuminate our practices. That words are “used in a particular way” is a “fact” (p.62) because our lives have been “firmly established” (Id.) There is a correct way (as in, appropriate) to address a subject, its mechanics, which is how you can be “wrong” p. 63. This is not being nit-picky and pedantic about word usage—because it is our lives that are normative (influence the conformity of our acts). Note here when Austin says: “‘Real or not?’… can’t always be raised. We… raise this question only when… suspicion assails us…” (p.69) (emphasis added)

In saying that the “distinctions [are] embodied” (Id.), Austin is saying we live them, in them, by them. Distinctions are how we judge, and, in judging along those lines, we reinvest ourselves in the criteria for that practice. There is nothing “arbitrary” (p.63) about the way our practices work. They have import because they reflect our interests in our lives.

So “Reality” is a prefabricated (a priori) standard of judgment measuring everything against perfection. (P.64) What philosophy did is take the ordinary question: is that a real duck? (or a decoy?) and turn “real” into a quality of everything. However, there are many different ways (criteria for how) things count as real, and one of the most important being because there is an antecedent (expected) alternative, like: fake, a variant context, deception, artifice, etc. So, it is untenable for everything to be real (or not), unless… you remove the question and abstract the (unnatural) quality onto the whole world—ta da: Reality!

happy for others to move on, if you want to do VII. — Banno

I don’t mind someone else taking the lead either, as I tire of beating my head against the wall and talking to myself.

It also looks to me that you might have been reading Cavell? — Ludwig V

Oh yeah that’s probably a straight ripoff. I wouldn’t normally bring in these kinds of larger implications/conclusions except I don’t seem to be getting any headway in understanding by keeping my cards covered as Austin does (to the point people only think it matters to words).

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus

That people have made up their mind, or had made it up before we began), without even understanding what Austin is saying, much less why he is saying it, is proof of the point he is trying to make. Ayer (Plato) makes it look like he is investigating our relation to the world, but before starting had a standard already decided for the answer, thus the need for the wacky picture.

Is anyone going to do a reading of VII? Or are we not done with VI.

I'm only gesturing at the point that what's in question is not "ordinary", contingent falsity, but something more radical, in that Ayer uses "direct" and "indirect" in an incoherent way. — Ludwig V

I agree here, but the radical nature of it is not that Ayer is incoherent; he was chosen because of his putting the case as well as one can. Austin is going after the desire for classic analytical philosophy to need a certain standard or “certain” knowledge, without context. The wish for that is a fear of any chance of error, instead of seeing that our practices are rational and any errors have means of resolution, even when that is only rational disagreement (in the moral or political realm). Our fears and desires are isolating us as the only way to maintain something certain (by pulling back from the world); but we don’t need everything to meet the criteria of certainty.

To attempt to clear up the direct/indirect issue,
— Antony Nickles

I'm thinking that there is an argument in the background that is confusing people. It relates to Corvus' question

You still have not answered whether Austin was a direct realist or not.
— Corvus — Ludwig V

It is a fantasy-world question, dreamed up by Ayer’s desire to have fixed, certain (direct) access to the world, even if he has to make up the terms, like “sense-data”, so something can be “real” (which is the singular standard which sets up this whole kind of answer from the start—old as Plato).

If you accept Austin's ordinary language definition of direct and indirect perception, then he does accept that some perceptions are direct and others are not. — Ludwig V

He is not talking about perception, he is discussing indirect and direct (here as they relate to seeing, reflecting, etc.); he accepts none of that. I must be a terrible writer.

The understanding of Ayer's position that I've come to in this discussion is that there is such a thing as direct perception - perception of sense-data - and the objects of this kind of perception are always real, in the sense that they are what they seem to be, but always unreal in that they are not what we would like to think they are - perceptions of "external" "objective" reality. Austin rejects that idea, not on the ground that it is false, but on the ground that it is incoherent. — Ludwig V

We want so desperately to have something certain (“objective”) that we even set it off the table (“in that they are not what we would like to think”) but go through somersaults to keep it as the standard. (Kant anyone?) I haven’t seen anything that would make me think Austin would concede that it was not false. His use of it should be qualified with “I’m just using this term to try to figure out what Ayer might mean by it. No luck so far.”

Of course, there needs to be evidence under the scrutiny of judgment. I mean, it’s not like we can just make up anything.
— Antony Nickles

"Evidence" needs to be interpreted here. — Ludwig V

The point is that there is not one kind of evidence (direct or not; real or not). There are different kinds of evidence for each thing, for what counts as evidence of dreaming, or being awake, or seeing something. Now it is true that these will be different kinds of evidence, but just depending on the thing. Evidence does not need to be shoe-horned into the standard of “objective” too. Part of what Ayers has done is imagine the world as unintelligible, a scene of competing wills, with nothing true, because of his prerequisite.

”There are recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking… deciding whether a thing is stuffed or live” — Richard B, quoting Austin

Austin is not talking about the words awake, and dreaming: what their explanations or definitions are, how to use them in a sentence (or gather the science of sleep). Austin is pointing out that we, our society, have ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking (and, let’s presume, being awake). They come with their own means of judgment—their criteria, that are reflected in what we say at those times (in examples of the type of things we say when we are trying to differentiate between the two).

He is not saying that our judgment in this leads to the same “level” of knowledge—with foundation and certainty—as Descartes wants for the self. However, we do distinguish between the two, say, when we experience something surprising and someone comes in the room and, when told, they ask “were you dreaming?” Or, when I go to tell someone about a surprising thing and they tell me I was just asleep and must have dreamt it, and I say, “But it was sooo real!”. One insight is that we only report dreams past tense, afterwards (most of us). These are evidence (examples) only of the rational ways these cases (events) can be decided—you are the judge of them yourself: are these rational criteria for the use of distinguishing between dreaming and being awake in these particular situations? No? well if you wanted you could probably come up with some expressions that might satisfy your reservations, which would prove their rationality, and maybe teach me something important about the world (the rationality of say, seeing, or thinking). The fact that ways to distinguish are possible is proof of Austin’s claim. Descartes was trying to pull the same stunt in setting the goal before investigating the field. In Other Minds, here, it is that whether something is real or not, always has to have a suspicion it is a phony, abnormal.

However, this thread is about Austin's answer to Ayer's and thus it is about that notion of perception. That would be the correct one in this situation. "Correct" in the sense that that is the one under consideration, so the others are irrelevant here. — creativesoul

I actually second the notion that it is important to understand Ayer’s idea of “perception” and not bring a preconceived notion to our reading, which is a good practice with any terms (or even various senses of words, like believe). Even if, as here, when we have been given no definitions or direct explanation, there is its place in the argument, what role the term plays in relation to others, and the criteria that might be used in making judgments on its identity, application, and mechanics. We can use our imagination to create rational inferences, even with a placeholder, like here, with “perception”. Of course, there needs to be evidence under the scrutiny of judgment. I mean, it’s not like we can just make up anything.

It could be argued that we cannot expect "ordinary language" to be adapted to cater for this (relatively) new kind of knowledge - yet — Ludwig V

Just want to clear this up (if I can). The method of "Ordinary Language" Philosophy is not to reduce philosophy to ordinary words (Wittgenstein uses "ordinary" words as his own technical terms all the time: criteria, grammar, sense, use, etc.). It is also not to reduce philosophy to the understanding of the person-on-the-street. Like Socrates, what Austin and Wittgenstein do (which I tried to set out once here) is to look at what people say (sort of like, the phrases they use) in certain situations, like when we say, "I know..." This evidence, or data, allows for a number of things. One is that we see that there are multiple different things going on ("knowing" is not only one thing--Wittgenstein calls these senses, or uses), and in different situations (paying attention to context, and how we expand context to clarify sometimes), but we also see how we judge differently (by criteria that show what matters about it to us), and also depending on the situation. What they sometimes do (Wittgenstein more than Austin) is take a philosophical statement and imagine one or more (even fantasy) situations to reveal what standard philosophy is using for judgment (compared to which, the criteria of their examples are termed "ordinary"--which is not really: ordinary, like the reasons we might use), and what context (if any) could the philosophical statements be placed in for them to be more intelligible (or less, as Austin is more prone to).

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus

To attempt to clear up the direct/indirect issue, Austin's method, as I said previously, is to look at the opposite part of a dichotomy because how something fails shows us more about how it works (On Excuses is actually about action, and through that, morality.) So when he takes up "indirectly" he is looking at examples of what we say in a situation (his method), here, involving "indirect perception" (though these are not claims nor proposed alternate explanations). Those examples show that any opposite of indirectly does not have the implications (sense) or criteria (rules of judgment) that Ayer wants his "directly" to have, which are that we perceive infallibly, indisputably. Since we do not "directly" perceive, we cannot "not directly" (or "indirectly") perceive in a way that would be opposite to Ayer's fantasy of perceiving directly, say, always personal or flimsy, so ever needing justification, argument, or mutual agreement. This of course is to overlook that perception is not a thing (thus, as shown in Sec. VI that "my perception" is not a thing). True, false, right, wrong, correct, mistake, me, us, do not work this way.

I'm inclined to attribute Ayer's approach to Cartesian scepticism, rather than to any ethical question. — Ludwig V

Austin does not dwell on or spell out the implications as much as Wittgenstein, so Austin is not very well understood because he is assuming he is talking to people who have read philosophy and will see the connections and understand the magnitude of what he is taking on (with Ayers as just a good example), which is basically every philosophy that has addressed skepticism (mind/body, moral, object) and come up with an answer (or accepted it), like metaphysics, or Kant, or positivism, etc. He is not for or against it, but is taking the whole thing apart (Wittgenstein will go to a deeper place).

Ayer seems to back off the radical implications of his theory by denying them — Ludwig V

Now this I either have not gotten to (I am at Sec VI) or don't understand.

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus

In Sec. VI Austin is full of so much vitriol and sarcasm it’s hard to gather what the argument is. I had to go back to Ayer, who says "having described the [ empirical ] nature of the evidence that is ordinarily thought to be sufficient to establish [mirrors, bent sticks, and mirages]... I wish to consider what would be the position of one who, though he acknowledged the particular facts about our experiences that constitute this evidence, still chose to deny the propositions about material things that these facts are supposed to prove." (Ayer p. 17 emphasis added) And here I can imagine is where Austin goes ballistic, and rightly so. Why would anyone imagine someone who ignores evidence?

Nevertheless, Ayer postulates someone (I'll call them the philosopher) who says that, although there are facts they do not dispute, say, that we are seeing the same coin, that that "does not prove that he really is seeing the same object" (Id. Emphasis added) One reason why the philosopher might say they "really" don't see the same object is because they want to claim that each of us has our own "perception", as in: "Where we say that two observers are seeing the same material thing, he prefers to say that they are seeing different things which have, however, some structural properties in common." Even worse, Ayer here does not even try to reconcile the two positions, but simply chalks them up to "a choice of language". (Ayer p. 18) Instead of attributing that the philosopher is wrong, Ayer chooses that "it is to be inferred that he is assigning to the words a different meaning from that which we have given them." Id. This is why Austin keeps saying that Ayer’s philosopher can agree to the facts, but then say "whatever [they] like" Austin p. 59

I finally realized what is going on. This is Plato’s (projected straw-man) problem with the Sophists; he thought they believed there was nothing like knowledge except persuasion by rhetoric (of beliefs, as he framed it). Here it is the fear of that skeptical moral world transferred to our best case scenario, a physical object. Our failure even to come up with a standard for (all of) the physical world leads to the assumption that the resolution must be metaphysical, like sense-data (and not that our desire for one standard and one context is wrong). From Ayer we could say one reason is that we would like to maintain our own perspective as a fixed, given of human nature (that you and I (always) see our each coin, even though we agree they are the same). Ayer resigns himself to only be able to be sure of facts about sense-data (to thus be certain by one, fixed standard because only one type of object, without the need of any talk of context).

Not a bump, swear.