but we got sidetracked discussing this question: "is the will fundamental in all ethical theories?". — Pussycat

My question to you was:

Is there any ethics that is not based on will - on volition or choice? — Fooloso4

Ethics is not a theory of ethics, just as music is not a theory of music. The failure to make that distinction results in a failure to understand what Wittgenstein means by ethics. The comparison with music was deliberate because in the Tractatus he links ethics/aesthetics. Someone who has never heard music will not come to understand it via a theory of music.

As for Kant, some of the things that Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus, I think that they are directed towards him, so Kant is important here as well. — Pussycat

Yes, but not in the way you claimed. You asked:

How are they fundamentally different, since the foundation in the both of them is the will, no? — Pussycat

This followed your claim:

I would say it's 100% percent Kant — Pussycat

The will is fundamental for all ethics in so far as we intend to do what is right or good. When we ask how that is to be accomplished Kant and Wittgenstein part ways. Kant thinks there is a moral science, Wittgenstein rejects this. That does not make it "100% percent Kant".

But if ethics, as Wittgenstein says in the lecture, is defined to be the general enquiry into what is good (taken from Moore), or the enquiry into what is valuable, or what is really important, or the enquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living, then the will may in fact not be fundamental, or be trivial or even redundant. — Pussycat

So, which is it? Is the will fundamental or not? The basis of your confusion seems to be, once again, the failure to distinguish between ethics and a theory of ethics.

If Aesthetics is the inquiry into what is beautiful, then we can define Ethics similarly as the inquiry into what is a beautiful life, making thus Ethics part of Aesthetics, defining it in terms of beauty that is, and then there would only be beauty to investigate to get a glimpse of them both. — Pussycat

This should be seen in light of the saying/showing distinction. What answers the inquiry is not something that can be said but something that becomes manifest, something experienced. It is not a matter of defining one in terms of the other. It is not a matter of defining it at all.

... you also misunderstood what W was trying to say in the Tractatus, in propositions 6.42 to 6.43: it is not his own opinions on ethics that he is presenting there, but those of conventional ethics, as they have been traditionally discussed. — Pussycat

Are you claiming that when he says:

6.42:
So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
6.421:
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the
same.)

that this is ethics as it has traditionally been discussed? Where? By whom?
And where does the conventional opinion say:

6.43
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the
world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to
speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.

On the contrary, it is the conventional view that says ethical action has an affect in the world.


If this is not Wittgenstein's view then what is his view?

These unessential psychological investigations point to Kant and his categorical imperative, Kant is not doing philosophy there but psychology. — Pussycat

The moral law for Kant was not grounded in psychology and did not appeal to psychology. It is determined a priori by reason.

Philosophy cannot speak of ethics where the will is present, but psychology can. And if we formulate ethics such as we could philosophically speak of it, then it will not do for us what we always tried to make it do ... — Pussycat

Philosophy, according to Wittgenstein, sets the boundaries of what can be thought and said. Ethics is on the side of that boundary that cannot be said or thought. Ethics is transcendental. It is not about theories or propositions or formulations, but rather the life of the "happy man"; life as he knows it via his own experience of the good exercise of his will.

Scepticism, however, does not have any sense at all, and is therefore excluded from philosophical investigations: — Pussycat

As late as "On Certainty" skepticism remained central to his investigations. We need to distinguish between two forms of skepticism: 1) knowledge of ignorance and human limits, 2) radical doubt. Wittgenstein accepts the first and rejects the second.

Descartes took his motto from Ovid: He who lived well hid himself well.

What hides behind the pious facade of a proof of God’s existence based on his perfection of God is the program for the perfection of man.

The three things that characterize a god in Genesis are knowledge, immortality (3:22) and with a universal language man is able to do whatever it is he wills to do (11:6).

In the Meditations Descartes says that as long as we will only what we know we will not err. With his algebraic method (universal language) of solving for any unknown variable, whatever we do not know can be known. The greater the increase of knowledge the less chance of error.The immortality of the soul/mind is “given” via Christianity (contrary to the Genesis story). So, we have all the elements that characterize a god in Genesis: knowledge, immortality, and the ability to do whatever it is we will to do. Descartes’ true concern is not with proofs of God but with overcoming God’s attempt to prevent man from becoming gods.

The topic is the Tractatus but you jump from W. to Kant because both discuss the will and then to a misrepresentation of Russell in order to show that for him the will plays no part in ethics. Based on that misrepresentation you make a dubious claim about a science of ethics, try to tie it back to the Tractatus, and conclude that there are ethical facts and an ethical science.

What you fail to see is that for W. the will does not make ethical determinations. The will does not make ethical determinations for Kant either. In addition, however ethical determinations are made, to choose and act ethically does require the will. Simply determining that one should choose or do ‘x’ does not mean one will choose or do it. I might decide that I would benefit more by not doing ‘x’ even if it harms others. The will alone is not sufficient but is necessary if one is to choose and act ethically. Simply following the rules is not enough because one might not follow them when he can go undetected and it is to his advantage to not follow them.

As to a science of ethics: Russell is not claiming the possibility of a science of ethics but a science of perception - just as the physicist can give an answer to why an object looks yellow or blue, he suggests that there is "probably an answer of the same sort" as to why I think one sort of thing good and another evil. That does not mean that there is a science that determines whether it is good or evil but rather a possible science of moral perception. Moral perception, however, is not moral truth:

R: I don't like the word "absolute." I don't think there is anything absolute whatever. The moral law, for example, is always changing. At one period in the development of the human race, almost everybody thought cannibalism was a duty. — Copleston Debate

Your question which for some reason you were not able to previously articulate:

"what would happen to ethics if it was found that ethics is one of the natural sciences?". — Pussycat

What evidence do you have that such a thing is possible? Where in the world are the facts of meaning and value located? How are they known?

You seem to have moved without making a clear distinction from challenging my interpretation of the Tractatus to what appears to be an ambiguous challenge to the Tractatus itself. From challenging what I said about the role of the will in the Tractatus to challenging the role of the will in ethics to an assertion of ethical facts to speculation about a science of ethics.

So again here, what is ethical has nothing to do with willing it or not, but is based on a fact, a scientific fact, which as W - to get him back in the game - says:

6.43 If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be expressed in language.

So science was able to express in language the ethical, — Pussycat

There is nothing here that indicates that you have distinguished Wittgenstein’s position from your own claim of a science of ethics. Nothing that indicates that they are not seen by you as one and the same.

Fooloso4, can you elaborate on the "will" to do good according to Wittgenstein? I am under the impression that the will to do good is derived from the transcendental self wrt. to the world. Yet, if the self cannot be encapsulated within the bounds of the world, then what can be said about the will? — Wallows

6.422
So our question about the consequences of an action must be unimportant.—At least those consequences should not be events. For there must be something right about the question we posed. There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.
(And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant.)

6.43
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.

6.43
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.

6.432
How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.


Being happy means being in agreement with the world (NB 8.7.16)
Living in agreement with the world is living in accord with one’s conscience, which is the voice of God.

I am then, so to speak, in agreement with that alien will on which I appear dependent. That is to say: “I am doing the will of God” (NB 8.7.16)

It is the connection of things that is important. Simple objects contain their possibilities for occurring in states of affairs, but we cannot tell from these objects what is actually the case, that is, how the world really is.

The Tractatus is mind independent. Idealism plays no role. It is objects in logical space that determine all that is.

Have you read my posts on this? Any answer I give will only be repeating what I have already quoted him saying

R: Well, why does one type of object look yellow and another look blue? I can more or less give an answer to that thanks to the physicists, and as to why I think one sort of thing good and another evil, probably there is an answer of the same sort, but it hasn't been gone into in the same way and I couldn't give it [to] you.

This is not about a science of ethics, it is about why someone would think one sort of thing good and another evil. It does not follow that the one is good and the other evil.

This analysis does not need will, neither its approval, for it to be carried through, — Pussycat

Of course it needs the will to be carried through. It needs the will even to attempt to determine what is ethical. Without the will to do good there would be no need for ethics. You are confusing the determination of ethical action and the motivation for ethical action. Even with Kant the good will is not sufficient for determining what is in accord with one's moral duty. This is the point of the categorical imperative.

which as W - to get him back in the game - says:

6.43 If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the
limits of the world, not the facts; not the things that can be
expressed in language. — Pussycat

Once again, you have misunderstood Wittgenstein. For W. ethics has nothing to do with what happens in the world. He is quite clear that ethics is not a science. He is also clear that it does have to do with the will. I provided ample evidence of this based on the Tractatus, the Notebooks, and the Lecture on Ethics.You jump from a remark made by Russell to the conclusion that W. held that ethics is a science and has nothing to do with the will, the opposite of what he says.

If you have not been convinced then there is nothing more that I can say.

Unless you have something substantive to say based on the Tractatus I think we are done.

For this theory I said that the will plays a non significant role, since ethical matters are judged according to pleasure. — Pussycat

Since we desire pleasure and avoid pain, and move toward the one and avoid the other, it is a matter of will, of what one wishes to pursue or shun.

So if for example our will is to do action A, but it is judged that its consequences will be most unpleasant, then, in order to be ethical, we would refrain from doing it, and do some other action B instead, that causes less discontent and/or more pleasure, so it is not a matter of/for the will, the will succumbs. — Pussycat

No, the will to do what causes less discontent and/or more pleasure wins out.

I said that the will is absent from the first theory, not from both of them. It is absent from the scientific version of ethics since there a person is supposed to be impaired or have an affliction that causes him to act most unethically, or be gifted with something that makes him most ethical. So the will is completely unimportant, just like a color-blind person won't start seeing colors because he wills it so. — Pussycat

By analogy with color blindness, the ethical person will still will or want what is perceived to be good and avoid what is perceived to be bad. Since they are not able to make the distinction correctly, however, their actions may not be ethical.

The ability to make the distinction correctly, however, does not assure that one will act ethically. Being able to see that 'x' is bad 'y' is good does not mean that one will avoid 'x' and do 'y'.

While here ethical matters are decided according to the effects of our actions: we take into account all possible actions together with all their possible consequences, subtract the unpleasant consequences (NP) from the pleasant (P), sort them by their outcome (P - NP), and pick the action-consequences pairs from the top of the list. — Pussycat

Why would we do this if we did not will to do or choose what is good or best or just or most fair or most beneficial or least harmful?

So in both of these ethical theories, the will is either absent (as in the first), or plays a rather non significant role (as in the second). — Pussycat

The will is not absent. All such theories have at their basis the will - the wish or desire or want or motivation to do what is right or good. They differ in how they attempt to determine what that is.

Utilitarianism says that one's choice of action and policy should be guided by what promotes the greater good. Although not generally expressed in these terms, one could say that the Utilitarian wills whatever has the greatest utility.

Is there any ethics that is not based on will - on volition or choice?

Kant attempts to develop a moral science. It puts the will on the wrong side of the boundary that Wittgenstein establishes both in terms of where the will is located and what ethics is about.

I would say it's 100% percent Kant, what do you think? — Pussycat

No, they are fundamentally different. There is for Wittgenstein no categorical imperative.

With regard to actions and consequences:

6.374
Even if all that we wish for were to happen, still this would only be a favour granted by fate, so to speak: for there is no logical connexion between the will and the world, which would guarantee it, and the supposed physical connexion itself is surely not something that we could will.

6.41
The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no
value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens
and is the case is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.

6.422
So our question about the consequences of an action must be unimportant.—At least those consequences should not be events. For there must be something right about the question we posed. There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.
(And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant.)

6.43
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. — T

It is not the consequences of our action, which is something over which we have no control, but “good will”.

Actions are guided by conscience:

Being happy means being in agreement with the world (NB 8.7.16)
Living in agreement with the world is living in accord with one’s conscience, which is the voice of God.

I am then, so to speak, in agreement with that alien will on which I appear dependent. That is to say: “I am doing the will of God” (NB 8.7.16) — Notebooks

I would like to jump into the reading group. About where is the group in terms of section in the text? — SapereAude

I have gone through the whole of the Tractatus section by section, section by section, beginning on page 12. I skipped over the parts that address formal logic and, so to speak, climbed the rungs of the latter.

↪SapereAude I don't think we are anywhere in particular, we are just discussing bits and pieces, here and there. — Pussycat

You really do have a large blind spot.

Right, so how does this "ethical man" differ from someone that is not? If it doesn't have anything to do with whatever he says or thinks, then what else is there? — Pussycat

This has already been addressed. It is not a matter of what he says or thinks, but of what he does, how he lives.

Here he is starting to attack also the "thinking" mode of being ethical, besides the "saying" ... But this left people with believing that it's ok if we cannot speak of the ethical, because we can think of it, and also act upon this thinking ... — Pussycat

I don’t know who you are referring to but certainly not anyone who understands Wittgenstein. He is not “starting to attack also the ‘thinking’ mode of being ethical”. Setting the bounds of thought is fundamental to the Tractatus (see the preface, 4.113-4.114).

Well here he is trying to also bring down this castle, the last fort, the last resort of the ethical man. — Pussycat

There never was a “thinking mode of being ethical” for W. Ethics was always beyond the bounds of what can be thought.

You have completely missed the point. The “ethical man” has nothing to do with either what is said or thought to be ethical.

So Ethics is no science for W — Pussycat

Right. He is not attacking ethics, he is attacking the idea of a science of ethics.

And similarly the absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs

The ethical cannot be found in the world. He was quite clear on this in the Tractatus. Ethics has nothing to do with states of affairs.

And I want to say that such a state of affairs is a chimera.

It is not ethics that is a chimera but the idea of an ethical state of affairs.

It is therefore when and because we feel good with ourselves, pleasurable, that ethical thinking and saying springs. — Pussycat

Again, you do not understand him. See the paragraph after the one you quote:

And there, in my case, it always happens that the idea of one particular experience presents itself to me which therefore is, in a sense, my experience par excellence and this is the reason why, in talking to you now, I will use this experience as my first and foremost example.(As I have said before, this is an entirely personal matter and others would find other examples more striking.) I will describe this experience in order, if possible, to make you recall the same or similar experiences, so that we may have a common ground for our investigation. — Lecture on Ethics

His investigation of the ethical is to take place via personal experience. It is the common ground.

So I see here W argue in favour of amorality, just like Nietzsche, the opinion that ethics is non-existent, in thinking or in saying, in this world or beyond. — Pussycat

Here you betray your lack of understanding not only of Wittgenstein but of Nietzsche as well. What they have in common is the fundamental importance of value and meaning for life. They differ, however, in where that is to be found. For Nietzsche it is the revaluation of values. For Wittgenstein:

Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water and if I were to pour out a gallon over it. — Lecture on Ethics

I believe the best way of describing it is to say that when I have it I wonder at the existence of the
world. And I am then inclined to use such phrases as 'how extraordinary that anything should exist'
or ‘how extraordinary that the world should exist.'

I will mention another experience straight away which I also know and which others of you might
be acquainted with: it is, what one might call, the experience of feeling absolutely safe. I mean the
state of mind in which one is inclined to say 'I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens.' — Lecture on Ethics

This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it
springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the
absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But
it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply
and I would not for my life ridicule it. — Lecture on Ethics

I'm a bit simple so forgive me if I am understanding you wrong, but are you saying Plato was trying to put forth a system of belief for why he (or people like him) could be in charge of the city by claiming to have knowledge he clearly cannot have had? — Carmaris19

Plato, like Socrates, was deeply ironical. In addition, the Republic can be read as the kind of defense of philosophy that Socrates did not give at his own trial. There is a fundamental conflict between philosophy and politics. The Republic reconciles that conflict by making the city subordinate to the philosopher. The Republic is the search for the meaning of and defense of justice. It begins with the soul but Socrates enlarges it to the city because he says it will be easier to see in the larger whole. One of the definitions of justice is minding your own business. One sense of this is that each part of the well ordered soul and city will its proper part based on what it is most suited for. In another sense, it means that there can be no justice as long as the philosopher is not free to philosophize. In line with this, Plato is saying: “mind your own business”, that is, leave us alone. But the city will not leave the philosopher alone unless it is convinced that philosophy benefits the city. And so, Plato invents the story of a realm of transcendent truths that can be known by those who ascend from the cave. A quest that leads to the truth and Good.

Politics man..... — Carmaris19

Yes, but a politics of the soul. He is quite clear that he did not intend for this to be the model of an actual city. The Greek city states are long gone but Plato is still here and is still a philosopher-king, whether his rule is in the form of Platonism or Christianity (Platonism for the masses/people), or those who see past the public image of knowledge to the insurmountable problem of ignorance.

As for the form of a chair-- you could call it the form of a seat if you prefer, but if there is no need for a form of a chair-- as in some basic idea/concept that is irreplaceable (a seat) to that entity (entity being a thing that exists), then I see no need for forms in general — Carmaris19

It may be that the forms are useful for thought rather than as the basis of ontology. See the discussion of the “divided line” in the Republic for the central importance of the image making. It plays a role in almost every aspect of the book from the images on the cave wall, to the image makers, to mathematical images, to the images of Forms (which reverses the way Forms are presented, that is, the Forms themselves are images, part of Plato’s image making). With regard to chairs, it is not that there is an eternal chair grasped noetically, but that we can create a chair in the mind, an image that we can use as a form, a model, to design an actual chair.

I have not idea what the chimaera you are referring to that you say he is referring to is. If you would like to discuss it cite in in context and tell me what you think it is.

And?

There are various forms of knowledge including things that can only be known via experience. And that is why Wittgenstein remains silent about such experiences. What he says at the end of the lecture:

Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something ... What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense

supports that. I have highlighted "our" because this points to the difference between discursive knowledge, that is, knowledge that can be conveyed from one person to another, and what I can know only by experience.

Your complaint is like saying that there can be no knowledge of the taste of vanilla ice cream.

A couple of more quotes from the lecture:

Now instead of saying “Ethics is the enquiry into what is good” I could have said Ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable, or, into what is really important, or I could have said Ethics is the enquiry
into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living. I believe if you look at all these phrases you will get a rough idea as to what it is Ethics is concerned with. — Lecture

Now when this is urged against me I at once see clearly, as it were in a flash of light, not only that no description that I can think of would do to describe what I mean by absolute value, but that I would reject
every significant description that anybody could possibly suggest, ab initio, on the ground of its significance. That is to say: I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant language. — Lecture

The meaning and value of life are not things that can be expressed in language. I cannot know what they are based on anything you can say, but that does not mean I cannot know that life has meaning and value. It is not a criticism of either W. or my interpretation of him to point out that they do not relate to discursive knowledge, that is rather, exactly the whole point of the distinction between what can be said and what shows itself, what makes itself manifest.

It is quite clear that there is ethical experience. One knows what it is, according to W., to be a happy man. One knows what it is to be in agreement with the world, with one's conscience, the will of God. One knows what it is for life to have value and meaning. One knows what it is to live in the eternal present. One knows the mystical (it makes itself manifest). One know how to see the world aright and what it is to see the world aright. One knows how all things stand, how it is all related, that is, God.

Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something ... What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense

In other words, as I have been saying, there is not discursive knowledge regarding the ethical.

So where is it that W says that we cannot know God using reason, but that we can know God experientially? — Pussycat

In answer to the first part of the question, once again:

6.432
How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world. — T

In the Tractatus W. is almost silent about God, which of course would be expected, but there are a few statements in the Notebooks, a few of which I already pointed to can be found in an earlier post.

Wie sich alles verhalt, ist Gott. Gott ist, wie sich alles verhalt

God is how all things stand, how it is all related (NB 1.8.16)

To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter. To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning (NB 8.7.16) — NB

He expresses a trust in God as a father (NB 11.6.16)

In A Lecture on Ethics he speaks of the experience of feeling absolutely safe in which nothing can injure him regardless of what happens (Philosophical Occasions p.4)

The meaning of life cannot be found in either the world or in the “I” but only in the relation between them.

There are two godheads: the world and my independent “I”. (NB 8.7.16) — NB

Although what happens in the world is independent of my will, nothing that happens in the world has any meaning independent from the will.

Once again:

Being happy means being in agreement with the world (NB 8.7.16)
Living in agreement with the world is living in accord with one’s conscience, which is the voice of God.

I am then, so to speak, in agreement with that alien will on which I appear dependent. That is to say: “I am doing the will of God” (NB 8.7.16) — NB

But what does "discursively" mean? Rational thinking? — Pussycat

It is related to the term discourse, thus to language and the expression of thoughts.

Most likely this is what W meant, but by saying that "these cannot be known discursively", it endangers that we leave and throw reason completely out of the game. — Pussycat

That depends on the game. When the game has to do with the facts of the world, what is the case, or natural science then reason plays a role, but if we are talking about ethics and aesthetics then, according to W., it plays no role; such statements would have no propositional sense because it does not refer to the facts of the world.

In a similar tune in stanford's article on Kant that you shared, it says somewhere: — Pussycat

Above the passage you quoted, in the same paragraph:

Kant does not reject the thinkability of the supersensible … — Stanford

Wittgenstein does.

Why would Kant deal with reason with what is outside the bounds of language, if the latter - the unreasonable - were unknowable? (but neither with this I have a problem) — Pussycat

Your question is pretty jumbled. Kant uses reason to set the limits of reason, of what can be known via speculative reason and what illusions the non-critical use of reason leads to.

Now with this, I have a problem. I don't see anywhere in the Tractatus Wittegenstein:

a) say explicitly that what is outside the bounds of language can be known experientially.

b) even imply or hint that such is the case. — Pussycat

5.641
There is therefore really a sense in which the philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I.
The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the “world is my world”.
The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject,
the limit—not a part of the world.

The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world. — T

The sense of the world, its value lies outside the world. It is what is experienced by the happy man.

6.43
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. — T

The world of the happy man as well as the world of the unhappy man is the world as they experience it.

As to God:

Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
— T 6.42

How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.
— T 6.432

Being happy means being in agreement with the world (NB 8.7.16)
Living in agreement with the world is living in accord with one’s conscience, which is the voice of God.

I am then, so to speak, in agreement with that alien will on which I appear dependent. That is to say: “I am doing the will of God” (NB 8.7.16) — W

From which you extract:

Philosophy sets boundaries. — Pussycat

I do not extract that from the quote. He explicitly states that this is what philosophy does. I quote it and reference it in a post on the section of the Tractatus where he says it.

Now where exactly does W. say explicitly in the Tractatus that the things that are not within the bounds of language "are not known discursively but experentially"? Particularly the second. — Pussycat

If they are not within the bounds of language then by definition they cannot be known discursively. As to the experiential, I discussed this in my post on part six, specifically with regard to the will and the world of the happy man. What do you think he means by the world of the happy man?

An interesting article. I wonder how his thought would have developed if he had lived.

The following caught my eye as it related to the discussion of the Tractatus:

As Ramsey put it in a 1929 draft paper titled ‘Philosophy’, one method, ‘Ludwig’s’, is to:

construct a logic, and do all our philosophical analysis entirely unselfconsciously, thinking all the time of the facts and not about our thinking about them … — What is Truth? On Ramsey

This is the point of my saying that W.’s transcendental logic did not require a transcendental subject as Kant’s had.

I cannot comment on the rhino. I do not know what was said. I do not know, as the link assumes, that it had something to do with induction.

Here’s the problem:

2.223
In order to discover whether the picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
2.224
It cannot be discovered from the picture alone whether it is true or false.
2.225
There is no picture which is a priori true. — T

How can we determine whether the proposition that there is a rhino in the room is true or false? How can we compare it with reality if we reject empirical evidence?

Hume’s problem of induction is not about what can be verified empirically here and now, such as whether there is a rhino in the room, but about what we infer will be the case based on prior experience. For example, if every time I walk into Russell’s room there is a rhino I might after numerous times infer that there will be a rhino in his room the next time I visit. There might, but then again, there might not. That is something I cannot know until I visit. It does not follow logically that because there has been a rhino in the past there will be one in the future

So, with the above in mind, does Wittgenstein ever make the claim that, logic and the world, are one and the same? Or is there some distinction drawn between the two? Or in other words, how does logic relate to the world, if as we've discussed the metaphysical self lies beyond it? — Wallows

They are not the same. The world is made up of objects. Objects have logical form and combine to make facts. Logic is the structure, the scaffolding of the world, not the world itself. If you read my posts you will find that I have addressed all of this.

So, you ask questions but do not answer them?

Logic determines what is possible. It tells us nothing of what is actual.

How does that answer the question about induction?

I included several of those statements in my discussion of 6.

I think the larger issue has to do with his claim that the laws of nature and the law of causality are not necessary laws. It follows that there can be no law of induction. I am generally in agreement. I see the laws of nature as descriptive rather than prescriptive or proscriptive. They mark regularities, but I am not certain that things must always follow the same patterns as they do now. I am by temperament not a determinist, but I do not know enough to take an unyielding stance.

I do not know if this is what you are inquiring about though. What do you think about Wittgenstein's answer to Hume's problem of induction in the Tractatus?

Once again: the term metaphysics is used both in the sense of a science and a subject area that may or may not be addressed via science, that is, as something that can be known discursively. What is now called Aristotle’s metaphysics, the question of being qua being was not addressed a priori. First philosophy was not for Aristotle an a priori science. The question is whether metaphysics is for Wittgenstein a priori. My answer is: no, it is existential and experiential. It has nothing to do with science. That is the point of setting the bounds of science.

As to Kant: he holds that there can be no knowledge of anything outside of experience, and so it follows that there can be no knowledge of God or the soul. Some have taken this to be a rejection of the existence of God and soul since they are not objects of experience. But that is not the case. From the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason:

Just the same sort of exposition of the positive utility of critical principles of pure reason can be given in respect to the concepts of God and of the simple nature of our soul, which, however, I forgo for the sake of brevity. Thus I cannot even assume God, freedom and immortality for the sake of the necessary practical use of my reason unless I simultaneously deprive speculative reason of its pretension to extravagant insights; because in order to attain to such insights, speculative reason would have to help itself to principles that in fact reach only to objects of possible experience, and which, if they were to be applied to what cannot be an object of experience, then they would always actually transform it into an appearance, and thus declare all practical extension of pure reason to be impossible. Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith; and the dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice that without criticism reason can make progress in metaphysics, is the true source of all unbelief conflicting with morality, which unbelief is always very dogmatic. - Thus even if it cannot be all that difficult to leave to posterity the legacy of a systematic metaphysics, constructed according to the critique of pure reason, this is still a gift deserving of no small respect … (B xxix-xxx). — Kant

Kant rejects a priori arguments attempting to prove the existence of God and soul. They are not objects of knowledge a priori but matters of faith. For a detailed discussion see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/

↪Wallows I think that he is doing a good job, but partly. For the other part, its really bad: he makes his own views pass as W's, most commonly they appear at the end of a paragraph. — Pussycat

I have already asked you to point out where I have made a mistake or questionable move. Where specifically do my own views differ from his? What textual evidence points to that difference? I do not make my views pass as his. I set his statements in quotes and then comment on them. The two are easily distinguished.

Lots, like the last comment, "not discursively, but experentially", what the heck is this, where on earth did W say that, or even hinted?? — Pussycat

The following are direct quotes from the text. I cited them in my post.

It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

— T 6.421

If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. — T 6.43

I can see that I am still holding a bit of my own philosophy in my considerations, only sort of giving up what I need to for a rudimentary understanding-- but good, justice, and beauty do not register high in my ontology as they seem to be very subjective things, and more of ideals than things I could consider as having forms. — Carmaris19

That is precisely the point. By treating them as eternal, unchangeable Forms they are no longer a matter of opinion but of something known by the philosophers who rule the city. On my reading of Plato they are not ideals, in fact the Republic is fundamentally anti-idealist. On the one hand there is the public teaching - these things exist and are known by those few who have transcended the cave. They should lead since they alone know the truth. On the other, if we recognize that we do not know, that human wisdom is knowledge of our ignorance, then we should be skeptical of ideals because they are based on ignorance. But of course the city in the Republic is a city in speech. There is no city like it and there cannot be. The reason is, that the paradigmatic philosopher, Socrates knows that he does not know and as a careful reading of the text makes clear is telling a story about philosophers who know things that he does not and no one else does either. It is all a noble (kalos - which also means beautiful) lie.

I would have to say that if a triangle has a form, a chair has to though, and if a self exists it must to have a form (imo). — Carmaris19

Why would a chair have to have a form? It is, after all, something to sit on, and several things will serve that purpose. But if we want to be comfortable then someone will design something to sit on that supports the back and may have other features that distinguish a chair from a stool. There is no eternal, unchangeable model that the chairs we sit on are copies or images of.

Why would the self have to have a form? What is the relationship between a self and the Self?

I don't see the relevance of Parmenides, especially as the basis of the discussion requires the acceptance of Plato's forms. My goal is to understand Plato and explore the implications of his philosophy (which is really the same thing). — Carmaris19

The Platonic dialogue Parmenides, which takes place between Parmenides and Socrates as a young man. Parmenides raises several problems with Socrates’ idea of Forms that Socrates is unable to solve. Since the dialogue takes place when Socrates is still young it raises questions as to the status of Forms in Plato’s philosophy as represented by the character Socrates.

The assumption that Plato holds to a “theory of Forms” should not be taken at face value. His irony should not be ignored. His skill as a writer, his art of writing, his poesis, should not be ignored. What he says in the Phaedrus about the art of writing - comparing the well written work to a living animal with each part having a function working together to form a whole, tells us how a well written work should be read - as a whole, with each part having its function working together in a particular way to form that whole.

In the Republic the myths of the poets, the authorities on the gods, are replaced with a philosophical poetry. A new mythology of eternal Forms known only by a few.

I might put it this way: if logic is the transcendent condition for language then what is the transcendental condition for silence? The answer is ethics. Ethics is not about questions and answers or riddles, it is about the will and experience. It is about what one sees when he looks at the world in the right way, sub specie aeterni.

Philosophy sets boundaries. The boundaries of language exclude the metaphysical, but this is not a rejection of the metaphysical but rather means that the metaphysical is misunderstood and only leads to nonsense if one attempts to treat it as if it were within the bounds of language. Thus the right method of philosophy leads to silence about such things. There are not known discursively but experientially.

First off a simple summary of my understanding of the topic. I believe Plato argued that there was a material reality (the world of becoming) that was indeed "real," but that there was a deeper--immaterial--nature of reality (the world of being) that was more real. — Carmaris19

That is the story, but we should not read Plato as we would a discourse on metaphysics. There must be an art of reading that corresponds to his art of writing. See the Phaedrus.

The argument for why this world of being is more real than the world of being is in essence this: the ultimate reality should first of all be unchanging (perhaps I guess because if something can readily be given up, i.e changed, then it is not essential to reality? IDK not the interesting part to me except in setting up the basis for more ponderings). The world of becoming (material world) is in constant change though--so it cannot be the "essential" reality. — Carmaris19

That is part of it. It is also a matter of truth and knowledge. If I am to know what is just then I must know something that is timeless and unchanging, otherwise what is just here and now may be unjust at some other time and place. In other words, it cannot be a matter of convention.

The world of being though is a world of "perfect forms) however--or rather ideas. Ideas do not change. I will give 2 examples. The first is that of the perfect right triangle. He argues that it does not exist in the world of becoming because there will always be imperfections from a shakey hand or imperfect drawing surface. The "true" right triangle lies in the world of being. — Carmaris19

“Form” translates ‘eidos’, which is the look or kind of a thing. The term ‘idea’ comes from eidos and has an interesting philosophical history that includes a turn from universality to subjectivity, from something independent of the human mind to something that is of or from the mind. The triangles we draw are images of the triangle “itself”.

The second example is of a chair. Chairs exist in the material world, but they vary in shape, color, comfort, etc. You can change just about any detail of a chair--but ultimately those details are just ideas we have applied to the chair. The ideas themselves--say wheels on the bottom, or lumbar support--are immaterial "forms" that do not change. Lumbar support, no matter what it's called or how it is implemented, will always be the same--and a right triangle will always have 3 sides and a 90 degree angle, regardless of any changing material details. For this reason, the world of being is argued to be the truest reality. — Carmaris19

Whether there are Forms of such things as chairs is problematic for Plato. See Parmenides. But then again, the Forms themselves are problematic for Plato. We may have an idea of a chair, a universal, but this does not mean that this idea has the ontological status of the eidos such as the Good, Justice, and Beauty. In all cases we do refer to some idea, but the Forms themselves are said to be beyond our knowledge.

I assume we all experience having a mind--but what does it mean in regard to Plato's worlds that the mind we experience is not immune to change? Perhaps it means that besides our bodies being a part of the world of becoming, so too is our mind. Perhaps it means that not only can we never truly experience the mind of another, but that we can never even accurately experience our own mind (which means we can never fully claim to know even our own self). I argue it could even possibly mean that experiencing material reality is experiencing the formation of your own mind. — Carmaris19

The analogy that Plato uses is to sight. Noesis, seeing the Forms, is passive. It is not like dianoia or reason with is active or constructive. In other words, there is no changing mind corresponding to the changing world. Knowledge of the Forms is stasis, or more precisely, exstatis.

Here's my thinking: if what is ultimately real does not change--then an ultimately real mind cannot change. If your mind changes-- then what you are experiencing as your mind cannot be the ultimate reality of your mind. — Carmaris19

It is interesting, although Plato does talk about Mind, I do not think that he ever talks about Mind as a Form in the Republic, which is his most sustained discussion of such things. Although in the Phaedo he does talk about soul as Form.

After your death, as far as we can tell in the world of becoming, your mind does not change. — Carmaris19

We do find in Plato the myth of recollection, of what learns in death when the soul is separated from the body, that is, knowledge of the Forms. In the Phaedo he uses this as one of his “proofs” of the immortality of the soul.

Do others know you better than you know yourself? I can't find a truly satisfying answer in my understanding of Plato's world's. — Carmaris19

Plato’s Socrates calls himself a physician of the soul. In knowing what medicine his interlocutors need to cure their illness he knows them better than they know themselves. He frequently cited the motto “know thyself”.

Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world.
Logic is transcendental. — T 6.13

Transcendental, as the term is used here, means both what transcends or is not contained within and, in the Kantian sense, the condition for the possibility of knowledge - of language, of representation of the world. Logic is the scaffolding (6.124). W. differs from Kant, however, in that for W. there is no need for a transcendental subject as a condition for knowledge.

6.3
And outside logic all is accident.
6.36311
It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it will rise.
6.37
There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

6.371
The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.
6.372
Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages.
And in fact both are right and both wrong: though the view of the ancients is clearer in so far as they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if everything were explained. — T

That the world is as it is is accidental. That things are as they are is not because that is how they must be. It could have been otherwise. There is nothing that causes things to be as they are in any absolute sense. No necessity that the sun will rise tomorrow. The view of the ancients - God and fate is clearer in so far as they acknowledged a terminus, that is, we cannot go further than saying how things are. Why they are as they are and not some other way yields no answer.

The world is independent of my will. — T 6.373

It is because there is no necessity, no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened, that my will cannot determine what will happen.

Just as the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, so too the only impossibility that exists is logical impossibility. — T 6.375

The laws of nature are not logically necessary laws and thus not immutable. The fact that something violates the laws of nature does not mean it is not possible for such a thing to occur if it not logically impossible for it to occur.

The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world. — T 6.41

W. is using the term ‘sense’ (Sinn) here in different way than he had been using it. Prior to this sense referred to propositions and they had a sense insofar as they pointed to a state of affairs (4.022). Here he is not referring to propositional sense, for the sense of the world has nothing to do with the facts of the world. The facts of the world are accidental, and thus have no value.

So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher. — T 6.42

There are no propositions about value. If one attempted to put the non-propositional sense of the world into words the proposition would be senseless (sinnlos). The value of the world is experiential.

It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.) — T 6.421

The ethical is not within the facts of the world, it is the condition for the possibility of knowledge of the world in terms of value and meaning.

The connection between the self and the world is via the will.


6.422

When an ethical law of the form, ‘Thou shalt . . . ’ is laid down, one’s first thought is, ‘And what if I do not do it?’ It is clear, however,that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms.
So our question about the consequences of an action must be unimportant.—At least those consequences should not be events. For there must be something right about the question we posed. There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself.
(And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant.)

6.423
It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes.
And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology.
6.43
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man. — T

The exercise of the will does not determine what happens in the world. There is no logical, that is to say, necessary connection between what I do and what happens. The effect of the exercise of the will is on the subject. The world as a whole is different for the happy man and the unhappy man.

In the Notebooks 1914-1916 says a bit more about the happy man:

Being happy means being in agreement with the world (NB 8.7.16)
Living in agreement with the world is living in accord with one’s conscience, which is the voice of God.

I am then, so to speak, in agreement with that alien will on which I appear dependent. That is to say: “I am doing the will of God” (NB 8.7.16) — Notebooks

He asks:

How can man be happy at all, since he cannot ward off the misery of this world (NB 13.8.16) — Notebooks

And answers:

The only life that is happy is the life that can renounce the amenities of the world. To it the amenities of the world are so many graces of fate (NB 13.8.16)

I can only make myself independent of the world - and so in a sense master it - by renouncing any influence on happenings (NB 11.6.16) — Notebooks

Happiness requires that I not be dependent on a world that is independent of my will.

So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end. — T 6.431

He does not mean that he believed that when he dies there would be no one and nothing left to read his work. The end of the world is for each of us the end of my world, for that is the world alone that I experience, solus ipse.

Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death.
If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present.
Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits. — T 6.4311

Here we see another sense of the importance of limits for W., or in this case of what is without limits.

Not only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul, that is to say of its eternal survival after death; but, in any case, this assumption completely fails to accomplish the purpose for which it has always been intended. Or is some riddle solved by my surviving for ever? Is not this eternal life itself as much of a riddle as our present life? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time.
(It is certainly not the solution of any problems of natural science that is required.) — T 6.4312

The question of the immortality of the soul is of no importance to W.

A man who is happy must have no fear. Not even in the face of death. Only a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy. For life in the present there is no death. (NB 8.7.16) — Notebooks

How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world. — T 6.432

One sense of this might be with regard to the problem of evil and the claim that if there is evil there cannot be a benevolent God. He is saying that the former has no bearing on the latter. Another sense is made explicit: God does not reveal himself in the world. We can know nothing of God by looking at the world.

6.4321
The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution.
6.44
It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. — T

It in not how the world is that is mystical, but that it is. In “A Lecture on Ethics” W. describes the ethical experience par excellence as follows:

I wonder at the existence of the world. And I am then inclined to use such phrases as “how extraordinary that anything should exist” or “how extraordinary that the world should exist” (Philosophical Occasions, p. 41) — Philosophical Occasions

Such phrases he points out, are nonsense, but what they attempt to express, the experience, is meaningful.

6.45
To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole—a limited whole.
Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical.

6.522
There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest.
They are what is mystical. — T

The proper connection for W. between ethics and aesthetics is not with regard to modes of expression but with regard to a way of looking at things:

The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis, and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connexion between between art and ethics.

The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside. (NB 7.10.16) — Notebooks

Drawing the limits of the world has not only a semantic but an ethical importance as well. To view the world sub specie aeterni as a limited whole is to view the world in independence from it. To see that the world is my world is not simply to see how logic limits the world from inside through language, but to see how ethics enters the world from outside through my will.

6.53

The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one.

6.54
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical,
when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. — T

The central point here is not the distinction between what we cannot say but can only show, it is a matter of what shows itself, what can be seen if we look at things in the right way. The meaning of the world is something experiential, something mystical, something transcendent, something ecstatic - (exstasis, to stand outside of or beyond).

Then what can be said about the subject at all if it forms cannot be depicted? — Wallows

There are some things that can be said relating to the will, which I will address, but it is more about what is seen, what is experienced. The saying/showing distinction can obscure this since showing is dependent upon seeing. And this is why all of this leads to silence.

A subject cannot represent itself — Wallows

Right, just as the eye sees but in seeing does not see itself, the subject represents but does not represent itself.

I never said your posts are incoherent. — Wallows

You said:

Please distill your thoughts. I can't gather them all in one coherent fashion, — Wallows

A bit off putting since I spent a good deal of time and effort combing through the Tractatus trying to show the rungs of the ladder.

I wouldn't dare to say that to a grad student which I assume you are. — Wallows

It has been a long time since I was a graduate student. If I was still in school I would not have time for this.

The work is easy to use as a means to end a sentence; but, I hope we can delve more deeply into the metaphysical self and its relation to the world through the logical form in logical space. — Wallows

Everything has been leading up to doing just that. I am mirroring Wittgenstein's approach, climbing the rungs of the ladder.

No, he seems to know what he is talking about. "A priori metaphysics" is somewhat superfluous and I'm still not sure what purpose was it suppose to serve. — Wallows

Because W. does not treat God and soul a priori. I will have more to say on this in #6 of the Tractatus.

These are concepts that Wittgenstein doesn't explicitly talk about in the Tractatus... Are you inferring them from what has been said contrasted to what hasn't been said? — Wallows

He does. I quoted them above.

Yes, I think so. But, it's just redundant to state a limit where none can be drawn, no? — Wallows

The most important limit he points to is the limit of my world. He need not trace the boundary of that limit in order to point to the fact that there is a limit. He denies that there can be knowledge of the whole. He is in that sense a skeptic. (There are various forms of skepticism.) He is not denying the possibility of knowledge but of knowledge of the whole. Compare the systematic philosophy of Spinoza and Hegel.

Not true, the facts of science are indisputable. — Wallows

It is not a denial of science. The two dimensional drawing of the cube yields two different facts. These facts are not independent of the subject who looks at it one way and then the other and sees the fact that looked at one way a is in front and the other that b is in front. The same set of lines yields two different facts, but those facts are dependent on the subject. (5.5423)

The subject may not represent itself; but, that is irrelevant. The form is the
same. — Wallows

The logical form that underlies the facts and propositions is the same. The subject is neither one of those facts and so cannot be represented in a proposition. The subject’s relation to the world is not a logical one. More on this in # 6.

I disagree. I think that whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. That we cannot talk about the "metaphysical subject" doesn't mean it doesn't exist in the world. — Wallows

The metaphysical subject does exist, it is not, however, in the world. The eye that sees the world does not see itself in the world.

Yes, but, the world came first. — Wallows

Right. And that is what is meant when I say that the limits of my world are not the limits of the world. There is more to the world than to my limited world. He is in this way a skeptic, but not in the modern sense. It is rather in the way that Socrates is - knowing that there are things he does not know, that my limits are not the limits of all that is.

Interesting. But the metaphysical self is then transcendental? — Wallows

It depends on what you mean by transcendental. If used in the sense of what goes beyond certain limits then yes. For Kant transcendental means the conditions for the possibilities of experience. W. says that two things are transcendental - logic (6.13) and ethics/aesthetics (6.421). I will have more to say on this when I get to 6.

Please read my post on 5 (the one you said was incoherent. I assure you that it is not). It is mostly direct quotes from the text and addresses all of the questions you raised.