Do you see the distinction being made between reasons and causes? — Wayfarer

I put my hand between the white ball and the red ball. If I have free will, then I have a reason. In determinism, there is a cause.

From Britannica - Reason

Reason, in philosophy, the faculty or process of drawing logical inferences.

Logic in a narrow sense is equivalent to deductive logic. By definition, such reasoning cannot produce any information (in the form of a conclusion) that is not already contained in the premises.

However, sooner or later, reason breaks down, as premises are assumed to be true, not proved to be true.

When asked "why did you put your hand between the white ball and the red ball?", at the end of the day it comes down to "no reason, because I wanted to".

Right, but these are peculiar forms of Idealism. — Joshs

Yes, Idealism is an extensive topic, as the SEP article on Idealism indicates.

Heidegger has "Being-in-the-World", but this may be a similar problem with Wittgenstein and the world. Where does this world exist, within the mind (Idealism) or external to the mind (Realism). Wittgenstein never says.

As the Wikipedia article on Ontology notes:

According to philosopher Rudolf Carnap, for example, ontological statements are relative to language and depend on the ontological framework of the speaker. This means that there are no framework-independent ontological facts since different frameworks provide different views while there is no objectively right or wrong framework

Provide a link to the person who made this classification and where you can read more about it — Astorre

As a start, there is the SEP article on Idealism and the SEP article on Realism.

Of course, but the question is how. Do they consist of matter, or do they exist in some other way? — Metaphysician Undercover

Words exist in a mind-independent world in two ways, in the same way that 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 exists in two ways.

They exist as physical matter, whether as electrons or the pixels 0 and 1, and they exist as spatial and temporal relations between these electrons or pixels.

Your mind perceives not only the pixels on your screen but also the spatial relations between these pixels on your screen

Even when not looking at your screen, these pixels and spatial relations between them exist on your screen.
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If it is something which is determined, by a deterministic world, then I'll just forget about making that stressful annoying effort. — Metaphysician Undercover

To forget about making an effort assumes free will. In a deterministic world, your decision to forget about making an effort has already been determined.

But the issue is, how do these things, words in this example, exist in that medium between you and me? Is the concept of "matter" required to explain that medium? — Metaphysician Undercover

Words must physically exist in some form in the physical space between where you exist and where I exist, otherwise we would not be able to exchange ideas.
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To say "I had no choice but to put my hand between the white and red ball" is not a good answer. It denies the usefulness of deliberation, which is not a good thing to do. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a deterministic world, you had no choice but to put your hand between the white and red ball.

Deliberation is part of a process that is determined in a deterministic world.
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The law of identity denies the possibility that two distinct clocks, named as A and B, are identical. So your example, although referring to the law of identity, really violates it. — Metaphysician Undercover

My main point is that the clocks A and B will continue to show the same time, not because of any external connection between them, but because of their particular internal structures. IE, there need not be a universal time in order for these two clocks to show the same time.

The question of how to approach the ontology of being that which exists beyond language and thought—is a central one in philosophy, since language and thought inevitably shape our perception of reality. — Astorre

It depends which line of enquiry you are considering.

There are two distinct lines of enquiry, the ontology of being within a Realist framework and the ontology of being within an Idealist framework.

Ontological realism of being is the view that being exists independently of our language and thoughts. Ontological idealism of being is the view that being is fundamentally of the mind, where reality does not consist of mind-independent particles or forces, but is grounded in consciousness and reason.

Husserl's phenomenology is certainly that of ontological idealism, where any belief in the world's independent existence is put aside to focus on human experiences.

Heidegger's Dasein is also about ontological Idealism. It is about "being-in-the-world", in that we are not detached observers of the world but embedded in our experiences.

Kierkegaard's "leap of faith" is within ontological Idealism, where truth is an inward movement towards a lived experience.

Zen Buddhism has similarities to Husserl's phenomenology, and again ontological idealism.

Philip J. Bossert wrote:

I believe that a discussion of this issue of language and paradox might provide a fruitful point of comparative philosophical dialogue between Zen Buddhism and phenomenological philosophy.

For Taoism, the ontology of being is possibly a meaningless question, in that it emphasises direct experience rather than any metaphysical speculation.

Are you considering ontological being just from the viewpoint of idealism?

I had to make some simplifications to explain things to Russell. — Astorre

It really is not necessary to simplify your ideas for me to understand, I will try to keep up.

I am interested in the other question: whether there is something that is regardless of whether we speak of it, think of it, or conceptualise it. This is the difference between epistemology and ontology. — Astorre

I was just wondering how we can approach the ontology of being, something that is external to our language and thoughts, without using language or thoughts.

The claim "esse est percipi", to perceive is defined and explained clearly in many of the philosophers' passages. Berkeley's is no different -- to perceive is to use the 5 senses and of course the understanding of this perception. — L'éléphant

"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived".

We both perceive through our sense of vision that Mary is wearing a yellow jacket.

Therefore for Berkeley, in the mind of God, Mary is wearing a yellow jacket.

However, I may perceive Mary is bored because she is wearing bright clothes and you may perceive that Mary is not bored precisely because she is wearing bright clothes.

If perception refers to understanding, the situation becomes very unclear. How can anyone know what is in the mind of God if everyone's perceived understanding of the same situation is probably different. How can anyone ever know Mary's true state of being.

Mary's "to be" can never be known if "is to be perceived" means perceived in the understanding.
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I think you must be conflating physicalism with "matter" which we call substance that is independent of tangible things and perceptible qualities. — L'éléphant

Some say that "Physicalism" is interchangeable with "Materialism".

Materialists held that everything was matter, an inert, senseless substance.

But Physicalists point out that not everything is matter, in that a force such as gravity is physical but not material in the traditional sense.

Both Materialists and Physicalist believe that there are things in the world existing independently of any observation by either human or god.

From SEP - Physicalism

Physicalism is sometimes known as ‘materialism’. Indeed, on one strand to contemporary usage, the terms ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ are interchangeable. But the two terms have very different histories.
As the name suggests, materialists historically held that everything was matter — where matter was conceived as “an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist”
But physics itself has shown that not everything is matter in this sense; for example, forces such as gravity are physical but it is not clear that they are material in the traditional sense
I will adopt the policy of using both terms interchangeably.

What's a "fact"? It's apparently not something existing in the world, so what is the correspondence? It seems to be a correspondence between two "things" that are both within your mind, and therefore circular. — Relativist

A public language exists as a fact in the world, therefore the word "chair" exists as a fact in the world.

The correspondence is between the concept of a chair in my mind and the word "chair" that exists as a fact in the world.

How do you account for truth? Is truth entirely subjective? — Relativist

There are many different definitions of "truth" - see SEP - Truth

In the absence of humans there would be no truth. For example, is a rock "true"?

"Truth" only exists in the presence of humans, and therefore is entirely subjective.

For me the statement "objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts" is true.

This must be a correspondence theory of truth, in that a true statement in language corresponds to a fact in the world.

"Objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts" is true IFF objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts.

As it is a fact that tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts, this must be a true statement.

It would be surprising if we saw different things, when looking at the same object. — Punshhh

I agree, I am sure that we do. But it can never be proved that we do.

Even more impressive, the geneticists concluded that all human beings on Earth right now can trace their lineage back to the Eve gene, a single common female ancestor whom scientists called the Mitochondrial Eve. She lived around 200,000 years ago.
science.howstuffworks.com

We largely speak a common truth. To claim solipsism with regard to other people is quite extreme. — Punshhh

On the one hand we speak the common truth that "the postbox is red".

But on the other hand, when we both look at this "red postbox", how do we know our subjective experiences of the colour "red" are the same?

We could only know for sure if mind-reading was possible.

The determinist perspective, which dictates that the white ball, in the past, will necessarily cause the red ball to move, in the future, assumes a necessary continuity through the present, thereby eliminating the possibility of choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

The deterministic perspective equates to my previous experiences.

All things being equal, if on a snooker table I saw a white ball hit the red ball a 1,000 times, I would expect that the red ball would react in exactly the same way. This is my experience of the world. From my personal experiences, my belief is that we live in a deterministic world.
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If this is the case, then there is no necessary continuity of existence of an object from past to future — Metaphysician Undercover

Scenario one. A white ball hits a red ball, and the red ball moves.

Scenario two. A white ball almost hits a red ball. I put my hand between them and the red ball doesn't move.

Both scenarios are consistent with being in a deterministic world.

In scenario one, there is the conservation of momentum.

In scenario two, living in a deterministic world, I had no choice but to put my hand between the white and red ball.

In both scenarios, there is a necessary and deterministic continuity from past to present.
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If the world is recreated at each passing moment, then it could be created in any random way, so the observed consistency needs to be accounted for. — Metaphysician Undercover

God could be the reason for consistency. A God who willingly re-creates the world at each passing moment.

This raises the question, why does God behave consistently. Why doesn't God behave in a random way. He could if He wanted. Perhaps one time the white ball hits the red ball and the red ball stays where it is. Perhaps the next time the white ball hits the red ball and the red ball shoots off at 90 metres per second.

Logic could also be the reason for consistency. For example, The Law of Identity states that each thing is identical to itself. Logic could be at the heart of reality. Even though logic is internal, a natural by-product would be a universality.

For example, consider two identical clocks both set at 1pm that slowly move apart. The times shown on their clock faces will remain the same, not because of some external connection between them, but because Clock A is identical to itself, clock B is identical to itself and clock A is identical to clock B.

The two clocks will maintain the same time, even though there is no external connection between them, but because each clock is identical to itself.

A by-product of the Law of Identity that something is identical to itself is a universal truth. A universal consistency.

Conversely, how can materialism justify belief in a mind-independent physical world without appealing to a likeness principle and a "master argument", in order to ground a theory of evidence relating subjective observations to the material world? — sime

For Berkeley, tables and chairs exist in the world even when not observed by any human, because they exist in the mind of God.

As an Indirect Realist, I don't believe that tables and chairs exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts.

This raises the problem of inter-subjectivity. How can two people talk about tables and chairs if no table or chair exists in the world?

For me, tables and chairs exist in language and language exists in the world.

Tables and chairs may not exist in the world as physical things, but "tables" and "chairs" do exist in the world as physical things, as physical words.

To the concept I have in my mind of a table, I can attach the label "table", thereby linking something in my mind to something in the world.

Someone else can do the same thing. They can have a concept in their mind, and attach the label "table" to it, thereby linking something in their mind to something in the world.

Intersubjectivity then becomes possible. There is a link from my concept to the label "table" and from the label "table" to a concept in someone else's mind, thereby linking a concept in my mind to the concept in another person's mind.

For Berkeley, tables and chairs exist in the mind of God, enabling inter-subjectivity. For me, tables and chairs exist in language, also enabling intersubjectivity.

That the reason we haven’t worked it out might be for another reason. We are blinkered, or blind to it. — Punshhh

It may well be that the truth is simple. The problem is interpretation.

I look at Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit and say "I see the truth, it is a duck". You look at the same picture and say "I see the truth, it is a rabbit".

The truth may be staring us in the face, but we may well see different truths.

Berkeley, by contrast, accepts that there are regular sequences among ideas (what we might call “natural causes”), which God has ordained as the stable framework of experience — Wayfarer

As I understand it:

For Malebranche, God controls every interaction, such as when a white snooker ball hits a red snooker ball.

For Berkeley, it initially seems that God no longer needs to control every interaction because He has created the Laws of Nature. For example, the conservation of momentum. The interaction between the white ball and red ball is now controlled by a Law of Nature rather than God directly.

But is it the case that for Berkeley the Laws of Nature exist independently of God?

However, ‘esse est percipi’ = "to be is to be perceived" and not only de we perceive objects such as tables and chairs, which therefore must exist in the mind of God, but we also perceive the Laws of Nature, which therefore must also exist in the mind of God.

For Malebranche, God must be involved in every interaction, such as determining how the red ball moves. But also for Berkeley, God must be involved in every interaction, in that to every interaction God must apply the appropriate Law of Nature. Even though it is this Law of Nature which then determines how the red ball moves.

One can conclude that even though God has ordained a framework of experience, such as the Conservation of Momentum, God still has to apply this framework of experience to every interaction.

Malebranche's view may be slightly different to Berkeley's view, but they both require God to be involved in every interaction.
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Whereas, I think, for you, the idea that objects are not physical means that they must be in some sense illusory. Would that be true? — Wayfarer

As regards definitions, I believe in what today is called Physicalism, being fundamental particles and forces. Berkeley did not believe in a world of material substance, such as today's Physicalism, but he did believe in a world of physical form, bundles of ideas in the mind of God.

As an Indirect Realist, for me, objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts.

Therefore, even though my concept of "chair" is not physical, I don't think of it as an illusion.

Is matter, stripped of all the perceptible qualities and can only exist parasitically on other objects, a perceptible object? — L'éléphant

I am unclear as to the meaning of "perceive" in "esse est percipi", "to be is to be perceived".

Does it mean perceive through the sense, as in "I perceive a red postbox" or "I perceive a loud noise" or does it mean perceive in the mind, as in "I perceive she is bored" or "I perceive the cause of the smoke was a fire"?

Today, my understanding of reality is described by Physicalism, where particles and forces are fundamental to the reality of the world.

As you say, things like quarks cannot be directly perceived but only indirectly perceived.

Berkeley did not believe in what today we call Physicalism, as he believed that everything in the world, whether fundamental particles, fundamental forces, tables, chairs or trees are bundles of ideas in the mind of God.

I take Berkeley to be arguing that we can do without the concept of matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems that way, in that for Berkeley "matter" does nothing for us.

See SEP - Occasionalism

Berkeley (1685-1753) may have been influenced by the Occasionalism of the French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715).

Consider a moving white billiard ball hit a stationary red billiard ball, which then starts to move.

For Malebranche, God not only started the world but ensures that it keeps running.

So the cause of the red ball starting to move is not the white ball but the mind of God. The only necessary connection between the white ball and the red ball is the mind of God

For Berkeley, as an Immaterialist, there is not a material world, where objects exist independently of any mind or perception, but there is a physical world, where objects are bundles of ideas in the mind of God.

So if the interaction between the white ball and red ball does not depend on the material within the billiard balls but does depends on the mind of God, then the actual material billiard balls are redundant.

The material world adds nothing if nothing is determined by the material world but is determined by the mind of God.

But rather, if such an alien were to arrive and tell us, we would likely have no difficulty in understanding it. — Punshhh

As I could never run a 4 minute mile because I am limited by the physicality of my body, all brains are limited by their physicality. Brains are physical things.

As a cat is limited by its physical brain in understanding Sartre's existentionalism, the human is limited in its understanding by its physical brain.

Even the alien will be limited by the physicality of their brain.

In no way — it’s all speculation, in the sense that any scientific postulate is, at its inception, a conceptual construct accepted without direct proof, but rather on the basis of its explanatory and predictive power — Astorre

How can you speculate about the ontology of being without using language or thought?

The moment you speculate about the ontology of being using language or thought you are in the realms of epistemology.

And language and thought are, by their very nature, dynamic rather than static.

In many contexts physical and material are synonyms — boundless

Yes, Materialism and Physicalism have other meanings as well.

But specifically for Berkeley, as an Immaterialist, he does not believe in a world of material substance, fundamental particles and forces, but he does believe in a world of physical form, bundles of ideas in the mind of God.

I am interested in the other question: whether there is something that is regardless of whether we speak of it, think of it, or conceptualise it. This is the difference between epistemology and ontology. — Astorre

Suppose there is an ontological "being" independent of human language or human thought.

How can a human approach ontological being if they can neither speak about it nor think about it?

What other approach is there?

I think that terminology is certainly not his. Have a browse of the Early Modern Texts translation provided in Ref 1. He’s quite the sophist. (I recommend the Dialogues.) — Wayfarer

Berkeley does not believe that there are material objects in the world, athough he does believe that there are physical objects in the world.

From SEP - George Berkeley:

Berkeley defends idealism by attacking the materialist alternative. What exactly is the doctrine that he’s attacking? Readers should first note that “materialism” is here used to mean “the doctrine that material things exist”.

Thus, although there is no material world for Berkeley, there is a physical world, a world of ordinary objects. This world is mind-dependent, for it is composed of ideas, whose existence consists in being perceived. For ideas, and so for the physical world, esse est percipi.

But, for Berkeley, all that is real are spirits, which could be glossed as ‘perceiving beings’, and objects are ideas in minds. — Wayfarer

I agree when you said:

George Berkeley (1685–1753) was an Irish philosopher and Anglican bishop best known for his philosophy of immaterialism — the view that physical objects exist only if perceived (summed up in the memorable aphorism ‘esse est percipi’). — Wayfarer

For Berkeley, objects exist as physical things in the world.

Before talking about the dynamics of concepts, I’d like to clarify: what exactly do you mean by “being”? Do you equate it with the linguistic meaning of the word, or with a concept? — Astorre

"Being" is a word in language and Being is a concept in the mind.

As regards linguistic meaning of the word, the Merriam Webster Dictionary describes "being" as "the quality or state of having existence, something that is conceivable and hence capable of existing, conscious existence, the qualities that constitute an existent thing, a living thing .........................."

As regards concepts in the mind, each word represents a concept, whether "being", "the", "quality", "or", etc

As concepts in the mind are dynamic, and words represent concepts, the word for a concept must also be dynamic.

Two meanings of ‘representation’ in play there. He objects to representative realism but I’m sure he would accept that the sight of smoke represents fire or a dangerous animal represents a threat. — Wayfarer

There are also two meanings of "perceive".

One meaning of "perceive" is something through one of the five senses, such as "I perceive a red postbox" or "I perceive a loud noise".

Another meaning of perceive is to understand something in the mind, such as "I perceive she is getting bored".

In the sentence "I perceive smoke through my sense of sight and I perceive the smoke has been caused by fire" the word "perceive " has been used in two different ways.

In Berkeley's expression "esse est percipi", I understand the word "perceive" to refer to something through one of the five senses, not to something understood in the mind.

In my view, this conceptual shift had profound consequences for the entirety of Western philosophy. Instead of exploring being itself as an event or process, metaphysics became preoccupied with the search for a static, indivisible “substance”—an unchanging foundation of reality. — Astorre

Consider "Socrates is a philosopher".

On the one hand, "is" could be a static "being", an unchanging substance. On the other hand, "is" could be a dynamic "becoming", a changing process.

Regardless of the meaning of "is", consider the meanings of "Socrates" and "philosopher".

"Socrates" and "philosopher" are concepts.

Even if "is" is being used as a static "being", the expression as a whole "Socrates is a philosopher" is dynamic, as all concepts by their very nature are dynamic.

No concept is static, in that no concept has a fixed meaning. The meaning of any concept constantly changes. What I mean by a particular concept is most certainly different to what you mean by the same concept, and what I mean by a particular concept is constantly changing as I learn new things.

Fixity in language is impossible. Language by its very nature is dynamic.

As regards black holes, Berkeley doesn’t reject inductive inference; in fact, his Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues show that he accepts the regularities of experience and the way we extend them to predict or explain things we haven’t directly sensed. — Wayfarer

A Black Hole may emit gravitational waves, and it is these gravitational waves that we can perceive.

These gravitational waves "represent" the Black Hole that emitted them.

However, Berkeley rejects representationalism.

Both Reid and Berkeley reject ‘representationalism’, an epistemological position whereby we (mediately) perceive things in the world indirectly via ideas in our mind, on the grounds of anti-scepticism and common sense.
https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/abs/10.3366/jsp.2019.0242?journalCode=jsp

As you wrote:

What Berkeley objected to was the notion of an unknowable stuff underlying experience — an abstraction he believed served no explanatory purpose and in fact led to skepticism. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure about that. The gravity waves from black hole collisions can be perceived via gravity wave detection. Wouldn't that put them in the same category as, say, neutron stars? — RogueAI

"Esse est percipi" can be translated as "to be is to be perceived”.

A Black Hole causes gravitational waves. We can perceive these gravitational waves. Does that mean we perceive the Black Hole?

In Air Traffic Control, the operator can perceive dots on their radar screens. Does that mean they perceive the planes that caused these dots?

That for example, if an alien were to arrive and tell us how things are, to give us the full explanation of existence in a manual. — Punshhh

An alien may as be different to us as we are to a cat.

Would a cat understand if we explained Sartre's theory of existentialism to it?

Would we understand if an alien explained what they know to us?

George Berkeley....................best known for his philosophy of immaterialism — the view that physical objects exist only if perceived — Wayfarer

Humans cannot perceive Black Holes.

They may be inferred, but they cannot be perceived in Berkeley's terms.

Would it be Berkeley's position that Black Holes don't exist?

Also some can seek guidance, some can develop wisdom, some can learn to interpret ancient teachings and mythologies and gain insight. — Punshhh

At this moment in time I only know the reality that I exist within at this moment in time. I cannot know anything outside this reality because I cannot know what I don't know.

I could read The Republic by Plato and learn new things, but even after reading The Republic, even though my reality may have changed, it is still the case that I only know the reality that I exist in at that future moment in time.

It remains the case that at any moment in time, I can only know the reality that I exist in at that moment in time. However, this is not saying that my reality doesn't change with time.

We can change our reality, for example by reading The Republic, but we can never know what exists outside our reality. We can never know whether our reality is or is not reality itself.

As with Heidegger's Dasein, at each moment in time, there is an ever-changing horizon of knowledge that we can never go beyond.

My reality is not a static thing but is a dynamic thing.

My reality doesn't exist as a stone exists but has being as humans have being.

My reality is more a process in time than a substance in space.

. According to the main idea of my work, language itself - through grammatical structure and, in particular, the copula - inclines us to such fixation. — Astorre

Is any kind of fixity possible in language?

Consider "the apple is on the table". It is true that there is fixity here. We are explicitly told that the apple is on the table, and the copula "is" has fixed the apple on to the table.

However, "apple" and "table" as parts of language are concepts, and concepts are far from fixed. For example, your concept of "table" is presumably different to my concept of "table", and my concept of "table" changes daily as I learn new things.

Proof that the concept "table" is not fixed is the impossibility of describing "table" in words. Any description would be either incomplete or inaccurate.

Yes, the copula "is" has fixed the apple on the table, but as nether the concept "apple" nor "table" are fixed, the copula "is" is not capable of fixing anything.

Your "own reality" is not reality itself, but your idea of it...We invent tools to expand the boundaries of the senses — Astorre

No one can ever know if one's own reality is or is not reality itself.

Mary, in the knowledge argument, lives in her black and white world.

At each moment in time, Mary only knows what she knows. She doesn't know what she doesn't know, and what she knows makes up her reality.

Mary reads a book by Abai Qunanbaiuly, and in learning new things, her reality changes.

The book is a tool that Mary has used to expand the boundary of her senses.

Mary knows that her reality has changed since reading the book, and can reason that in the future she may know things that she doesn't know today.

Mary knows that in the future she will know new things, even though she doesn't know what these new things will be.

In such a way Kant knows that there are things-in-themselves, even if he doesn't know what they are.

Mary can reason that her reality will change, and can ask herself "is there a reality itself of which my reality is just a part?"

This question is unanswerable, as Mary can only know the reality she exists in at each moment in time. She can never know what she doesn't know.

In such a way is Heidegger's Dasein

Mary can never know if there is a "reality itself" of which her reality is just a part, because she can never know what is outside her own reality.

In fact, no one can know if there is reality itself of which one's own reality is just a part.

It follows that it is not even possible to say that "your own reality is not reality itself", because this is something one can never know.

For Heidegger the ontological is something like a condition of possibility, but it is not transcendental in Kant’s sense. Think of it as a stance or perspective, the Being of a being in terms of its way of being, not what a being ‘is’ but how it is. These stances do not precede the existence of the world, they are what it means to exist. To exist is to open up a stance. — Joshs

Is it like a Derain painting, which exists as shapes and colours, and where the form of the shapes and colours allows the possibility of content within these shapes and colours.

However, the form of shapes and colours cannot be said to precede the content of shapes and colours, as the form is what it means for there to be a content.

The form of shapes and colours is the ontological condition of possibility for an epistemology of content of shapes and colours. Yet, at the same time, the form of shapes and colours don't precede the existence of the content expressed by shapes and colours, the form is what it means for the content to exist.

Maybe not a perfect analogy, but it introduces the relationship between form and content.

Heidegger would reject the framing of the question, because it presupposes a priority of epistemology over ontology. — Joshs

Ontology is about the nature of reality, and epistemology is about how we know the nature of reality.

There is an analogy to Mary's Room, the knowledge argument. If Mary is embedded in a black and white world, can she ever discover colour.

If I see the colour red, is it possible for me to directly see the cause of my seeing the colour red.

If I don't know something, is it possible for me to decide to search for it.

If there is another reality outside my own reality, can I ever discover it.

I exist within my own reality, whatever that reality is. It is logically impossible to discover what exists outside my own reality using knowledge that is part of my own reality.

Perhaps this is "Dasein".

This means that I am limited to thinking about the ontology of my own reality, and the process of thinking about my own reality is epistemological.

Then, in this case, when I am thinking about my own reality, which comes first, epistemology or ontology.

Kant pure intuitions of time and space and pure concepts of understanding (the Categories) are the ontology of the human brain, and these allow the brain to cognise, which is the epistemological aspect.

So yes, the ontology of the brain precedes the possibility of epistemology by the brain.

My understanding of the definitions
As an Indirect Realist, I know that I, as a human, exist and I believe that a world independent of humans exists.

Ontology can be thought of as a noun, and is about the nature of reality.

Epistemology can be thought of as a verb, and is about how we know the nature of reality.

Substantialism is the theory that substances are the ultimate constituents of the reality of the world.

Processuality is the theory that humans, even at one moment in time, are not static things, like a rock, but are dynamic things that experience a continuous becoming.
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My hypothesis focuses on the ontological perception shaped by language and not on the epistemological perception of reality. — Astorre

How can you arrive at an ontological belief without first going through an epistemological process?

Is your ontological perception about the ontology of the substantialism of a world independent of humans or about the ontology of the processuality of humans?
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Direct realism (tables exist independently) and indirect realism (tables in consciousness) concern epistemology - how we know the world — Astorre

I agree that Indirect Realism concerns epistemology in how we can know the ontology of the world.

But as the Direct Realist believes they directly experience the ontology of the world, epistemology is redundant to the Direct Realist.
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and not the ontology of processuality (being as flow) or substantialism (being as essence). — Astorre

Am I right is thinking that Processuality only concerns humans and their continuous becomings, whereas Substantialism concerns the nature of reality in the world?

Am I also right in thinking that by the ontology of processuality, you are only referring to the ontology of humans, and by ontology of substantialism, you are only referring to the ontology of the world?
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That is, saying that considering the expression "Socrates is a philosopher" implies not only a concrete existence ("from Athens"), but also an abstract process ("seeks wisdom"), you remain within substantialism. — Astorre

As "from Athens" is something that exists in the world, then substantialism seems appropriate.

However as "seeks wisdom" is something that only exists in the human mind, and humans experience processuality, then this would infer that human concepts are also subject to processuality.

Concepts are never static, continually change, are dynamic and flow through the mind like birds on the wing. Concepts are not substances that make up the reality of the world.

From the Eastern perspective, continental philosophy looks quite analytical. — Astorre

As a first approximation, one could argue that thinking in the West tends more to a search for substance and in the East thinking tends more to a search for process.

However, in the West, there is another aspect. For example, looking at the expression "Socrates is a philosopher", the word "philosopher" refers to two distinct things.

First, there is the concrete: Socrates was a Greek from Athens, known through the posthumous accounts of classical writers, particularly his students Plato and Xenophon, accused of impiety and corrupting the youth in 399BC and after a trial that lasted a day was sentenced to death (Wikipedia, Socrates).

Second, there is the abstract: a philosopher is a person who seeks wisdom or enlightenment, a scholar and a thinker, a student of philosophy, a person whose philosophical perspective makes meeting trouble with equanimity easier, an expounder of a theory in a particular area of experience and one who one who philosophizes (Merriam Webster, philosopher).

Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations gave the example of the duck-rabbit picture. One day when looking at the picture one perceives a duck and the next day, looking at the same picture, one perceives a rabbit.

Similarly, in thinking about "Socrates is a philosopher", one has two distinct thoughts. There is the concrete, "Socrates was Greek", unchanging, a substance, historical and existence. There is the abstract, "a philosopher seeks wisdom", changing, a process, ahistorical and being.

Similarly with the philosophical schizophrenia between Direct Realism and Indirect Realism. I would guess that one-third on this Forum are Direct Realists, one-third are Indirect Realists and one-third are confused between the two.

The Direct Realist believes that tables and chairs exist in the world independent of any human observer whilst the Indirect Realist believes that tables and chairs only have being in the mind. Direct Realism is about literal immediacy whilst Indirect Realism is about phenomenological representation. Direct Realists include Thomas Reid and John R Searle, whilst Indirect Realists include Immanuel Kant and Bertrand Russell.

As a second approximation, in the West, when looking at the expression "Socrates is a philosopher", not only does "philosopher" refer to not only the concrete existence, "from Athens", but also the abstract process, "seeks wisdom". In addition, for the Direct Realist, concrete existence means a substance in the world and for the Indirect Realist, concrete existence means a being in the mind.

In the West, thought is also about both existence and being.

At least to a point that we cannot say something as silly as "English is more extensive than Russian" — Moliere

It would be silly if that is what I had said.

What I actually said was "It seems that English is more extensive than Russian in that we also have a word for "blue", which the Russians don't seem to."

You left out the words from your quote "it seems that" and "in that we also have a word for "blue", which the Russians don't seem to."

Russian philosophy, developing from the 18th century, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, differs from Western philosophy in its emphasis on spirituality, existential questions, and a holistic perception of being. — Astorre

Though this sounds very similar to Continental Philosophy, with its emphasis on human behaviour, existentialism and psychoanalysis.

I agree not exactly the same, but sharing a family resemblance, and more similar than Analytic Philosophy.

As the article Analytic and Continental Philosophy: 4 Key Differences writes

Their approach to philosophy is more reflexive as they try to understand human behaviour by using social science. They do not believe that scientific models that dissect, analyse, and explain ideas provide a comprehensive answer. Instead, they look at things from a humanistic perspective, thus investigating the context and history of a subject matter to draw a conclusion.