So you can be reassured that the ship is securely next to the quay and physics will prevent it from moving. You can decide where the relationship is — Ludwig V

The ship is secured because of physics, the force in the rope between the ship and the bollard.

The ship is not secured because of the relationship between the ship and the bollard, otherwise no rope would be needed.

The actual distinction Kant makes is between empirical realism and transcendental idealism..............................................For Kant, empirical realism means that objects of experience - the phenomena we encounter in space and time - are real within the empirical domain. When we perceive a tree or a rock, these objects have objective reality as appearances. — Wayfarer

Kant's distinction is slightly more than between transcendental idealism and empirical realism, if empirical realism means that the objects we encounter are real within the empirical domain of appearances.

Kant also wanted to make the distinction between transcendental idealism and realism, where realism means that objects exist independently of any perception of them.

In B276 of his Critique of Pure Reason, in his Refutation of Idealism, he attempts the proof of his theorem "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

This is more than empirical realism.

Bertrand Russell has a chapter called World of Universals in his early Problems of Philosophy, which I often refer to. — Wayfarer

Bertrand Russell: Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it.

I agree that it it seems plain that Edinburgh and London exist in different places independently of our knowledge of them.

The concept "relation" certainly exists in our mind, in that I know that Edinburgh is to the north of London.

But is it the case that relations exist independently of the mind?

I see this as a similar problem Bertrand Russell approached in his article On Denoting, where he wanted to show that the puzzles of identity, Law of Excluded Middle and non-existence were problems of language.

For example, "Socrates is a philosopher" logically means that "there is something that is a person, seeks wisdom, tries to understand fundamental questions regarding existence, knowledge, and values and is named philosopher"

Relations is also a problem of language, in that we could remove the word from our language and still be able to communicate.

Rather than say "Edinburgh is north of London" we could say "Edinburgh is at 55.9533 deg N, -3.1883 deg W and London is at 51.509865 deg N, -0.118092 deg W".

In language we could remove relational words such as north of, to the left of, above and replace them by existent spatial locations.

I agree that this may make language cumbersome, but this shows that relations is a problem of language rather than a problem of any mind-independent world.

That's why I say that all forms of realism are grounded in idealism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Kant in Critique of Pure Reason would agree that realism is grounded in idealism, in that the pure intuitions of space and time and pure concepts of understanding are the a priori conditions of experience.

But Kant would also agree that idealism is grounded in realism, in that there have to be experiences before they can be categorized by the pure intuitions and pure concepts.

Idealism and realism are two sides of the same coin.
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When a body is caused to accelerate, it may continue to accelerate long after that cause has ceased acting. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think that this is the case. From Newton's Second Law, F = ma. If there is no force, then there can be no acceleration.

So everything in our world except for rock, water and gas, was created by our cousins and ancestors. Their minds literally created/caused these things. — Punshhh

The first living organisms on Earth were bacteria, which had no minds, so It cannot be that life was created by the mind.

The first living organisms on Earth were one-celled organisms known as prokaryotes, which emerged between 3.5 and 4.1 billion years ago.
https://www.naturalhistory.si.edu/education/teaching-resources/life-science/early-life-earth-animal-origins

The issue isn’t whether the dinosaur existed before humans. It’s that the meaning of ‘T. rex’, it’s place in our world, is a product of our engagement now. That’s the intertwining I’m pointing to. Empirical knowledge is not a passive representing of what’s out there. — Joshs

Introduction
As a supporter of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, I agree that "Empirical knowledge is not a passive representing of what’s out there."

I also agree with Enactivism, the idea that the human brain has evolved in synergy with its environment (Wikipedia - Enactivism)

I am also an Indirect Realist, in that I don't believe that I experience the external world as it really is, but only through representations of how the external world really is.

It follows that I believe in Realism, in that there is a realty that exists independently of the mind.

It also follows that I believe in Anti-Realism, the idea that what we perceive as the world is dependent upon and has been constructed by our minds, whether in language or concept.

Therefore, believing in both Realism and Anti-Realism, my approach is similar to the pragmatism as described by Evan Thompson, who wrote that "the world is both found and made: it is made in the finding and found in the making". In the terms of Kant's Transcendental Idealism, the world is found in Realism, in his belief that a world exists independently of the mind, and the world is made in Idealism, through a priori pure intuitions of space and time and a priori pure concepts of understanding.

Heidegger's "Being-in-the-World"
The story goes back to Heidegger's "Being-in-the-World", a statement that I have no trouble with. My question is, where does this world exist, something Wittgenstein avoided engaging with.

There are two worlds, the world as we perceive it and the world that has caused the world we perceive.

The world we perceive is a representation of the world that has caused the world we perceive, not a mirror image.

We perceive the colour red even though the colour red does not exist in a mind-independent world. However, there must be something in a mind-independent world that has caused us to perceive the colour red. This something in a mind-independent world may be different to what we perceive, but it would be invalid to argue that because it is different it cannot exist.

Heidegger's "Being-in-the-World" agrees with our everyday experiences, but ignores the obvious question. Does "world" refer to the world as we perceive it to be or does "world" refer to a world that has caused the world we perceive.

Something has caused the world we perceive, and even though it may be very different to the world we actually perceive, whatever it is, it is still a world.

To ignore this fundamental question, what caused the world we perceive, as Wittgenstein did, may be pragmatic, but not very philosophical.

Well of course, a belief is not evidence of the thing believed..........................However, beliefs do influence the way that we behave. And, I argue that this is in a non-deterministic way. — Metaphysician Undercover

You believe you argue in a non-deterministic way, but as you say yourself "a belief is not evidence of the thing believed."
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I will argue that all forms of realism are reducible to, or dependent on Platonic realism, for ontological support. So, if you are a realist, you are a Platonist. — Metaphysician Undercover

Philosophical Realism is the view that some things have a mind-independent existence (Wikipedia - Philosophical Realism)

It is possible to be a Philosophical Realist and a Nominalist, which is the view that universals and abstract objects do not exist in a mind-independent world (Wikipedia - Nominalism)

Platonism is the opposite of Nominalism, as it affirms the existence of abstract objects (Wikipedia - Platonism)
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It's very evident here, that you have no idea what "force" actually means...Very clearly it is a human creation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does anyone really know what a force is?

"Force" is a word and clearly a human creation. However, a body would not accelerate if there were no external force acting on it, and this force is clearly not a human creation.

From the Britannica article on Force:

(Newton's) second law says that when an external force acts on a body, it produces an acceleration (change in velocity) of the body in the direction of the force. The magnitude of the acceleration is directly proportional to the magnitude of the external force and inversely proportional to the quantity of matter in the body.

That's a silly question. It is presumably an attempt to explain what Bradley meant, but it is very unhelpful, amounting to mystification. It can't be what Bradley was saying. — Ludwig V

As regards the existence of ontological relations in the world, a human may know that Glasgow is west of Edinburgh.

But where in Glasgow is the information that it is to the west of Edinburgh?

Where in Edinburgh is the information that it is to the east of Glasgow?

Where in the space between Glasgow and Edinburgh is the information that Glasgow is at the west end of this space and Edinburgh is at the east end of this space?

As the SEP article on Relations writes:

Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh? The relation can’t be in one city at the expense of the other, nor in each of them taken separately, since then we lose sight of the fact that the relation holds between them (McTaggart 1920: §80). Rather the relation must somehow share the divided locations of Glasgow and Edinburgh without itself being divided.

Is it that he never gave his opinion, or that his answer is implicit in his later work, but has been missed by many because they are still looking for answers within the old binary: either mind or world, either inside or outside? — Joshs

I cannot accept that there are no binaries, and everything is a formless soup of amorphousness.

I cannot accept that Tyrannosaurus rex did not have an existence outside the human mind, a real, living and breathing existence outside of our concept of it.

I cannot accept that there is no binary between the mind and a mind-independent world, even if I accept that discovering it is philosophically difficult.

Like I explained, there is a big difference between fundamental particles, and fundamental forces. One is matter, the other is concepts...So, are you saying that "forces" only exist in the mind, since forces are relations expressed mathematically?....................................But "forces" are relations between particles, and as such they only exist in the mind, by your principles......................................"Forces" refers to conceptualized relations between material objects. Consider the traditional formula, f=ma. — Metaphysician Undercover

Physicalism vs Materialism
Historically, Materialists thought that everything was matter, but today, physics has shown that forces such as gravity are physical but not material in the traditional sense.

From SEP - Physicalism

Physicalism is sometimes known as ‘materialism’. Indeed, on one strand to contemporary usage, the terms ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ are interchangeable. But the two terms have very different histories.
As the name suggests, materialists historically held that everything was matter — where matter was conceived as “an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist”
But physics itself has shown that not everything is matter in this sense; for example, forces such as gravity are physical but it is not clear that they are material in the traditional sense

Fundamental particles and fundamental forces are both physical in the world, even if we have concepts for them in the mind.

Measuring something in the world does not remove that something from the world

The fact that we can use mathematics to describe the Eiffel Tower as 330 metres tall does not mean that the Eiffel Tower has no spatial extension in the world.

The Eiffel Tower has an existence in the world regardless of any measurements we may make on it.

Force is not the same thing as relation

That there is a relation between my feeling thirsty and my thinking about getting a drink does not mean that there is a literal force between my thoughts.

The force on the Moon because of the Earth does not depend on our knowing the spatial relation between the Moon and the Earth.

The equation f = ma is a human assumption that has been found to work through numerous instances. We know the equation works, but we don't know why it works . It is an axiom. It could well be that tomorrow it stops working, unlikely but possible. The equation f = ma is a conceptualized relation that has been found to describe what we observe in the world. It doesn't describe why f = ma

Therefore, it's very reasonable not to reason through anything, but just do what you feel like doing, if you believe in a deterministic world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Suppose the world is deterministic. Then one's beliefs have been determined, whether one's belief is that the world is deterministic or one's belief is that of free will.

Suppose the world is not deterministic and one has free will. Then one's beliefs have been freely chosen, whether one's belief is that the world is deterministic or one's belief is that of free will.

Your particular beliefs is no evidence either for or against your living in a deterministic world.

It is possible to believe in free will even in a deterministic world.

Was he saying that relations don't really exist? Or just that they don't really exist in the physical world? — Ludwig V

That relations don't really exist in the physical world.

From SEP - Relations

Bradley concluded that we should eliminate external relations from our ontology.
But Bradley’s argument is intended to establish that we cannot understand how it is possible for things to be related.
Bradley’s eliminativism{/quote]

Relations certainly exist in the mind, in that I know the apple is to the left of the orange, but in what sense does the apple "know" it is to the left of the orange.

In my opinion, we have gone too far, wandering in all sorts of classifications or approaches. — Astorre

Yes, fixing one's definitions adds complexity to an already complicated topic, such as establishing the differences between being and becoming, ontology and epistemology, realism and idealism, static and dynamic, substance and process, presence and absence, mind and world.

Even if we agreed that "Dasein is more radically in the world" we may not agree as to where this world is. Does this world exist within the mind or external to the mind? Is our world the construction of our mind. As Schopenhauer wrote "The world is my representation". As Abai Qunanbaiuly wrote “A person’s mind is the mirror of the world. If the mirror is clouded, the world appears distorted.” Wittgenstein avoided such a problem by never giving his opinion where his "world" exists. A strategic decision that does not seem to have affected his reputation.

As you say "And since philosophy speaks about the world relying solely on language, this creates difficulties for both the researcher and the reader."

I will try to be more specific to your text.

And if we think of "physical matter" in this way, we get the appearance of an infinite regress, because each time we find what looks to be the fundamental elements, we then find out that they can be broken down into further spatial relations. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not an infinite regress, as we eventually arrive at the (indivisible) fundamental particles and forces.

There are four fundamental interactions known to exist: Gravitational force, Electromagnetic force, Strong nuclear force, Weak nuclear force.
https://alevelphysics.co.uk/notes/particle-interactions/
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There is a strong argument for the ideality of spatial relations......................................The developing problem, is that as described above, the "spatial relations" are ideal, conceptual mathematics and geometry — Metaphysician Undercover

There is also a strong argument that ontological relations don't exist in the world but only the mind. As numbers and mathematics only exists in the mind (are invented not discovered), these relations are expressed in the mind mathematically.

FH Bradley made a regress argument against the ontological existence of relations in the world

From SEP - Relations:

Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh?

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This is why space itself needs to be understood as real active substance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Current scientific thinking seems to be that fundamental particles and forces exist in the world. Accepting that ontological relations between these fundamental particles and forces only exist in the mind, there is no necessity for space to be understood as a real active substance.
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Now we have a second possible intuition. Perhaps there is no fundamental matter at all, and the activity is simply the activity of space. What was represented as particles of matter existing in 'changing spatial relations', may actually be just 'changing spatial relations' without any real particles of matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I see it:

The fundamental particles and forces exist in the world as ontological Realism

The relations between these fundamental particles and forces exist in the mind as ontological idealism

In effect, you are telling me to forget about having any freedom — Metaphysician Undercover

In a deterministic world, looking forwards in time, the earthquake off the coast of Cotabato in 1976 determined a tsunami in the Moro Gulf.

In a deterministic world, looking backwards in time, the reason for the tsunami in the Moro Gulf in 1976 was an earthquake off the coast of Cotabato.

You are at lunch and wonder whether you should have a glass of Merlot.

You reason it through. If you have a large glass then you will feel tired. If you feel tired then you may miss the train. If you miss the train then you may be stuck in the city. If you get stuck in the city then you will have to pay for a hotel. But you have no money on you. You therefore conclude that you will stick to a glass of water.

As with the Philippines example, the fact that you have a reason for having a glass of water does not mean that having a glass of water was not determined at the moment you wondered what you should drink.

The direction of reason is from the future to the past, even though the future is determined by the past.

Do you see the distinction being made between reasons and causes? — Wayfarer

I put my hand between the white ball and the red ball. If I have free will, then I have a reason. In determinism, there is a cause.

From Britannica - Reason

Reason, in philosophy, the faculty or process of drawing logical inferences.

Logic in a narrow sense is equivalent to deductive logic. By definition, such reasoning cannot produce any information (in the form of a conclusion) that is not already contained in the premises.

However, sooner or later, reason breaks down, as premises are assumed to be true, not proved to be true.

When asked "why did you put your hand between the white ball and the red ball?", at the end of the day it comes down to "no reason, because I wanted to".

Right, but these are peculiar forms of Idealism. — Joshs

Yes, Idealism is an extensive topic, as the SEP article on Idealism indicates.

Heidegger has "Being-in-the-World", but this may be a similar problem with Wittgenstein and the world. Where does this world exist, within the mind (Idealism) or external to the mind (Realism). Wittgenstein never says.

As the Wikipedia article on Ontology notes:

According to philosopher Rudolf Carnap, for example, ontological statements are relative to language and depend on the ontological framework of the speaker. This means that there are no framework-independent ontological facts since different frameworks provide different views while there is no objectively right or wrong framework

Provide a link to the person who made this classification and where you can read more about it — Astorre

As a start, there is the SEP article on Idealism and the SEP article on Realism.

Of course, but the question is how. Do they consist of matter, or do they exist in some other way? — Metaphysician Undercover

Words exist in a mind-independent world in two ways, in the same way that 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 exists in two ways.

They exist as physical matter, whether as electrons or the pixels 0 and 1, and they exist as spatial and temporal relations between these electrons or pixels.

Your mind perceives not only the pixels on your screen but also the spatial relations between these pixels on your screen

Even when not looking at your screen, these pixels and spatial relations between them exist on your screen.
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If it is something which is determined, by a deterministic world, then I'll just forget about making that stressful annoying effort. — Metaphysician Undercover

To forget about making an effort assumes free will. In a deterministic world, your decision to forget about making an effort has already been determined.

But the issue is, how do these things, words in this example, exist in that medium between you and me? Is the concept of "matter" required to explain that medium? — Metaphysician Undercover

Words must physically exist in some form in the physical space between where you exist and where I exist, otherwise we would not be able to exchange ideas.
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To say "I had no choice but to put my hand between the white and red ball" is not a good answer. It denies the usefulness of deliberation, which is not a good thing to do. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a deterministic world, you had no choice but to put your hand between the white and red ball.

Deliberation is part of a process that is determined in a deterministic world.
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The law of identity denies the possibility that two distinct clocks, named as A and B, are identical. So your example, although referring to the law of identity, really violates it. — Metaphysician Undercover

My main point is that the clocks A and B will continue to show the same time, not because of any external connection between them, but because of their particular internal structures. IE, there need not be a universal time in order for these two clocks to show the same time.

The question of how to approach the ontology of being that which exists beyond language and thought—is a central one in philosophy, since language and thought inevitably shape our perception of reality. — Astorre

It depends which line of enquiry you are considering.

There are two distinct lines of enquiry, the ontology of being within a Realist framework and the ontology of being within an Idealist framework.

Ontological realism of being is the view that being exists independently of our language and thoughts. Ontological idealism of being is the view that being is fundamentally of the mind, where reality does not consist of mind-independent particles or forces, but is grounded in consciousness and reason.

Husserl's phenomenology is certainly that of ontological idealism, where any belief in the world's independent existence is put aside to focus on human experiences.

Heidegger's Dasein is also about ontological Idealism. It is about "being-in-the-world", in that we are not detached observers of the world but embedded in our experiences.

Kierkegaard's "leap of faith" is within ontological Idealism, where truth is an inward movement towards a lived experience.

Zen Buddhism has similarities to Husserl's phenomenology, and again ontological idealism.

Philip J. Bossert wrote:

I believe that a discussion of this issue of language and paradox might provide a fruitful point of comparative philosophical dialogue between Zen Buddhism and phenomenological philosophy.

For Taoism, the ontology of being is possibly a meaningless question, in that it emphasises direct experience rather than any metaphysical speculation.

Are you considering ontological being just from the viewpoint of idealism?

I had to make some simplifications to explain things to Russell. — Astorre

It really is not necessary to simplify your ideas for me to understand, I will try to keep up.

I am interested in the other question: whether there is something that is regardless of whether we speak of it, think of it, or conceptualise it. This is the difference between epistemology and ontology. — Astorre

I was just wondering how we can approach the ontology of being, something that is external to our language and thoughts, without using language or thoughts.

The claim "esse est percipi", to perceive is defined and explained clearly in many of the philosophers' passages. Berkeley's is no different -- to perceive is to use the 5 senses and of course the understanding of this perception. — L'éléphant

"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived".

We both perceive through our sense of vision that Mary is wearing a yellow jacket.

Therefore for Berkeley, in the mind of God, Mary is wearing a yellow jacket.

However, I may perceive Mary is bored because she is wearing bright clothes and you may perceive that Mary is not bored precisely because she is wearing bright clothes.

If perception refers to understanding, the situation becomes very unclear. How can anyone know what is in the mind of God if everyone's perceived understanding of the same situation is probably different. How can anyone ever know Mary's true state of being.

Mary's "to be" can never be known if "is to be perceived" means perceived in the understanding.
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I think you must be conflating physicalism with "matter" which we call substance that is independent of tangible things and perceptible qualities. — L'éléphant

Some say that "Physicalism" is interchangeable with "Materialism".

Materialists held that everything was matter, an inert, senseless substance.

But Physicalists point out that not everything is matter, in that a force such as gravity is physical but not material in the traditional sense.

Both Materialists and Physicalist believe that there are things in the world existing independently of any observation by either human or god.

From SEP - Physicalism

Physicalism is sometimes known as ‘materialism’. Indeed, on one strand to contemporary usage, the terms ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ are interchangeable. But the two terms have very different histories.
As the name suggests, materialists historically held that everything was matter — where matter was conceived as “an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist”
But physics itself has shown that not everything is matter in this sense; for example, forces such as gravity are physical but it is not clear that they are material in the traditional sense
I will adopt the policy of using both terms interchangeably.

What's a "fact"? It's apparently not something existing in the world, so what is the correspondence? It seems to be a correspondence between two "things" that are both within your mind, and therefore circular. — Relativist

A public language exists as a fact in the world, therefore the word "chair" exists as a fact in the world.

The correspondence is between the concept of a chair in my mind and the word "chair" that exists as a fact in the world.

How do you account for truth? Is truth entirely subjective? — Relativist

There are many different definitions of "truth" - see SEP - Truth

In the absence of humans there would be no truth. For example, is a rock "true"?

"Truth" only exists in the presence of humans, and therefore is entirely subjective.

For me the statement "objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts" is true.

This must be a correspondence theory of truth, in that a true statement in language corresponds to a fact in the world.

"Objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts" is true IFF objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts.

As it is a fact that tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts, this must be a true statement.

It would be surprising if we saw different things, when looking at the same object. — Punshhh

I agree, I am sure that we do. But it can never be proved that we do.

Even more impressive, the geneticists concluded that all human beings on Earth right now can trace their lineage back to the Eve gene, a single common female ancestor whom scientists called the Mitochondrial Eve. She lived around 200,000 years ago.
science.howstuffworks.com

We largely speak a common truth. To claim solipsism with regard to other people is quite extreme. — Punshhh

On the one hand we speak the common truth that "the postbox is red".

But on the other hand, when we both look at this "red postbox", how do we know our subjective experiences of the colour "red" are the same?

We could only know for sure if mind-reading was possible.

The determinist perspective, which dictates that the white ball, in the past, will necessarily cause the red ball to move, in the future, assumes a necessary continuity through the present, thereby eliminating the possibility of choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

The deterministic perspective equates to my previous experiences.

All things being equal, if on a snooker table I saw a white ball hit the red ball a 1,000 times, I would expect that the red ball would react in exactly the same way. This is my experience of the world. From my personal experiences, my belief is that we live in a deterministic world.
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If this is the case, then there is no necessary continuity of existence of an object from past to future — Metaphysician Undercover

Scenario one. A white ball hits a red ball, and the red ball moves.

Scenario two. A white ball almost hits a red ball. I put my hand between them and the red ball doesn't move.

Both scenarios are consistent with being in a deterministic world.

In scenario one, there is the conservation of momentum.

In scenario two, living in a deterministic world, I had no choice but to put my hand between the white and red ball.

In both scenarios, there is a necessary and deterministic continuity from past to present.
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If the world is recreated at each passing moment, then it could be created in any random way, so the observed consistency needs to be accounted for. — Metaphysician Undercover

God could be the reason for consistency. A God who willingly re-creates the world at each passing moment.

This raises the question, why does God behave consistently. Why doesn't God behave in a random way. He could if He wanted. Perhaps one time the white ball hits the red ball and the red ball stays where it is. Perhaps the next time the white ball hits the red ball and the red ball shoots off at 90 metres per second.

Logic could also be the reason for consistency. For example, The Law of Identity states that each thing is identical to itself. Logic could be at the heart of reality. Even though logic is internal, a natural by-product would be a universality.

For example, consider two identical clocks both set at 1pm that slowly move apart. The times shown on their clock faces will remain the same, not because of some external connection between them, but because Clock A is identical to itself, clock B is identical to itself and clock A is identical to clock B.

The two clocks will maintain the same time, even though there is no external connection between them, but because each clock is identical to itself.

A by-product of the Law of Identity that something is identical to itself is a universal truth. A universal consistency.

Conversely, how can materialism justify belief in a mind-independent physical world without appealing to a likeness principle and a "master argument", in order to ground a theory of evidence relating subjective observations to the material world? — sime

For Berkeley, tables and chairs exist in the world even when not observed by any human, because they exist in the mind of God.

As an Indirect Realist, I don't believe that tables and chairs exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts.

This raises the problem of inter-subjectivity. How can two people talk about tables and chairs if no table or chair exists in the world?

For me, tables and chairs exist in language and language exists in the world.

Tables and chairs may not exist in the world as physical things, but "tables" and "chairs" do exist in the world as physical things, as physical words.

To the concept I have in my mind of a table, I can attach the label "table", thereby linking something in my mind to something in the world.

Someone else can do the same thing. They can have a concept in their mind, and attach the label "table" to it, thereby linking something in their mind to something in the world.

Intersubjectivity then becomes possible. There is a link from my concept to the label "table" and from the label "table" to a concept in someone else's mind, thereby linking a concept in my mind to the concept in another person's mind.

For Berkeley, tables and chairs exist in the mind of God, enabling inter-subjectivity. For me, tables and chairs exist in language, also enabling intersubjectivity.

That the reason we haven’t worked it out might be for another reason. We are blinkered, or blind to it. — Punshhh

It may well be that the truth is simple. The problem is interpretation.

I look at Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit and say "I see the truth, it is a duck". You look at the same picture and say "I see the truth, it is a rabbit".

The truth may be staring us in the face, but we may well see different truths.

Berkeley, by contrast, accepts that there are regular sequences among ideas (what we might call “natural causes”), which God has ordained as the stable framework of experience — Wayfarer

As I understand it:

For Malebranche, God controls every interaction, such as when a white snooker ball hits a red snooker ball.

For Berkeley, it initially seems that God no longer needs to control every interaction because He has created the Laws of Nature. For example, the conservation of momentum. The interaction between the white ball and red ball is now controlled by a Law of Nature rather than God directly.

But is it the case that for Berkeley the Laws of Nature exist independently of God?

However, ‘esse est percipi’ = "to be is to be perceived" and not only de we perceive objects such as tables and chairs, which therefore must exist in the mind of God, but we also perceive the Laws of Nature, which therefore must also exist in the mind of God.

For Malebranche, God must be involved in every interaction, such as determining how the red ball moves. But also for Berkeley, God must be involved in every interaction, in that to every interaction God must apply the appropriate Law of Nature. Even though it is this Law of Nature which then determines how the red ball moves.

One can conclude that even though God has ordained a framework of experience, such as the Conservation of Momentum, God still has to apply this framework of experience to every interaction.

Malebranche's view may be slightly different to Berkeley's view, but they both require God to be involved in every interaction.
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Whereas, I think, for you, the idea that objects are not physical means that they must be in some sense illusory. Would that be true? — Wayfarer

As regards definitions, I believe in what today is called Physicalism, being fundamental particles and forces. Berkeley did not believe in a world of material substance, such as today's Physicalism, but he did believe in a world of physical form, bundles of ideas in the mind of God.

As an Indirect Realist, for me, objects such as tables and chairs don't exist in the world, but only exist in the mind as concepts.

Therefore, even though my concept of "chair" is not physical, I don't think of it as an illusion.

Is matter, stripped of all the perceptible qualities and can only exist parasitically on other objects, a perceptible object? — L'éléphant

I am unclear as to the meaning of "perceive" in "esse est percipi", "to be is to be perceived".

Does it mean perceive through the sense, as in "I perceive a red postbox" or "I perceive a loud noise" or does it mean perceive in the mind, as in "I perceive she is bored" or "I perceive the cause of the smoke was a fire"?

Today, my understanding of reality is described by Physicalism, where particles and forces are fundamental to the reality of the world.

As you say, things like quarks cannot be directly perceived but only indirectly perceived.

Berkeley did not believe in what today we call Physicalism, as he believed that everything in the world, whether fundamental particles, fundamental forces, tables, chairs or trees are bundles of ideas in the mind of God.

I take Berkeley to be arguing that we can do without the concept of matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems that way, in that for Berkeley "matter" does nothing for us.

See SEP - Occasionalism

Berkeley (1685-1753) may have been influenced by the Occasionalism of the French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715).

Consider a moving white billiard ball hit a stationary red billiard ball, which then starts to move.

For Malebranche, God not only started the world but ensures that it keeps running.

So the cause of the red ball starting to move is not the white ball but the mind of God. The only necessary connection between the white ball and the red ball is the mind of God

For Berkeley, as an Immaterialist, there is not a material world, where objects exist independently of any mind or perception, but there is a physical world, where objects are bundles of ideas in the mind of God.

So if the interaction between the white ball and red ball does not depend on the material within the billiard balls but does depends on the mind of God, then the actual material billiard balls are redundant.

The material world adds nothing if nothing is determined by the material world but is determined by the mind of God.

But rather, if such an alien were to arrive and tell us, we would likely have no difficulty in understanding it. — Punshhh

As I could never run a 4 minute mile because I am limited by the physicality of my body, all brains are limited by their physicality. Brains are physical things.

As a cat is limited by its physical brain in understanding Sartre's existentionalism, the human is limited in its understanding by its physical brain.

Even the alien will be limited by the physicality of their brain.

In no way — it’s all speculation, in the sense that any scientific postulate is, at its inception, a conceptual construct accepted without direct proof, but rather on the basis of its explanatory and predictive power — Astorre

How can you speculate about the ontology of being without using language or thought?

The moment you speculate about the ontology of being using language or thought you are in the realms of epistemology.

And language and thought are, by their very nature, dynamic rather than static.

In many contexts physical and material are synonyms — boundless

Yes, Materialism and Physicalism have other meanings as well.

But specifically for Berkeley, as an Immaterialist, he does not believe in a world of material substance, fundamental particles and forces, but he does believe in a world of physical form, bundles of ideas in the mind of God.

I am interested in the other question: whether there is something that is regardless of whether we speak of it, think of it, or conceptualise it. This is the difference between epistemology and ontology. — Astorre

Suppose there is an ontological "being" independent of human language or human thought.

How can a human approach ontological being if they can neither speak about it nor think about it?

What other approach is there?

I think that terminology is certainly not his. Have a browse of the Early Modern Texts translation provided in Ref 1. He’s quite the sophist. (I recommend the Dialogues.) — Wayfarer

Berkeley does not believe that there are material objects in the world, athough he does believe that there are physical objects in the world.

From SEP - George Berkeley:

Berkeley defends idealism by attacking the materialist alternative. What exactly is the doctrine that he’s attacking? Readers should first note that “materialism” is here used to mean “the doctrine that material things exist”.

Thus, although there is no material world for Berkeley, there is a physical world, a world of ordinary objects. This world is mind-dependent, for it is composed of ideas, whose existence consists in being perceived. For ideas, and so for the physical world, esse est percipi.

But, for Berkeley, all that is real are spirits, which could be glossed as ‘perceiving beings’, and objects are ideas in minds. — Wayfarer

I agree when you said:

George Berkeley (1685–1753) was an Irish philosopher and Anglican bishop best known for his philosophy of immaterialism — the view that physical objects exist only if perceived (summed up in the memorable aphorism ‘esse est percipi’). — Wayfarer

For Berkeley, objects exist as physical things in the world.

Before talking about the dynamics of concepts, I’d like to clarify: what exactly do you mean by “being”? Do you equate it with the linguistic meaning of the word, or with a concept? — Astorre

"Being" is a word in language and Being is a concept in the mind.

As regards linguistic meaning of the word, the Merriam Webster Dictionary describes "being" as "the quality or state of having existence, something that is conceivable and hence capable of existing, conscious existence, the qualities that constitute an existent thing, a living thing .........................."

As regards concepts in the mind, each word represents a concept, whether "being", "the", "quality", "or", etc

As concepts in the mind are dynamic, and words represent concepts, the word for a concept must also be dynamic.