I would not have lied.
— Mww

But I didn't ask him what he would have done, I asked him if he thinks what I did is wrong. So that doesn't answer the question. — Amalac

The point being, the rightness or wrongness of an act is never a thought of mine, but only the act’s felt moral integrity. To lie is to be intentionally deceitful, and the principle of intentional deceit can never stand as ground for a universal law, therefore to lie is refuse obligation to a c.i., and is thereby immoral. The question of whether I think another’s acts are right or wrong is irrelevant, for my thinking does not, and cannot, supervene on my purely subjective moral principles.

It is, on the other hand, I may judge the rightness or wrongness of me telling a lie, iff there results an experience of mine because of it, insofar as all experiences presuppose a discursive judgement that makes the experience possible. Even while knowing the immorality of telling a lie, I go ahead and tell one anyway, I am then offered the chance to judge its effect. The problem with this consequentialist approach is, I am judging the effect of my deceit on another subject, in which such effect can never be properly understood, for if it was I could claim to know his thoughts, which is impossible. I am, for all intents and purposes, assigning a right to my reason that far exceeds its boundaries. Thus, not only am I committing an immoral act, I am committing an irrational act as well. I am but a sad, ignoble, immoral egocentric. Woe is me. (Sniff)
(Kidding)
————

To stay silent is not to lie.
— Mww

I didn't mean to imply that it was, I was just wandering if the deontologist was forced to tell the truth about how he feels according to the imperative, or if he could stay silent. — Amalac

Wandering, were we? Spellchecker: can’t live with it, can’t kill it. (Sigh)

Forced is kinda harsh, but I get it. Guided by is more apt, in that reason has no causal force. So, no, the deontologist is not forced into anything. As to whether silence is justified as opposed to a definitive response, that is the prerogative of the subject.

Also, for the sake of consistency, “to tell the truth about how he feels according to the imperative” has the proverbial cart before the horse. Feeling is always the antecedent ground, being primal in humans, interactive with yet separable from, reason. As such, imperatives don’t tell you how you feel, you don’t feel according to an imperative. The proposition is better stated as.....he feels telling the truth is imperative categorically.

Disclaimer: not sure of your context here. It makes sense to tell the truth about how one feels about the taste of Lima beans, but that actually reduces to a cognition. He is merely being accurate in his recounting of what he thinks of Lima beans, insofar as he thinks they are an affront to his taste buds. Hardly a moral judgement preconditioned by an act of will.
————

do you think most such people spend a significant amount of time pondering about their actions and philosophizing? I don't. — Amalac

Nor do I. Generally, folks go with “that just doesn’t feel right”, or, “why did I do/say that”, without actually finding the why. If he thinks about it long enough, and under his given conditions, he might arrive at an answer already provided by one philosopher or another.

if I ask a deontologist if he thinks it was wrong for me to lie to the man on his deathbed about his son’s condition, would he answer with a “yes” or a “no”? — Amalac

A regular dude would answer by how he thinks, a pure moral deontologist would answer by how he feels. The former may answer yes or no, the latter would only answer....I would not have lied.

What does the categorical imperative say here? Should the deontologist truthfully answer that question, or is he allowed to stay silent? — Amalac

To stay silent is not to lie. The imperative is merely a formula, determined by principles held by the subject. Only the subject knows what the imperative commands.
———-

When you think something is for the best, you think a good as it is for yourself.
— Mww

In a sense yes, in so far as another person’s suffering would also make me suffer more, and their happiness make me happier. — Amalac

These two statements do not hold the same truth value. There is no reason why another person’s subjective condition must necessarily pertain to yours. You can allow it, but it is neither biologically nor metaphysically the case that it must be allowed. If you feel another’s subjective condition and make no reaction to it, you may merely sympathize and you’ve violated no moral law. If you feel another’s condition and do react to it from some sorryful inclination, you’ve more than merely sympathized, you’ve treated the other as an end for yourself, which does violate a moral law.

It has never been a consideration here, as to whether people in general actually do things this way. All this is about, is a exposition of what proper Kantian moral philosophy entails. As such, it is a determination of principles, which are always certain, not the actions possible because of them, which are not.
————

Is that “using another as an end for my own good”? Maybe, but why is that bad? — Amalac

It isn’t bad to help people. It is praiseworthy and admirable, from a common point of view, but may lack any moral import without the determining conditions for why you do it. Do you help people to alleviate their suffering to make yourself feel better, or do you help people from a duty that prevents you from not helping people. The former is mere inclination, the latter is lawful obligation.
————-

I wouldn’t want psychopaths who feel nothing when they watch or contemplate the sufferings of others to adopt a consequentialist criterion — Amalac

And how would you ever make that preventable? You cannot, so what matters what you want?

The deontologist also makes judgements on others, since he thinks they are acting wrong when the lie, or borrow money. — Amalac

No, that’s a wrongful interpretation. A deontologist makes a discursive judgement on a behavior not his own by his cognitive criteria, which is an experience. That experience informs by means of a aesthetic judgement as to whether he would or would not behave in similar fashion under the same conditions, measured exclusively by how such behavior would make him feel about himself.

The deontologist, then, would find no pleasure at all, in a intentional deceitful behavior. If he abstains from that behavior for that reason, he demonstrates his morality; if he commits to that behavior in spite of that reason, he demonstrates his immorality.

When you think something is for the best, you think a good as it is for yourself. If you use the thinking for what is good for yourself, but apply it to another, as would a typical consequentialist, you are in effect using that other as an end for your own good. To use others for your own good can never be justified as a universal law.

This might exemplify an inconsistency in Kolakowski‘s interpretation of Kant's c.i.: a consequential moralist makes judgements on others predicated on his criteria; a deontological moralist makes makes judgements on himself using his own criteria.

This raises the question of warrant for knowledge of my suffering. To witness the behavior of the sufferer says nothing of the suffering. In effect, a judgement is forthcoming for an impossible experience.

I sincerely hope it is not a consequentialist that finds me after my car accident, if he shoots me because he thinks it best I do not suffer.

(Actually, due to blood loss to the brain, I’m in a perfectly euphoric state, reliving my fondest memories from a long, illustrious life....and that clown ended it all because of something that completely escaped his judgmental criteria.)

Immoral indeed.

I was under the impression that Kant held some form of moral cognitivism....... — Amalac

“....we may especially remark that all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations. (The feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will, which are not cognitions, are excepted.)...”
(CPR A49/B67)

To think is to cognize, therefore if one thinks he is a cognitivist. To be a moral agent, one must act in a certain way, but he acts in accordance to what he feels, not what he thinks, therefore no moral agent is a moral cognitivist.

The argument is, then, a moral agent must think the principles from which his moral actions ensue. On the other hand, the conception of a moral constitution, or a moral predisposition, implies principles are innate, and that which is innate does not need to be thought.

Pick your own poison?
————

re-read the Critique of Practical Reason. — Amalac

Bear in mind....you don’t need the transcendental proof for the validity of freedom as a sufficient causality, if you do not grant the absolute necessity of the will in a human being as his only moral authority. CpR is a waste of time for those who do not hold with a deontological moral doctrine.

Do you agree with tim's claim that Kant doesn't tell us what to do? — Amalac

Yes, absolutely. No one can tell anyone else what to do, except in cases of instructions for, or in the pursuit of, a skill.

why, according to Kant, do we have to act as the categorical imperative says, instead of basing our actions on consequentialist/utilitarian principles? — Amalac

Generally, Kant promoted a strictly deontological moral doctrine, wherein respect for law as such, makes no allowance for possible consequence. This in turn is predicated on two fundamental human conditions: good in and of itself, without regard to any object of it, and, happiness, and the worthiness of attaining it, which is morality itself.

Kant claims that the categorical imperative is known a priori, in which case it could be deduced through logic alone, and as Kolakowski suggests, this would imply that we can have “independent and unquestionable moral certainty” — Amalac

It is known a priori, But perhaps not so much through logic alone per se, but through pure practical reason, by which is deduced on its own accord, those “commands of reason”.

The logic that grounds the deduction, in the form of cause and effect, has been argued incessantly, insofar as the causality here can never be proved, which logic requires, even while the effect is obvious in the actions that follow from it. Kant was chastised for his inability to prove the reality of transcendental freedom as a causality with the same necessity as empirical causality naturally, but based his entire moral philosophy on the impossibility of morality itself without it, whether or not it could be proved. Hence, the ground for the birth of consequentialism proper, post-Kant.

The independent merely indicates without empirical influences, which are wants or desires, and the unquestionable merely indicates the impossibility of disregarding that of which our own reason informs. Both of those are given, which makes Kolakowski’s implication correct.
———-

But how does Kant know that the way of being good moral agents is to follow the imperative — Amalac

There are no knowledge claims in pure speculative moral philosophy, so all this is not something Kant claims to know. Morality is based on feelings alone, from which follows that if one feels he has acted in accordance with the goodness of his own will, he can claim entitlement to being happy. There are, nonetheless, knowledge claims a priori in a subject, in that he knows either how he ought to act, or, he is acting, according to his will. He also knows when he does not, for he can feel it, in aesthetic judgements he makes on himself. The most familiar common knowledge a priori being.....”I’m sorry”.

Is “being a good moral agent” defined as “following the categorical imperative”? If so, that's a mere tautology, isn't it? — Amalac

Technically, this is correct, but allowances must be made for the fallibility of human nature in general. In trying to clarify things, I shot myself in the foot, by qualifying moral agents as good, when, in Kantian moral philosophy, good is restricted to the will the agent has. I should have said, an agent’s morality is defined by his compliance to the goodness of his will.

Of course, the goodness of a will is relative to the agent, which we witness in disagreements in moral actions across such agents in different cultures. As such, the guy beheading is acting morally from his principles, just as the guy that finds that action abominable, not ever even considering the possibility that he himself might have to become a beheader under any circumstance whatsoever. Easy to see how that could cause all kindsa problems.

So let’s just say, to follow the c.i. epitomizes what it is to be a moral agent.

categorical imperative [stated in the form: “you should act only according to a maxim that you can... (and so on)”] is true. — Amalac

The c.i. doesn’t have a truth value; it is a “command of reason”.

The c.i., because it is a command, is a “shall”, not a “should”. Should, or ought, denotes a hypothetical imperative.

If Kant really didn't mean that we ought to do as the categorical imperative says..... — Amalac

He didn’t mean we should; he means we must (in order to demonstrate the worthiness of calling ourselves good moral agents). What we are to do, is act. And to act in any situation governed by a moral feeling, in accordance with a principle you yourself will. “...Act only on that maxim.....”.

The OP's quote comes from the book — Amalac

Ahhhh....that explains it. Thanks.

he never says anything about the transcendental idea of freedom. — Amalac

It’s not in vogue so much these days.

And you will find that he is comprehensive in presentation to a degree that does not lend itself to short, easy summary-as-argument. — tim wood

I find it worse than that.

Kant's theory of practical reason has been perhaps the most audacious attempt to find an independent and unquestionable source of moral certainty — Kolakowski

The idea by which moral certainty is possible is given in CPR 1781. The ground for moral certainty is given in F.P.M.M.,1785. And while the essay is nearly exclusively predicated on the concepts from 1785, it says nothing at all about “audacious attempts to find an independent and unquestionable source” for those very concepts, which is given in CpR 1788.

And there’s more, but.....another time, perhaps.

In Kant, the source for moral certainty is the transcendental idea of freedom, not once mentioned in the essay. Or, at least the part of the essay posted here. I couldn’t find it to see if there was more to it.

So, yes, absolutely. Comprehensive in presentation. Over seven years and three separate volumes.

“what do you think of “whiteness”
— Mww

If I hear the word "whiteness", in my mind I link the physical word "whiteness" with several physical objects in the world, — RussellA

Which is not what the question asks, as pre-conditioned by what you shouldn’t do.
————-

I could invent a logical system whereby a single identity can exist and not exist at the same time — RussellA

You could invent a logic but couldn’t imagine whiteness?
————-

The question is why is one invented logical system accepted and used rather than another. The answer is that logical system which corresponds with what has been discovered in the world. — RussellA

Maybe, but probably much more likely that discoveries by humans correspond to the logical system intrinsic to humans. We don’t invent logic; we are logical. We merely invent the representations of its necessary systemic conditions.

So.....go ahead and try inventing a logic without using the logic with which you are naturally imbued.
————-

I would say that to date we have no literal knowledge of anything, meaning that there is no alternative but for the metaphor to suffice. — RussellA

We have no absolute knowledge, meaning there is no alternative but for contingent knowledge to suffice.

Knowledge is the highest degree of relative certainty, certainty literally is what is the case relative to the time of it. Exactly the opposite of metaphor.

I understand your literal/metaphorical dichotomy has purchase in a non-representational system, which is, oddly enough, self-defeating, in that literal and metaphor are each themselves representations. And even if they weren’t, it is far from established, that a non-representational system holds over a representational one as the whole of human intelligence qua rational thought.

As the saying goes "Getting knowledge about something is like making a map of a place or like travelling there. Teaching someone is like showing them how to reach a place". — RussellA

Whatever bonehead said that didn’t heed its weakness. Knowledge is literally making a map; teaching is metaphorically giving a map. The map made is pure experience; the map given is the opposite in the form of rote instruction.

But I get it, it’s how you claim knowledge of red flowers in vases.....because somebody told you so. Somebody showed you how to get from physical object in the world to what you should call it from then on. And you never bothered to ask yourself how that happened, and apparently, no one ever gave you a map that took you to a place you didn’t want to go.

Your system works well enough, as long as there’s no glitches. Just as soon as there is one.....for which there is ample historical precedent....that kind of system cannot sustain itself.

The word "whiteness" exists as a physical object on the screen that you are currently reading. — RussellA

If I speak to you, say, “what do you think of “whiteness”, in which case the word appears in the world as a sound to your ears just as it appears to your vision as a word on the screen, what object am I referring to, per Russell’s comment? You shouldn’t bring any worldly object to consciousness at all, because I didn’t ask what you thought about white things, but only the relative quality of white in general. That which many thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and the object of all thoughts of whiteness, is.....white. And white is not an object in the world.
————-

......because I believe that an object in the world cannot both exist and not exist at the same time then it follows that I also believe that human thought is not to be taken seriously. — RussellA

That’s not what I said. I said......I think you don’t assign enough importance to human thought, as a consequence of reading you say logic exists in the world, and is not a human invention. What you did with the existence thing, is merely provide a proof for the logic already thought by a human. The world is the existence of things, so the simultaneous thing and no-thing cannot be a condition of the world, but only a condition of some intelligence that thinks about it in a logically self-contradictory way. I’m only rather emphatically contending that a typical human intelligence should already know all that, and a decent cognitive philosopher certainly would.
————

Perhaps one should think of the apple as a metaphor rather than something literal. — RussellA

Metaphors are never sufficient for knowledge; only the literal will suffice. The irreducible, the unconditioned. The truth as far as we can tell.

One must already have the experience of red flowers in vases, before he can say an instance of perception, is that.
— Mww

Indeed. A nice point of agreement to end with! — Andrew M

Apparently, we aren’t ending, and we certainly aren’t agreeing, insofar as your “indeed” here has missed the point, and is not supported by what you’ve already said. You’re treating red flowers in a vase as always given, when it isn’t. What is given is a thing containing things. I’ve already argued all this in the preceding pages, re: the mosquito bite, ‘57 DeSoto’s, and such. “Before he can say an instance of perception, is that” makes explicit time as a necessary condition for experience of objects, therefore empirical knowledge itself.

I think it of no intellectual consequence here, to follow the chronology back to the beginning, when the tree we all claim to know, was just this thing poking out of the dirt, and the only reason we know it as such now, is because it was recorded as such then. As it is for every single known object ever. The metaphysical implications are enormous, which is probably why they’re forfeited to the nonsense of mere language on the one hand, and the restrictions to pure physicalism on the other.
————-

I reject that we see only images (of unknown things), hence the allusion to Kant: — Andrew M

“...but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something....”

You should reject that we see only images of unknown things, insofar as Kant’s “appearance” is not your “see only images”. In Kant, the unknown things we see are not images (they are phenomena, “the undetermined objects of intuition”), and images we have are not unknown things (they are called schema, and represent “the synthesis of the understanding into a possible cognition”.

I’ve noticed you’ve never used that word....understanding. I suppose your thesis has no need of it, in that, in this discussion, we’ve never got past the transition from the physical external to the rational internal, and furthermore, that physicalist explanations for brain mechanics is both necessary and sufficient for human knowledge. Problem is, of course, that while physicalist predicates are certainly necessary, the sufficiency of them is not given by their mere necessity, and can never arise from it alone.

Also, without the use of understanding as a rational condition, you’ve entitled yourself to say stuff like.....

the object whiteness and the word "whiteness" are physical things in the world. — RussellA

....and, my personal favorite, so far anyway.....

Independent of the mind, logic exists in the world. — RussellA

.....which is fine, if that’s how you roll, but you’re gonna have a hellava job supporting either of those assertions, that eliminates the inconsistencies in them. I get it, honest, I do, I guess. You’re of the opinion that human thought is not anything to be taken seriously. You might grant that everybody thinks, but the how and why of it doesn’t matter. And if everything is in the world, from red flowers to logic to whiteness, and given to us as it is, we don’t need to think about the world becoming comprehensible to an intelligence such as humans possess.

But humans are wrong about so much, and distinct from each other in so many ways, it might be best to figure out humans, rather than just give us all a world to hide behind.
————-

Consider an object having a physical existence independent of any observer....... — RussellA

Duly considered. To consider is to think, and I can think an object having physical existence without observing it. Doesn’t mean I know there is such a thing that conforms to my thinking, but if I can think it without implicit contradiction, it must be a possible thing.

.....such as an apple. — RussellA

An apple is a determined object. A determined object cannot be independent of that which determines it. From a human point of view, the only one from which we are entitled to speak, apple is a human determination, which makes explicit a human observer of an object having physical existence.

there are plenty of people out there who do share my fondness for Thai — Andrew M

Categorically false.

Sufficiently true: you and many people out there have similar experiences of Thai food because all of the individual qualitative judgements made on it, are congruent with each other.
———-

Presumably..... — Andrew M

Metaphysics concerns itself with that which is true, under a given set of conditions, thereby eliminating presumptions. We don’t care about the conditions under which you presumably might (think/experience/know) later, but rather, the reasons why you don’t (think/experience/know) now.
———-

The red flower itself is not passed on, only information. That information allows us to perceive the object (in the world) in a particular form. — Andrew M

Obviously then, if red flower itself is not passed on, but information is, then red flower itself is not contained in the information. (Sounds familiar, donnit)

How did the perceived object in its particular form get to be the red flower we know? If the information in a particular form is the red flower, how is it that we didn’t have the red flower itself passed on?

You do realize, don’t you? That the only way we can know the information contained in the perception of a particular smell is the particular object “bacon”, is from experience? So saying, your system only works for extant knowledge, but is hopelessly futile for that of which we have no experience. Yet, there are multiple instances of perceiving information to which we can relate no object at all.

Nobody cares about what is known. The natural human proclivity is to learn what we don’t. And for that, we need to think. Talking is necessary for rote instruction, but hardly necessary for assimilating such instruction, and not even present in a purely personal experience, into a subjective consciousness.
————-

This is just another way of saying that to perceive a red flower in a vase entails that there is a red flower in a vase (i.e., the logic of perception). — Andrew M

A “...mere worthless sophism...”, as The Highly Esteemed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Koenigsberg would exclaim. To perceive a red flower in a vase presupposes knowledge of what a red flower in a vase entails. One must already have the experience of red flowers in vases, before he can say an instance of perception, is that.

This dialectical back-and-forth is endless, but at least it is something to do.

conjunction between....analytic...and....continental philosophers. — RussellA

Oil and water!!!! Fire and ice!!! Mom’s apple pie and Tabasco!!!!

To say "I am my subjective experiences" means that "I am my subjective experiences of thoughts and feelings". — RussellA

My subjective experiences can include both thoughts and feelings. — RussellA

—————

It is usually enough to say I am that which these two different things have in common.
— Mww

I would not say that "I am what thoughts and feelings have in common". — RussellA

Sorry. I figured there was no loss of truth value in my configuration of the statements as opposed to yours. Didn’t intend to flagrantly misinterpret.

The reason I said “it is usually enough” is because conventionally, it is. But technical metaphysical reductionism in the continental tradition denies that thoughts and feelings are experiences in the first place, so all that remains.....currently in vogue.....is the facility of convention, re: analytic language games.

Sorry for the delay. OK...fine. I totally missed this. My bad, because it was worth a response.

Descartes campaigned for a particular method of epistemology to be the benefactor of his establishment of the cogito. — Paine

Doubt is a negative truth claim, but is it a knowledge claim? Rather than a method of epistemology, I might go with a method of inference. This sorta fits, because establishment proper should follow from an ”ergo”, right? I mean.....”therefore” seems to indicate that which is established, as consequent, from some antecedent necessary truth.

How about this: Descartes campaigned for the establishment of “sum” as the benefactor of his particular method of inference.

Now, there is a particular method of epistemology that benefits from the establishment of “cogito”, but Descartes didn’t campaign, and wasn’t himself responsible, for it. Had to wait about 150 years for pure a priori cognitions to make the scene, which are the source of knowledge given from the thinking subject alone.

Minor technicality maybe, but still....should probably keep things in order.

It is usually enough to say I am that which these two different things have in common.

Until it is asked what those two different things are, what makes these two things different. Then it is not enough to say they are those which are common in me, for no two things can be distinguished by something common to each.

Perhaps Descartes should have said: "I am my thoughts, therefore I am" — RussellA

Not bad. — Mww

———-

As Descartes might have said "I am my subjective experiences, therefore I am" — RussellA

Better.

You still have to prove that thoughts and feelings are equally experienced, in order to affirm that I am only my subjective experiences. The principle of identity cannot justify that which is comprised of two unequal things. Strawson gave the clue.

and because experience is not in the world......
— Mww

That doesn't seem right to me. — Andrew M

Yet you’ve preface every one of those examples with “I”, the feeling of excitement, fond memory of the restaurant, more knowledge on the job. All of those belong to you alone, you said it yourself. So how can any of them be in the world if they are in you. If you’re right, I should go to that restaurant and experience your fondness for it. But it happened to be Thai and I hate Thai. So.....sorry, doesn’t work that way; when you get right down to critical examination there arise too many inconsistencies.

Are you using the term "experience" differently to all of those? — Andrew M

You betcha I am. Experience is an end in itself, a result, the finished product, in this case, of the employment of an individual, private, subjective human cognitive system, which is its means. That every single human that ever lives experiences things in the world is hardly sufficient reason to claim experiences are things in the world.

Still.....benefit of the doubt. When we both experience clouds, but I imagine a lion and you imagine a seagull in the same cloud formation......how do you explain those different experiences given from the exact same object? Rather than mandating a contradiction in the form of the same experience of the same cloud as both lion and seagull simultaneously, it is much more logical to say our simultaneously imagined experiences contradict each other, the cloud being merely its own single thing.
———-

On a non-representationalist view, no copy is being made. Instead we are perceiving the original object — Andrew M

The representationalist also perceives the object directly. All sensation is a direct affect of a particular object, or an assemblage of them. The impressions on sensibility are all direct perceptions. How could it be otherwise, and still make legitimate claims as to what the object is? How could a thing perceived as round legitimately be experienced as square? Or anything other than round? Can’t get it right in the end, by beginning with a wrong.

So we both perceive the original object directly. We both can say the impressions on our senses are given from a very real, very distinct, very “right there” object. If the representationalist makes copies of the object to pass on to the remainder of the system, what does the non-representationalist pass on to the same system? Even if he passes on mere information, doesn’t that still represent the perception? Otherwise he must pass on the red itself flower itself in itself a vase itself, which is quite absurd.

Put some instrument on a nerve bundle, say, for mere tactile reception. Wait for a mosquito bite. Do you really think a mosquito is going to show up on the instrument display? Nahhhh....you’ll see a graph, or a voltage reading, or some.....wait foooorr itttt.....representation of whatever object is affecting the skin. I suppose you could make the instrument such that it takes that information and makes a picture, but then, why bother when you’ve got a brain doing just that.
————-

This is a conceptual, not an empirical point. We're investigating what we perceive (i.e., can point at), and what we perceive is the object "as it is in itself", so to speak. — Andrew M

Yes, we’re investigating what we perceive. Yes, what we perceive is the object. That is the empirical point.

No, not as it is in itself. If it were as it is in itself, why are we involved? That is the conceptual point. “In-itself” means not in us. And by extension, not in any intelligence whatsoever. How else to explain the logically necessary objective reality of things before there were ever any intelligences to perceive them?

And herein lay the real problem. These days, there are so very many objects for which we are the empirical causality. For these we are wont to say we perceive them as they are in themselves, because we made them as they are in themselves. But this is an aberration, insofar as we still do not perceive the material constituency of the object, but only the final form the constituency is given.
————-

On a non-representationalist model, objects have natural characteristics that we can discover. — Andrew M

I get your point. Nevertheless, I would invite you to explain what you mean when you say “we discover”? What are we really doing when we discover? That objects display tendencies, or are imbued with qualities, is given, else we wouldn’t be able to perceive them, or know them as a particular thing, but that does nothing to address discovery, but only makes discovery possible because of those antecedent conditions. It follows that, with respect to that vase for instance, didn’t we already have to know, rather than discover, what form the vase must have, in order for it to be a water-holder?

The point being.....information or representation....you still gotta do something with it. Just calling it something doesn’t get us what we want.

my thoughts and other attributes are things that belong, or else pertain, to me (rather than equating to me) — javra

I think that closer to the case, yes. I am the unity of all my representations. Something along those lines.

I was going more for knowledge by acquaintance — javra

Yes, another iteration of a Platonic dualism. His: knowledge of, knowledge that; Russell, knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge by description. Kant somewhere in between with knowledge a priori and knowledge a posteriori. It’s all good.

In contrast to such stance...... — javra

Which stance are we talking about here? His, or mine? You quoted me, so supposing my stance, that we are not only our thoughts, your comment that we don’t necessarily change along with our thoughts, seems to support it, which isn’t in contrast to it.

So...I shall assume his, in which case, I agree, but only in the lesser sense, that we do not change along with our thoughts. But, as soon as we bring in time, we leave the lesser sense, and get down to the technical, greater, sense.
—————

Descartes: if he knew he was because he thought — javra

Gotta be careful here. Rene never said he knew anything; all he ever said was he doubts, and that necessarily. Makes no sense to say I know I doubt, while I am actually engaged in doubting.

“....I wasn’t meaning to deny that one must first know what thought, existence and certainty are, and know that it’s impossible for something to think while it doesn’t exist, and the like. But these are utterly simple notions, which don’t on their own give us knowledge of anything that exists...”
(P. P., 2. 10., 1647)

From that, we can say he never claimed knowledge of “I”, or mind as subject, even after having proved “I am” because his thoughts are indubitable. That a thing is necessary doesn’t tell us anything about what it is. Or, ontology claims are not epistemological claims. Descartes never said he knew he was merely because he couldn’t doubt his thoughts; his successors foisted that on him, without proper warrant.

On the other hand, one could fall back on “knowledge that”, in order to escape “knowledge of”. Like I said....gotta be careful.
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personal identity is quite the headache, at least for me — javra

Personal identity invokes conceptions of virtue, which involves reason, as do any conceptions. But reason is fallible, so.....there ya go.

Not bad.

Except I am more than my thoughts. I am not only my thoughts.

all experience has phenomenal ground.....
— Mww

So I'm curious whether you think that statement is compatible with the view that experience is grounded in the world, understood as that which we can point to around us..... — Andrew M

Hmmmm. “In the world” implies spatial location, and because experience is not in the world, I would go with “grounded by the world”. This removes the ambiguity of location but leaves the necessary implication of time, insofar as experience always presupposes its objects.

A common rejoinder is the notion that phenomena are themselves in the world, but this is not the case. Phenomena are “the undetermined objects of intuition”, most easily grasped by comparing phenomena to the information transferred along the nerves. This separates the external object from the impression it makes on our senses, and because we are never aware of such physical transfer, it fits with the “undetermined” in the metaphysical definition. Convention puts phenomena in the world; critical reason does not.
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.....that which we can point to around us (and which do have characteristics, e.g., the red flower in the vase). — Andrew M

Ever wonder how it became “red flower in a vase”? How does something....anything.....get its characteristics?
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while experience is certainly predicated on sense data given from objects of perception.....
— Mww

And also whether that statement is compatible with saying that what we perceive are objects in the world..... — Andrew M

Yes, what we perceive are objects in the world, that which impresses, or affects, our senses.

....objects in the world (which we have attendant thoughts and feelings about). — Andrew M

No, we have thoughts and feelings about representations of perceived objects in the world. It behooves the purely physicalist-minded, to remember 100% efficiency of energy transformation is absolutely impossible for human sensory apparatus. Because there is necessarily energy loss, that which is upstream from sensation can never be the same as what is downstream from it. If the latter is different in some way, it can no more than merely represent the former to some arbitrary degree.

That relieves us of invoking the tautological nonsense of saying things like, “there are no basketballs, ‘57 DeSoto’s.....and no “red flowers in a vase”.....in my head”.
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(I note that you mention "sense data", but also that it is not "sense data" that is perceived, since it is not an object of perception). — Andrew M

Correct. Which gets us back to how objects get their characteristics. Sense data is quite general, yet characteristics are particulars. That the particulars are derivable from the generals doesn’t say how the one is separated from the other, if that is the case, or annexed to the other, if that is the case.

All that reduces to.....is it a red flower in a vase because it just is that, or, is it a red flower in a vase because we say it is just that. Personal preference?

Color, form and dimensions are characteristics that objects have. Perception is the process by which we become aware of an object with such characteristics. It's not a process of purple, squareness and boxhood being synthesized in our minds or, alternatively, brains. — Andrew M

Apparently so.

if I cannot understand the nature of the mind by looking at the minds of other, and I cannot understand the nature of the mind by looking at my own, then I will never be able to understand the nature of the mind. — RussellA

Agreed, which means this.....

I agree that "I am my mind". — RussellA

....is wrong, and is only corrected by shortening it to “I am”, which immediately reconciles the contradiction stated here......

Schopenhauer wrote: “that the subject should become an object for itself is the most monstrous contradiction ever thought of” — RussellA

.....and has the added benefit of being apodeitically certain.

They stand in relations and thus ground a structure of relations but qualia themselves are not relations and have no internal structure. — litewave

Be that as it may, it only goes to sustain my opinion for the superfluousness of qualia, in that the Kantian categories adhere to that very same criteria and serve the same general purpose.

I reject the concept of “qualia” outright, as superfluous....
— Mww

Thanks! You omit those words (as superfluous) but, as I understand it, retain the underlying representationalist model. — Andrew M

Remember the times. Pierce, 1866, inflicted “quale” on the metaphysical world for one reason only: Kant didn’t elaborate on his infliction of “pure aesthetic judgement” on the metaphysical world. Or, I suppose....his elaboration was so complex its validity escaped everyone, so they speculated on their own. Given that Pierce was a Kantian, at least he was in 1866, and given that it is the case that he defined “qualia” as “the character of phenomenal experience”, it is clear he speculated his way far from the original, insofar as all experience has phenomenal ground, hence the notion of “superfluous”, and, experience doesn't even have “character” in the Enlightenment transcendental sense, hence the notion of speculative advancement of a standing theory.

Subsequent elaborations removed qualia from the phenomenal character of experience, per se, to manifestations of the “feeling of what it is like to have a phenomenal experience”, which predicated the concept on the affect of sense data has, that is, sensation, as elaboration over phenomena, on the subject’s feelings. This elaboration in effect twice removed qualia from Kantian metaphysics, in the first because, re: Pierce, experience doesn’t have character, and second, because, re: Lewis, 1929, while experience is certainly predicated on sense data given from objects of perception, feelings just as certainly are not. Continuing these conceptual monstrosities through time just made it easier to counter them, as they got further and further removed from the inception of them.

But back to the beginning......representations are all and only given from sensibility as intuitions, or understanding as conceptions. A representational model of cognitive metaphysics leaves room for qualia, obviously, because they can be thought, and furthermore they stand as valid conceptions insofar as they do not carry an intrinsic contradiction.
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Which gets us to......

The theorem:
One can hold with such representational model, while abstaining from incorporating qualia in it.

....which in turn dialectically mandates....

The proof:
Major:
It is really quite irrelevant that there is a quale representing a “feeling of what it is like”, if there is no aesthetic judgement made in relation to it. If we have the feeling and make no judgement, the feeling, and by association its cause, doesn’t matter. If we have a feeling and make a judgement on it, we have cognized that which belongs to the judgement as it relates to its cause but not always with a sufficient determination of it.

Minor:
We know this to be true, given we are sometimes presented with an occasion where we do like (instances of the beautiful which is always a pleasure) or do not like (instances of the sublime which is always a pain), the feeling we get from some thing or other of our experience, but can’t say why. And if we can’t say why, if we cannot judge a sufficient cause of the feeling, there’s no reason, under these beginning conditions, to say qualia are anywhere involved. It follows logically that if we cannot attribute qualia to some feelings, we loose justification for attributing them to any feelings, given that all feelings are, in and of themselves alone, regardless of degree or kind, all exactly equal as merely a human condition.

All that to posit this conclusion:
Qualia do nothing but give feelings an unwarranted cognizable object, and thereby make it so there is no need for aesthetic judgements to which cognizable objects actually belong, which is anathema to every single transcendentally conditioned human that ever lived. In other words.....all of us.

So there, dammit!!! How come everybody doesn’t know this already???? Obvious to even the most casual observer, right??? ‘Course it is.

You can even say that the mind is the cause of the force that propagates material processes. — Raymond

Nahhhh....I can’t. Reeks of reification. Misplaced concreteness.

But you can if you like. I’ll wait for the peer review.

the mind is not a cause of a new state of affairs — RussellA

Finally.

As if an abstract non-entity can be a force.

Point:

when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism v Naturalism

Counterpoint:
“....No image could ever be adequate to our conception of a triangle in general. For the generalness of the conception it never could attain to, as this includes under itself all triangles, whether right-angled, acute-angled, etc., whilst the image would always be limited to a single part of this sphere....”
(CPR, A141/B180)

These two guys cannot both be right. Or....under what conditions could they both be right. Granting the validity of mental seeing in both cases, is seeing the form in the first the same or not, as imaging in the second?

Inquiring minds......

What is thinking? — Xtrix

Thought is cognition by means of conceptions.

Thinking (rationally), then, is the conscious act of synthesis of a diversity of conceptions in a logical unity.

And now you know.......

A small infant doesn't see...... — Wayfarer

Right, and I don’t think any epistemological science or metaphysics should concern itself with pre-teen individuals. We want to know the rules, after all, not the exceptions to them.

percepts however require concepts — Wayfarer

Right again, at least as far as human knowledge is concerned, and I would add it’s pretty hard to get “concept” out of “brain state”, while it’s rather easy to get percepts....read as object of perception.....out of them.
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Thanks for the link; good stuff. Wouldn’t let me C & P though, which is a bummer.

The question is: when is it justified? — Raymond

Depends on the premises of the theory, I guess. Empirical theories are justified by correspondence with natural law; metaphysical theories are justified by correspondence with logical law.

Subtleties sold separately.

Could you expand on what you mean by "subjective experience"? — Andrew M

I only used the compounded terminology because that was how it was originally presented. All experience is subjective, in that any experience belongs only to the rational agent that reasons to it, therefore “subjective experience” is superfluous.

I reject the concept of “qualia” outright, as superfluous as well, insofar as the given senses of them are already accounted for in established metaphysics. That is not to say they are false, or don’t have their own predication, but only that such predication has earlier, and better, representation.

While advocating modified theories, or generating new ones, is perfectly warranted, if the modified or new theory doesn’t justify relinquishing the old one, it doesn’t really serve any purpose, other than perhaps making a name for its provocateur.

......the brain contains no stable, high-resolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008) — Wayfarer

....what is being described here is close to, or identical with, what Kant describes as synthesis. (....) I wonder if @Mww would agree with that. — Wayfarer

He would, with the caveat that Kant is talking about the rational side of human mentality, but the brain having no representation of a visual scene, is the empirical side of brain mechanics.

Hence the inescapable duality of being human: there is no place in the brain for visual representation, but humans think in images.

(Delete overly extensive and manifestly unsolicited exposition on the real explanatory gap, so as to prevent the your sorrow, and the gallery’s dirty looks, for asking me whether I agreed with something or not.)

why would a "neural representation" be assumed in the first place? — Andrew M

Because this: representation is necessarily the case, and because neurons are the only possible source of representations as such, therefore neural representations.

But not this:

Because "subjective experience" (...) is a Cartesian conception of experience (the Cartesian theater, as it were). — Andrew M

Cartesian theater was never the case, and subjective experience has long evolved from Descartes, as so aptly noted.

Brain machinations can be scientifically determined all day long, but how the “sense of self” manifests out of them isn’t answered by them. So either there is no sense of self, a veritable species-wide anathema, or, science wants it to be that there isn’t, by physical means.

Sad state of affairs indeed, that science wishes to determine rationality right out of being human, and at the same time, manifests a self-contradiction in attempting to do it.

I mean....so what if all the science is right? So what if all the brain machinations are determined as pure physicality and therefore subjective experience is pure physicality as well? B.F.D. The scientist is still going to sit there, and wonder what to do about it, which requires him to employ the very thing he just proved doesn’t exist.

Probably outta stick to better toaster ovens and birth of the Universe and such. You know....that which might make a difference.

“HEY!!! TEACHER!!! Leave us kids alone!!!”

It feels as though if we cannot establish a foundational inerrant truth to build our knowledge upon, then somehow by extension all claims to truth are equal, knowledge is impossible or meaningless — Reformed Nihilist

Been that way for millennia, so...this:

http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~pthagard/Articles/metaphors.pdf

Agreed, both.

Reason always seeks the unconditioned, something to use as an irreducible bottom line, for which mind seres the purpose. After the conception of it, barring logical self-contradiction or non-compliance with natural law, best just to leave it be.

All good. With reference to.....

....attacks on dualism.... — SophistiCat

....do you think the attacks are legitimate, or is it just the human proclivity for arguing with each other?

Did you read any further than that opening sentences? — SophistiCat

Yep, seeing as how the first snippet was from the beginning of the article, and the second from about half-way through it. But, yeah, I did skim over the life-after-death part, and bypassed completely the spiritual believer part.

I must say, though, “we struggle to imagine our absolute nonexistence”, isn’t the slightest, that “science forces us to accept that we are not living on a flat Earth” is a gross over-estimation of maritime history, but at the same time, it makes me all warm and fuzzy inside, to be informed I am “entirely normal and psychologically adaptive”.

Whether to advance my sympathies, or demean the author’s credibility.....I dunno. He’s a shrink, writing in a psychology journal, meaning he’s neither natural scientist nor philosopher, so yeah......blah, indeed.
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the argument that the article cites is not confined to restating Descartes definitions. — SophistiCat

I take this to mean the footnote, which is exactly what prompted me to comment in the first place, insofar as it appeared Carroll didn’t really know what Descartes’ definitions actually were. Or if he did, he misrepresented them. Be all that as it may, it is quite clear Descartes never intended his mind “substance” to interfere with the material or body “substance”, even going so far as to warn his readers not to confuse the two. Not his fault some of his successors did it anyway, and to this day, they still do. All because of one little word. I mean...if the guy needs to be shot, shoot him for the use of the pineal gland, not the use of a word.

And probably to everyone’s annoyance, I shall mention the fact it was Kant who removed mind from any form of manifest causality, relegating it to a mere logical condition, thereby eliminating any requisite Cartesian “substance” dualism.