There are many devils in the details.

Yeah.....just think of how many meanings can be changed merely by gutting a quotation.

Kant has anything to do with Science generally. — Galuchat

FYI, and of no particular import, Kant demonstrated the refutation of Newtonian absolute space and time (1786), advanced the first iteration of the nebula theory of star-generation (1755), the first iteration of plate tectonics (1756), the first to use “quantum” in its current meaning as “minimally discrete”. The absolute space thesis was metaphysical, having no mathematical proofs so not really science, the nebula essay inspired LaPlace and is still the core principle, the plate tectonics was way off-base, the point being he was the first to think what would eventually become current science.

Things and things-in-themselves are equal as objects, just not as knowledgeable objects. Things as they are in themselves are still spatial-temporal things.
— Mww

This doesn't make any sense I'm afraid. The thing-in-itself is exactly what Kant, repeatedly, says is what cannot be known. — Xtrix

You continue to confuse, or equate, the knowledge of a thing with the existence of it. A thing to be known must exist, but a thing that exists may not be known. Things existing before knowing beings, are the very same things existing and known by humans. Merely adding thinking subjects to the total of reality makes no difference to the thing. The thing doesn’t give a hoot about humans, it will remain always just itself.
————

We label objects as thing-in-themselves only to tell us we have no way to prove that what we know about objects is what they actually are.
— Mww

"Actually are" apart from our way of knowing them, which is spatial-temporal. There's nothing left over, hence why we cannot say anything about it. — Xtrix

The subtlety is.....our knowledge of a thing may be exactly what it is in itself. But without proof, which we don’t have and can’t get, because we have nothing with which to compare, we can’t know with apodeictic certainty. And we don’t have and can’t get proof because we don't know things, in themselves or otherwise, because we only know representations of things. It follows that our representations may perfectly exemplify things as they actually are in themselves, but once again, we can’t prove it.

All human empirical knowledge is grounded in the principle of induction. The more we know about a thing, the more conceptions we can logically understand as belonging to it, the closer we are to total knowledge of it, knowing exactly what that thing is. We cannot possibly have complete knowledge of some things (the quantum, the cosmological, because we have no idea what conceptions might even apply), which makes explicit the difference between what we do know and what there is to know, is exactly the same difference between the thing known and the thing in itself unknown.

Yes, what effects us from outside corresponds exactly to what we sense. That which effects our eyes exactly corresponds to what we see; that which effects our ears corresponds exactly to what we hear, etc. We have to have consistency between incoming data and what the cognitive system works with.
— Mww

Then the stimuli would be the thing in itself, not representation. — Xtrix

Correct. We can shorten thing-in-itself to just object or thing, without changing anything but the words.
—————-

All kinds of things are outside us, but they are not representations, they are real, physical objects of experience,
— Mww

Saying they're real physical objects and representation is the same thing. Of course they're representations. — Xtrix

No. Things outside us are real physical objects that become represented in and by the system. They cannot be representations antecedent to the system that causes them.

Now, if you wish to call representations and objects the same thing, you certainly can. But can you say how the representations are determined, if they reside outside the mind, as objects reside outside the body? If you use the Kantian system, you end up with representations of representations, which is catastrophic to the system itself.
—————

you're arguing some kind of correspondence theory of truth. Again, that's not Kant. — Xtrix

I wouldn’t know, and really don’t care. Kant is concerned with knowledge, and says very little about truth qua truth in his knowledge thesis.
—————

I say we don't perceive objects in themselves (which is obvious), then you disagree and quote Kant and the first thing he says is "objects are quite unknown to us in themselves" — Xtrix

That was supposed to show perception of objects in themselves is actually true where you say it is false, and it is actually the case that knowledge of objects in themselves that is false.

Object are quite unknown to us in themselves says exactly the same as objects in themselves are quite unknown to us.
— Mww

Sure. So you agree? — Xtrix

Of course; I wrote it. You’re talking about perception of, I’m talking about knowledge of. You’re saying it’s obvious objects-in-themselves are not perceived when they actually are. Perception, and the faculty of sensibility cannot tell the difference between a thing and a thing in itself. There is no difference in the data received from a thing and the data received from that very same thing in itself. Which is probably why we just call it an object. Reconciles the whole mess.
——————

Reducing experience to "empirical" experience is pretty limiting, and not very clear. — Xtrix

The theory is touted by its author as being “...complete and self-contained, with nothing not of account...”. Best way to do that is keep everything in a place exactly created for it, so nothing overlaps and gets in the way. Commonly called self-contradiction. Experience is called one thing, in order to prevent it from being something the conditions for that one thing, simply won’t allow. So, yes, it is limited, intentionally.
—————

The initial response was about my saying the subject/object variation I was thinking of was Kant's. — Xtrix

It is. Or, it can be. Kant goes to great length to give a dissertation on logic and how logic is the form of all a priori cognitions of pure reason. And of course, all logical propositions are constructed on the subject/object dualism. We got side-tracked by the present discussion on different topics that don’t require a subject/object dualism for understanding them, but they would come into play when discussing what the subject himself is actually doing when he thinks, without getting as far as knowledge and experience, which is what phenomena/noumena and things in themselves are all about.

I’ll love weeds. Metaphysical weeds, not common garden variety weeds.

"The concept of a noumenon, (...) as a thing in itself" (B310) — David Mo

Your (...) leaves out the most important part, that act having its own special name.

“.....giving the name of noumena to things, not considered as phenomena, but as things in themselves...” (B310, 1985)
“....the concept of noumena, not to be thought as objects of the senses, but as a thing-in-itself...” (B310, 1929)

Your comment says what a noumenon is like, the author says how it should be treated. The two iterations are very far from being consistent with each other,

Thanks, and a tip of the pointy hat in your general direction. (Grin)

Representations of our sensibility is an affect on our senses. An affect on our senses is a perception. A perception requires what we call an outward object. Outward objects are outward things. Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. Outward objects in themselves are perceived. things-in-themselves are perceived. That which is merely perceived is unknown to us. Things-in-themselves are unknown to us.
— Mww

Your argument is wrong. — David Mo

All of mine you quoted above is assembled from my quote below:

“...objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility...”
(B45)

Simple substitution, object in itself for thing in itself. It is done by the author repeatedly. Please show how my argument is wrong.

Things-in-themselves (thus outside our spatial-temporal modes of experience) — Xtrix

This is a classic misunderstanding of thing-in-itself. “In-itself” is a knowledge claim, not a claim of condition. We label objects as thing-in-themselves only to tell us we have no way to prove that what we know about objects is what they actually are. Things, without respect to whatever they are in themselves, absolutely must conform to our necessary conditions of space and time, otherwise, we would never be affected by them. Therefore, “things-in-themselves (thus outside our spatial-temporal mode of experience)”, is a false conditional. Things and things-in-themselves are equal as objects, just not as knowledgeable objects. Things as they are in themselves are still spatial-temporal things.

The second they (stimuli) hit the sense organs, they become representations to us, unless you argue that what effects us from "outside" corresponds exactly to what we sense, perceive, etc. That's fine, but it's not Kant. — Xtrix

Yes, what effects us from outside corresponds exactly to what we sense. That which effects our eyes exactly corresponds to what we see; that which effects our ears corresponds exactly to what we hear, etc. We have to have consistency between incoming data and what the cognitive system works with.

The stimuli become sensation (rods and cones, eardrum, pressure...), that which becomes an appearance (optic nerve, those little tiny bones....I forget the name, skin), from a sensation is a representation of it.
——————

So how are representations created? By the brain and nervous system on the "occasion of sense," through our cognitive faculty. — Xtrix

The brain and nervous system have nothing to do with a speculative epistemological system. Just as intuition, conceptions and representations have nothing to do with cognitive neuroscience. Two different domains of investigation. When it comes right down to life and living, all our mental mechanics are done by the brain, but that is soooooo boring for the philosopher.

As to how representations are created: “....we have not here anything to do....”. We don’t know., and it really doesn’t matter, in a purely speculative epistemological theory.
——————

Saying we can't create representations "outside of us" is not true -- there's all kinds of things outside me: trees, books, rivers, anything at all. — Xtrix

All kinds of things are outside us, but they are not representations, they are real, physical objects of experience, because they have particular names in accordance with the conceptions understood as belonging to them, thus cognized as a certain thing.
——————

Yes, we perceive objects. We don't perceive objects in themselves. — Xtrix

I just quoted Kant as saying that’s exactly what we do.
“...objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility...”
Object are quite unknown to us in themselves says exactly the same as objects in themselves are quite unknown to us.
——————-

I think this stems from the above and not using sensation and perception in the same way I am. Again, I consider them phenomena, and by phenomena I mean literally anything experienceable. — Xtrix

Fine. Go right ahead. That’s the easy way out of digging the subtleties from the theory. Literally anything experienceable is a possible experience. No merely possible experience can be a phenomenon. A merely possible experience will have a merely possible phenomenon as it condition. I can think swimming the English Channel, and it is experienceable, but the perception, the sensation and indeed the very phenomenon, are entirely absent.
——————-

I don't see how "things" and "representations" are different. — Xtrix

“....The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is called sensibility....”

This tells you representations are a consequence of objects, or, of things, and if they are a consequence, they cannot be antecedent to or simultaneous with, that which is their cause. And don’t be confused by “receiving representations” such that they appear with the object. When conditioned by “the mode in which we are affected” makes clear all representations are generated after they are perceived.
——————

So whatever affects us certainly isn't empty to us -- it's any object at all, and not just trees and books but feelings, emotions, pains, thoughts, etc. — Xtrix

Again, a common misunderstanding. Books, trees, yes. Feelings, emotions, pain, thought.....no. None of those are given representations by sensibility, even if the object which causes them, may be, thus can never be empirical cognitions. Feelings are relative subjective conditions alone, and have no object of their own. You cannot draw a feeling on a piece of paper as you can draw a tree; you can only draw that which you think is responsible for that feeling.
—————-

Imagining a pink unicorn is still an idea, yes? Imagination is an experience as well, bounded by our human limits. That's still part of phenomenology. — Xtrix

We don't care about the phenomenology. Just because Kant gave a very specific task to a relatively small part of his system doesn’t make him one. Besides, phenomena are not even used in pure reason, in which the faculty of sensibility is not in play.

Imagination is not an experience. Empirical cognition is. Imagination is at the beginning of the thought process and is below our attention, while experience is the culmination of the thought process and is quite apparent to us. While we certainly think the object of imagination, in this case the pink unicorn, such is not an experience, because it is not an empirical cognition given from an object of sense.

A pink unicorn is an idea, yes, Imagining a pink unicorn is not an idea, it is a rational activity of the thinking subject. So called because imagination is supposed to synthesize appearance with intuition, but with e.g., pink unicorns, nothing appears, which means imagination is creating a phenomenon from intuition alone without synthesizing anything, but rather, is merely combining like content. This is why we can imagine weird stuff, because understanding can find no contradictions in an object comprised of just one kind of content.

And the band played on.........

Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. What we perceive -- our representations, our sensations in time and space -- are phenomena. You grant this. — Xtrix

No, I do not grant that what we perceive are representations. Or, if I said something to that effect, then I shall go beat myself up.

One needs to keep in mind perception actually is nothing but reception of incoming empirical data. If incoming data, not in but incoming, are representations, how were they created? We can say how representations are created on the backside of sense organs, but we cannot use the equipment from the inside of us to create representation on the outside of us. Inside, everything relates to something, on the outside, what would data relate to except other data, which tells us nothing.
——————-

That which is merely perceived is unknown to us.
— Mww

You just said perception is an affect of our sensations, of our senses. Some sensations and perceptions are "unknown"? I still don't see your point I'm afraid. — Xtrix

An affect on our senses, not of. It isn’t that perceptions are unknown, as in we don’t know we have been affected. We don’t know what we’ve been affected by.

Try this: incoming data is information in certain forms of energy. The output of the sense organs is still energy, but a different form. The translation from one to the other is unknown to us, but it must have happened, because we did perceive something. What we perceived needs more equipment doing different things, just as e.g., the optic nerves are different than the rods and cones.
—————-

We don't perceive it, because we have no knowledge of it — Xtrix

Thing is...to say we have no knowledge is to say we have no experience. But we often perceive things of which we have no experience, every time we learn something new. Or just a loud bang from around the corner caused by something not known. So the lack of knowledge, or, experience, cannot be the reason we don’t perceive noumena. Either noumena just aren’t there to be perceived, or there is no such thing as noumena to be perceived.
——————

If something is perceived, it's phenomena. — Xtrix

Not yet. If something is perceived, it will be a phenomenon. It isn’t phenomenon merely by being an affect on the senses. That is sensation and tells us something has appeared to the faculty of representation.
—————-

To say the thing in itself is perceived is therefore saying it's a phenomenon or representation of some kind. It's not. — Xtrix

Correct. It’s not. See above. The thing-in-itself perceived is just another something perceived. Same-o, same-o. See waaaayyyy above: object in itself equals thing-in-itself, and we certainly perceive objects, so.......

Don’t forget. We cognize representations, not things. There’s no contradiction in allowing things-in-themselves to be the objects of perception, because they have nothing to do with the system, other than to kick-start it.
——————-

but we have no idea what that something is, and as soon as we try to attribute to it any property whatsoever we're assigning to it something spatial-temporal -- that's the whole point of bringing in the "in itself." — Xtrix

We can’t have an empty object affect us. How would we know we’d been affected? We have no knowledge of a thing as it is in itself. That doesn’t mean we don’t know anything about the thing that affected us. We are given an object, that object must have characteristics of some kind which show up in its appearance.

Then the fun begins!!!

Imagination pulls intuitions out of consciousness, throws them at the appearance, finds out what sticks. Experience helps by telling imagination it can pull a narrower range of intuitions. Whenever imagination is all happy, it gives understanding...the faculty that thinks....a phenomenon. Understanding thinks whether its conceptions match the intuitions experience says belongs to the phenomenon......

( yep....wood, paint, wheels....all cool.)

....then thinks the pure conceptions, the ones understanding possesses regardless of phenomenon, and thinks a phenomenon must have regardless of any of its empirical properties......

(Does the phenomenon have shape? Can the phenomenon be a cause or an effect? Is the phenomenon even possible? Oh oh. No, the phenomenon has been imagined as having wings. In light of the manifold of intuitions imagined, that contradicts experience, this object is not possible. Scratch the wings)

......and if the phenomenon meets the criteria, it is judged as a proper cognizable object with a name, and “soapbox racer” becomes knowledge.

So you see, we don’t bring in the “in-itself”; we only bring in the thing. The in-itself is determined by its own nature, not ours. What we don’t know, and is impossible to ever know, is whether the nature of the thing-in-itself attributes to the thing, the same properties we think the thing has.

And this says nothing about a priori cognitions. Well....lemme tell ya all about....wha? No? Too much?

What I'm failing to see is where noumena play a role if they're not representations and not the thing-in-itself. — Xtrix

“...But there is one advantage in such transcendental inquiries which can be made comprehensible to the dullest and most reluctant learner—this, namely, that the understanding which is occupied merely with empirical exercise, and does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may exercise its functions very well and very successfully, but is quite unable to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to determine, namely, the bounds that limit its employment, and to know what lies within or without its own sphere....”

Yadda yadda yadda...transcedentally generated, empirically employed, this and that....

“...But we are met at the very commencement with an ambiguity, which may easily occasion great misapprehension. The understanding, when it terms an object in a certain relation phenomenon, at the same time forms out of this relation a representation or notion of an object in itself, and hence believes that it can form also conceptions of such objects. Now as the understanding possesses no other fundamental conceptions besides the categories, it takes for granted that an object considered as a thing in itself must be capable of being thought by means of these pure conceptions, and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intelligible existence (noumenon), a something out of the sphere of our sensibility, for a determinate conception of an existence which we can cognize in some way or other by means of the understanding....”

Phenomena are the only “input” to understanding, to which are synthesized concepts and from which cognitions are the “output”. Understanding thinks....

(“...understanding cannot intuit and intuition cannot think, neither of these can be exchanged....”)

......of phenomena as an object in the same way imagination treats an appearance. Imagination synthesizes appearance with intuition to give phenomena....

(“....undetermined object of empirical intuition...”)

.......understanding says....hey I can do that. I’m just gonna synthesize phenomena, the object in a certain relation I think of as an object in itself, with conceptions and get me, not the undetermined object of empirical intuition, but rather, the undetermined conception of an intelligible existence, thereby cognizable in some way.

Whoa, hoss. Two things, yo.
1.) The only concepts understanding can use in its synthesizing are the categories, which are already claimed in the synthesis with empirical real objects, in order to get cognitions. Therefore, the categories won’t fit and the intelligible existence is illegitimate, and,
2.) You can’t go changing a phenomenon into an object in itself. You have no ground to do that, And just because you can doesn’t mean you should.

No...you whoa hoss. If I can think it, it must be conceivable.
(Yeah, conceivable, but nothing can be done with. No cognition, no experience, no knowledge....zip, nada.)
——————-

So you see, boys and girls, what happens when a big-shot faculty gets too big for his britches.

( I made all that up. Made perfect sense at the time.)

It exists. It must, or we would have no perception of it.
— Mww

Then in this sense both thing-in-itself and noumenon exists, otherwise we wouldn't say anything about either. Although to use "perception" is misleading -- we don't strictly perceive either. — Xtrix

“...objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility...”

Representations of our sensibility is an affect on our senses. An affect on our senses is a perception. A perception requires what we call an outward object. Outward objects are outward things. Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. Outward objects in themselves are perceived. things-in-themselves are perceived. That which is merely perceived is unknown to us. Things-in-themselves are unknown to us.

That which is conceived can be talked about. To be conceived does not require existence.

We perceive the thing-in itself. We don’t perceive noumena because there is nothing in the human faculty of representation that allows for it.

Kant is an indirect realist, if such be synonymous with being a representationalist. His entire academic catalog is dedicated to a representational human epistemological and moral system.

He calls himself a transcendental realist, in order to grant Hume his empiricism, but also to add the faculty of pure reason to it, as a supplementary, but no less necessary, human condition.

and the thing-in-itself is given no reality when it is actual quite real.
— Mww

"Real" in what sense exactly? — Xtrix

It exists. It must, or we would have no perception of it.

That aliens could see it differently from our perceptions? — Xtrix

Dunno. Maybe. Maybe not. depends on how alien they are.
————-

That's such a misreading of Kant. But have it your way. — Xtrix

Thanks. I think I will, doncha know.

“...as to other thinking beings, we cannot judge whether they are or are not bound by the same conditions which limit our own intuition...”

Remove intuition and there is nothing to say, yet to refer to some item, any item - be it of thought or knowledge - must necessarily mean there is an attachment to sensibility and intuition (space and time) — I like sushi

If this is true, we have no account for justice, beauty, mathematics, or anything that does not have an object strictly of its own. We think justice only by means of things being relatively just, those things being in space and time. But the thing said to be just isn’t justice itself, justice being merely a judgement.
——————

The number one is only given as a concept via sensibility — I like sushi

True enough, but we could never conceive the number one if not first having the concept of quantity. We only use numbers because, e.g, we look at our hands and see there are many little thingys sticking out of them. In the same way, we see a snowflake melt, and iff we ask....how did that happen, we’ve already presupposed there was a reason. Which gives us the principle of cause and effect a priori in understanding. Even if we don’t know why, we know there must be a why....because we watched something happen.
—————-

There is no ‘chair in and of itself’ and there is no ‘thing in and of itself’, there is phenomenon that is given through sensible experience due to limitation. — I like sushi

Do you see that you’ve named something in the former, but not in the latter? If you name a thing a chair, you’ve cognized what was once a mere thing of sense, into an object known as a specific thing. So there is a chair in and of itself, because you said so. Before you named it, before you did all the mind stuff, when it was nothing but some thing you perceived, it was merely a thing-in-itself with no name.
—————-

The relevance to the thread here is likely the miscasting of what can reasonably be called ‘outer’ that isn’t a merely anything but ‘inner’. — I like sushi

Well said.

Good post.

Yes, give up for things-in-themselves out there (waves at the world), but not for how we think about them in here (taps his forehead).
— Mww

I'm not sure what you mean. Could you say more? — frank

Oh hell, I can always say more. A-hem......

There are basketballs out there, there are no basketballs in my head. Therefore it is absolutely impossible that the basketball I know, in whatever way, shape or form I know it, can be the basketball out there.
————-

we don't represent black holes with an image of black holes. — frank

Sure we do; in no other way can we cognize them, in order to talk about them. The images are indirect representations, therefore possibly false, but images nonetheless.

The black hole part is a representation. — frank

Yes, a representation of what mathematics predicts, and cosmology has shown evidence, comprised of the extant conceptions of black, hole, and all those swirling lights and stuff. But I get your point: we do not have a representation of black holes as physical objects given from appearance directly.

For Kant, we need to give up on spacial and temporal extension for things-in-themselves. — frank

Yes, give up for things-in-themselves out there (waves at the world), but not for how we think about them in here (taps his forehead).
———————-

For Kant, these things are all representations. — frank

Yes, representations for us. Couldn’t be any representations without something to represent.
———————

I can leave Kant out of it. Everything I think will still be predicated on transcendental idealism nonetheless. With a smattering of Copenhagen and healthy contribution from relativity, of course.

When you modify "object" with "physical" aren't you talking about a thing that is known apriori to have spacial extension? — frank

Yes, as opposed to objects of reason. Objects of reason are, for example, the categories, numbers, geometric figures. Things not naturally residing in Nature but are put there as products of human reason. Existence, causality, plurality.....pure, non-empirical conceptions like that.

Within the confines of the present discussion, there is no such thing as a phenomenal physical object. A physical object is in space and time, has objective reality; a phenomenon is in a specific theoretical speculation, residing in the mind and having only objective validity. In the former, it is actual, in the latter it is merely justified.

1.) Good;
2,) Better;
3.) Hmmmm.....maybe. Not sure.

Well-thought post. Thanks.

it follows that it has to make sense to talk about what is not a phenomenon and what Kant calls the thing in-itself or 'noumena'." (My translation Spanish-English) — David Mo

This is correct. But one can see what Kant really meant to get across if we merely read it as, “...what Kant calls the thing-in-itself, or, what Kant calls the noumena...”. Then we see it does make sense to talk about either of them as distinguished from phenomena without saying they are therefore equal.

If he literally refers to a thing in itself being noumenon (on more than one occasion) I’m happy to assume he meant it.
— I like sushi

Both the quotes you provided didn't, but sure, perhaps somewhere so far unstated he did. — StreetlightX

He does put them side by side, at first glance, a confusing manner, such that it appears they are meant to be the same:

“....An undetermined perception signifies here merely something real that has been given, only, however, to thought in general—but not as a phenomenon, nor as a thing in itself (noumenon), but only as something that really exists...”

That, taken by itself, sends the pro-noumena folk into a epistemological frenzy, But the context, which is rather long and involved, puts “...thing-in-itself (noumena)...” on the equally footing of being not subjected to the categories. In effect, Kant is saying the thing-in-itself is not subjected to the categories...oh, and by the way...neither are noumena.

Again, they are not the same. Just treated by understanding the same way, meaning the categories cannot be thought as governing them as they necessarily must for all empirical cognitions, or, which is the same thing, experience.

phenomenon and thing in-itself are synonymous in Kant. They are very important concepts in a negative sense. — David Mo

You quoted me talking about noumena/thing-in-itself, but here you’re talking about phenomena and thing-in-itself.

Be that as it may, phenomena, while indeed very important, actually quite necessary, are in no way in any negative sense. Without phenomena, cognition is impossible. Without phenomena presented to understanding, there is nothing to cognize. There is no such thing as a negative phenomenon.

The thing in itself, however, is not defined by its relation to sensibility.
— StreetlightX

It is, and he says so. He must, necessarily, use sensibility to talk of any proposition. — I like sushi

Don’t know how he could say so, given it would seem pretty hard to define a thing when we know absolutely nothing about it. The thing-in-itself is not defined by its relation to sensibility because it doesn’t relate to sensibility at all. The “thing” does, the “thing-in-itself” does not.

In addition to what X said, CPR was written in response to Hume’s strict empiricism, which requires sensibility to talk about any proposition, which is the same as saying there is no such thing as a priori propositions, or that such things are silly and useless......slave of the passions and all that. Kant proved such things are indeed possible and very far from silly, thus permitting the notion that sensibility is necessarily required to talk of any proposition, to be false.

The point of using ‘thing in itself’ alongside ‘noumenon’ is to show they are one and the same. — I like sushi

No. They are used in conjunction with each other to show they should be treated the same way. Treating them the same way does not make them the same thing.

The final reduction concerning both of them, is the fact we attribute no schema whatsoever to either of them, the thing-in-itself because we don’t know what they would even be, the noumena because our rational apparatus simply won’t allow it.

Remember...all this arises from a speculative epistemological theory. The theory falsifies itself if it is claimed that phenomena perform a certain task, then noumena are incorporated, as some unknown something, to do the some unknown task. The theory destroys its own credibility.

Logically, also remember the human system, no matter what theory is used to describe it, operates on the principle of complementarity, insofar as for every up, there is a down, for every left there is a right, ad infinitum. Therefore, logically, for phenomena, it is logically possible for there to be conceived its complement. I mean, c’mon...the title of the chapter is “The Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena”, and the ground is....logic!!!

Which may be the biggest stumbling block in Kantian metaphysics: not so much what noumena are supposed to be, but why did The Esteemed Professor even put those damn things in there in the first place!?!?!? They don’t do anything, they aren’t part of anything, and most of all, in a theory concerned with knowledge.....we don’t and can’t know a damned thing about them. Personally, because Kant knew Greek philosophy quite well....all academics did in those days......and had the utmost respect for Aristotle, obvious because all three Critiques are treatises in logic, he incorporated them as sort of a nod to him, because the Greeks gave great response to the notion of them. Same with the categories.

Mww is right to distinguish between the thing in itself and noumena. — StreetlightX

The problem is that people attribute to noumena some reality it doesn’t have, and the thing-in-itself is given no reality when it is actual quite real. We call the second planet from Sol “Venus”, but the second planet from the sun is only that because we think it that way. Just because we name things in accordance to the way our own nature requires that we think about them, gives us no right whatsoever to then claim the object absolutely cannot be anything else. The thing-in-itself is nothing but the allowance for our own error in reason. It allows for the perception by rationalities other than our own, who may not cognize “Venus” such that we would even know what they’re talking about.

We know dolphins communicate with each other, but we will never know if they see via phenomena or noumena.....because we only perceive via the former and never the latter. I think it quite absurd to think dolphins will cognize “fish” as an object with fins, lays eggs, has scales. The thing-in-itself, known to us as fish, will be a thing-in-itself known to dolphins as.....something else.

Would Kant say there are two tables (one for each of us)? — frank

If there is one object affecting the sensibility of two similar rational agencies, all else being equal, each will cognize “table”, iff each have experience of tables such that their respective systems intuit, understand, and judge the object each one senses, such that each arrive at “table” without contradicting each other. So, yes, there will be two instances of “table” being cognized from one real physical object external to, and in common with, two people.

Tables are not that hard to cognize equally, but e.g., cloud shapes, a loud bang from around the corner, the meaning of the words to “Lucy In The Sky”.....not so easy. The reason the system is so complicated is to account for how it may be the case such agencies disagree on their judgements.

You really have no clue. — Xtrix

HEY!! Use your own pejorative, dammit!!!

And don’t call me a joke. You already used that one, too

No, he doesn't talk about that — Xtrix

“...Suppose now, on the other hand, that we have undertaken this criticism, and have learnt that an object may be taken in two senses, first, as a phenomenon, secondly, as a thing in itself...”

“...objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations...”

“...Now although phenomena are not things in themselves, and are nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized...”

How much more of your homework am I supposed to do? Even you should be able to deduce the thing-in-itself is eternal to us, whether or not Kant said so much in so many words.

And I congratulate you on finally getting a clue.

you still maintain that somehow he's saying the thing in itself is "external" and the noumenon "necessarily within us." That's telling. — Xtrix

Yes, it’s telling. That you don’t know he talks about the thing-in-itself in another section, describing it as the real, albeit known object of sensibility, and here, on noumena, he talks of the pure understanding cogitating noumena in the same way it cogitates the thing-in-itself. That you can’t deduce from that that one is internal (from pure understanding), the other external (from sensibility), is not my problem, is telling indeed. And that you fail to grasp they cannot be the same thing because of that alone, is just as telling.

The "thing in itself" and "noumenon" is essentially the same thing, yes. If you have evidence otherwise, I'd be glad to hear it.
— Xtrix

Which you then claim you gave, while I merely cite Wikipedia.

So the point stands: you haven't. — Xtrix

The point doesn’t stand; I specifically said I gave no quotes on the distinction. The claim I referenced has to do with the phenomena/representation distinction.

(Sigh) If I must.....this sure as hell won’t be in wiki:

“.....The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are called noumena for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its application to all that the understanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena, all is for us a mere void; that is to say, we possess an understanding whose province does problematically extend beyond this sphere, but we do not possess an intuition, indeed, not even the conception of a possible intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility could be given us, and in reference to which the understanding might be employed assertorically. The conception of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception and therefore only of negative use. But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion, but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however, being capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere....”

Cogitated as a thing-in-itself, meaning cogitate noumena the same way the thing in itself is cogitated, both solely through pure understanding, which gives us no cognitions at all.

Thing-in-itself called noumena to indicate a limit, the limit being the same for both, the limit being sensible intuitions.

Noumena is not thing-in-itself. It is merely treated like one by the understanding. Thing-in-itself is external to us, noumena are intellectual intuitions given from pure understanding, thus necessarily within us. They cannot possibly be the same thing.

The only justification for conceiving noumena is because we are not entitled to claim our form of cognition is the only kind there is.

Happy now? You told me this was all basic stuff, but you didn’t seem to understand any of it. You admit to not being a Kantian and not holding with his philosophy, which doesn’t necessarily presupposes you know it, so I guess it’s ok.

No, you haven't. If you'd like to, feel free. I won't hold my breath. — Xtrix

All my quotes are right out of CPR 1787. I use...if you MUST know....Miekeljohn online for C&P, backup by both Guyer, Cambridge 1998, and Kemp Smith, London, 1929, in print. Sometimes I will interchange the translations for clarity. And Palmquist,1993 for technical glossary with interpretive guidance.

All the evidence needed has been posted, except the distinction on noumena and phenomena. I don’t bother because the theory with which the critiques are concerned have to do with phenomena alone.

Cool. You’re back. Your self-restraint is admirable.

I see no evidence so far that I am wrong, of course — Xtrix

You use wiki, I use Kant.

‘Nuff said.

Oh. It is armchair philosophy, yes. It also correct.

The "thing-in-itself" is a crucial part of Kant's philosophy.

Thus,

And forget noumena; the notion of them is utterly irrelevant in discussions by humans about humans.
— Mww

Is a bit ridiculous. And probably the source of his confusion. — Xtrix

Hmmmm......here’s ridiculous: the claim, or even the intimation, that because noumena and the thing in itself are both unknowable to or by means of the human system, they are therefore the same thing. And the thing-in-itself is not crucial, per se, to the Kantian epistemology; it is merely given ontologically as extant, therefore inescapable and irrelevant. If it was crucial, why didn’t he talk about it, other than to say there’s nothing there to talk about? Reason has to do with what goes on in our heads, with respect to what’s outside it but not because of it.

Hell.....I can do this chit all day.
————————

Let the readers judge who’s confused. No one may comment, but if they judge by the content of the dialogue, they will certainly have the means to think it.

Find your own.

phenomena and representation are the same thing, otherwise there would be no need for the idea of the thing in itself. — Xtrix

No. Phenomena and representation are different qualifications of the same thing, that being the external object. Representations are general things known to reason a priori, phenomena are unknown particulars. Appearances and intuitions are representations of the faculty of sensibility; conceptions are the representations of the faculty of understanding. Phenomena are undetermined empirical objects of the faculty of imagination, internal to us, thus cannot be the same as the thing-in-itself, which is external to us.

And there is a need for the idea of the thing-in-itself, because our knowledge of things is predicated on their representation, or, how they appear to us, which is NOT the thing. Our method may not give a correct representation of the thing as it really is. We just don’t have any choice in the matter, so the critique is a method created to regulate reason within a certain set of criteria.

It’s all in The Book.

If they're physical objects, or anything else whatsoever, then they're representations. — Xtrix

Correct. Representations for us, re: the human cognitive system. That does not say anything whatsoever about the object itself. But they are real physical objects nonetheless.
———————

Real physical objects external to us, are experienced through our representations.
— Mww

This is not Kant at all. Nor would he ever make any such claims. — Xtrix

Apparently, it is, and, apparently, he did. Ironically enough, from the very Aesthetic you so kindly suggested.

“...For, otherwise, we should require to affirm an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd...”

“...The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation (...) That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation.... (...) It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori.... (...) By means of the external sense (a property of the mind), we represent to ourselves objects as without us, and these all in space.

I would say obvious to even the most casual observer, but apparently, it isn’t.
———————

Your Schopenhauer is pre-dated by:

“....Now, if it appears that when, on the one hand, we assume that our cognition conforms to its objects as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought without contradiction, and that when, on the other hand, we assume that our representation of things as they are given to us, does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects, as phenomena, conform to our mode of representation, the contradiction disappears: we shall then be convinced of the truth of that which we began by assuming for the sake of experiment; we may look upon it as established that the unconditioned does not lie in things as we know them, or as they are given to us, but in things as they are in themselves, beyond the range of our cognition....”
———————

this is introductory stuff. Not difficult. — Xtrix

Agreed. Makes me wonder why you’re having so much trouble with it.

In Kant, phenomena are only experienced through our representations. — Xtrix

“....We cannot think any object except by means of the categories; we cannot cognize any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding to these conceptions. Now all our intuitions are sensuous, and our cognition, in so far as the object of it is given, is empirical. But empirical cognition is experience...”

A speculative system has an sequential order for its logical constituents. If the order is wrong or misappropriated, the system is falsified. If your system says phenomena are experienced through representations, so be it. Just don’t call it the Kantian system.

Real physical objects external to us, are experienced through our representations.